Examining the Problem of Holding Artificial Intelligence (AI) Entities Accountable for Criminal Offenses

Abstract

The issue of assigning criminal responsibility in cases involving artificial intelligence entities has become increasingly intricate. This complexity arises from the multitude of stakeholders associated with these emerging criminal scenarios, including the owner, user, programmer, and even the artificial intelligence entities themselves. Furthermore, the potential involvement of third parties adds a layer of confusion and uncertainty, especially in the absence of specific legal guidelines addressing these novel criminal situations. Consequently, the challenge of determining accountability for crimes stemming from the utilization of artificial intelligence entities has come to the forefront of legal debate and scholarship.

Henceforth, divergent jurisprudential approaches have emerged in the endeavor to formulate specific principles and theories applicable to ascribing criminal culpability in cases involving artificial intelligence entities. The authors have chosen to distill these approaches into three key concepts: the accountability of the individual representatives (i.e., owner, user, or programmer), the theory of prospective liability, and the theory of direct liability for artificial intelligence entities themselves.

The paper concludes by mentioning that the concept of criminal liability has piqued the interest of jurists and criminal law specialists in their search for solutions to the challenges posed by artificial intelligence issues, and it has gained significant importance now. Many studies and research attempts were made to define the legal foundation on which this duty could be built, and the matter became a reason for the criminal legislator to intervene and control, with clear texts, liability for the usage of these entities.