Employing the Teleological-Causal Presumption between Al-Khwarizmi and Ibn Yaish’s Explanations of Al-Mufasal (even) as a Model
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59670/ml.v20iS4.3891Abstract
It is a moral presumption that includes the object for its sake, and it is called the object for it or the object for its sake, which is the present tense after (lam, ki, fa, willn, and then), and it is not an excuse for the occurrence of the matter (1), and it requires a connection between the two sides of (a cause with a cause) united by a reason for a specific purpose (2).
The object has a reason or an excuse, because it is an explanation of what came before it, of the cause. The reason for the occurrence of the action, being the motive for causing the action and the bearer of it (3), indicates that the infinitive is restricted to a special reason. So if I said: (I came to you with the hope of honoring you), then I attributed the coming to your souls, restricting it to a special cause, which is (the purpose), which is considered a direction and evidence for understanding the coming, because this is not an absolute general, but rather a cause (4).
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