

First Submitted: 25 January 2019 Accepted: 22 July 2019  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v17i1.688>

## The Securitisation - Integration Dilemma: The Case of British Muslims

Sevgi Çilingir<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

*This paper analyses the securitisation of the socio-political integration of British Muslims by mainstream British politics from 2001 to 2015. The discourse and policy of consecutive Labour and Conservative-led governments regarding integration are evaluated concerning the securitisation criteria of the Copenhagen School, as revised by the Paris School. The institutionalisation of a common discourse to legitimise policy was analysed by examining the intertextuality between political and bureaucratic discourse, and party positions while in government and opposition. The findings demonstrate that British mainstream politics has been dominated by securitisation of Muslim integration in the form of a 'politics of unease' rather than a 'politics of exception'. Muslims have been othered, first as immigrants by a 'logic of equivalence' (2001-2005) and then as integrated Muslims versus potential terrorists by a 'logic of difference' (2005-2015). Although this approach appears inclusive of Muslims, its securitisation framing inhibits the desired integration due to its othering characteristics.*

**Keywords:** securitisation; othering; immigrant integration; Britain; Muslim.

### Introduction

Muslim immigrants in Western Europe have become internal 'others' and securitised, especially since 9/11 (Bigo, 2002; Buonfino, 2004). Simultaneously, policies were developed to enhance their integration. In the context of securitisation, integration is intended to neutralise the threats that immigrants are assumed to pose (Triadafilopoulos, 2001). This creates a dilemma for policy makers since securitisation logic and integration logic are irreconcilable.

This paper examines the dilemma between securitisation and the socio-political integration of Muslims in Western Europe in the case of Britain. Britain has been a pluralistic state relatively open to immigration (Favell, 1998). Furthermore, Muslim immigration has continued for long enough to foster a sense of belonging (MCB, 2015: 22, 34). Despite a favourable historical and structural context, the assumed inadequate integration has become a security concern in relation to Muslims' involvement in northern city riots of 2001 and the threat of home-grown terrorism following the 7/7 bombings of 2005 (Cantle, 2001; DCLG, 2007: 4).

---

<sup>1</sup> Sevgi Çilingir, PhD, Dokuz Eylül University, Department of International Relations, Izmir, Turkey.  
E-mail: [sevgi.cilingir@deu.edu.tr](mailto:sevgi.cilingir@deu.edu.tr)

**Acknowledgement:** This paper is based on the author's PhD dissertation titled "The Otherization and Securitization of Muslim Immigrants, and Integration Dilemma: The Case of Britain", Dokuz Eylül University, Izmir, 2016. A previous version of this paper was presented at the ECPR General Conference, Prague, September 7-10, 2016.

The analysis is focused on the securitisation of the integration of British Muslims by mainstream political actors from the 2001 riots to the 2015 general elections.<sup>2</sup> The discursive conditions for securitisation are examined through an intertextual reading of speeches, official reports and policy papers. The policy framework is assessed with respect to the criteria for a 'politics of exception' (Copenhagen School) and a 'politics of unease' (Paris School).

The paper approaches securitisation as a process that involves othering. Muslims have been othered in British mainstream political, legal, and media discourses, as well as among the former proponents of multiculturalism – the left and academia (Modood, 1997: 3; Squire, 2005). By investigating the continuity of discourse and policy, this study provides new findings as to whether and how Muslims' othering has become dominant. More importantly, the paper aims to decipher how othering operates within a security framing of integration. The securitisation literature reveals that immigration and Muslims have been securitised in Western Europe (Waever et al., 1993; Bigo, 2002; Buonfino, 2004). Although the literature implies that integration is involved in this process (Buonfino, 2004; Waever, 2007), there is a need for a specific focus on integration, to which this paper seeks to respond.

### **Securitisation of Muslim Integration in Western Europe**

Anti-immigration sentiment is widespread in Western Europe, inducing restrictive immigration policies particularly towards immigrants whose cultural differences are prominent (Freeman 2004: 958). The state experiences a dilemma between providing equal rights to immigrants and favouring citizens (Castles & Miller, 2003: 39). When security concerns dominate the agenda, openness and rights may be renounced (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002).

States develop policies to facilitate the adaptation of immigrants to their societies, ranging from assimilationism to multiculturalism. These immigrant incorporation models are based on the prevalent version of nationalism and liberalism (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998; Castles & Miller, 2003). Integration denotes becoming part of society without losing one's core identity; both the host society and immigrants are transformed through their interactions (Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003). Despite their previous differences, Western European states have begun to converge on integrationism (Joppke & Morawska, 2002).

Immigrants mobilise as communities that coalesce around identity markers distinct from those of the host society. However, as their difference becomes more pronounced, they become discriminated against. Immigrants' politics of difference, which may be appraised as an indicator of integration, conversely leads to polarisation and conflict over collective identities, thereby precluding integration (Kymlicka, 1995; Modood, 2005: 109-110; Castles & Miller, 2003: 37-46; Young, 1990: 60).

Muslim immigrants started to become othered in Western Europe, following their identity-based mobilisation in the 1980s (Kastoryano, 2003). Anti-Muslim discourse permeated from the far right into mainstream politics due to conservatives' electoral strategies (Boswell, 2003) and Islamophobia. The claim that Islam is incompatible with liberal democratic values and the

---

<sup>2</sup> Although the composition of parliament and government changed after the 2015 elections, the Conservatives remained in the most important government positions regarding security and migration policies – the Prime Minister and Home Office Secretary – while Labour remained in opposition. The Conservative-led government strategy relating integration to counter-terrorism also remained in place (only CONTEST was renewed in 2018).



association of Muslims with violence is rooted in both secular (the Enlightenment) and religious (Judeo-Christian) aspects of collective identities in the West (Khan, 2007; Mitri, 2007).

Defined by the Copenhagen School as the construction of an issue as an existential threat towards a referent object, thereby legitimising a ‘politics of exception’ through a state of urgency (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24; Waever, 2007: 75), securitisation construes a negative meaning of security. The Copenhagen School took immigration as an example of societal security, where the referent object is the society (instead of the state), and the threat is towards its collective identity (instead of sovereignty) (Waever et al., 1993). Resting on a Schmittian conception of politics, securitisation encompasses othering by adding a threat dimension to identities that are defined as lying outside the collective (Williams, 2003: 519). This has been the case for Muslim immigrants, especially after 9/11, which hinders their social inclusion since it re-constructs the collective identity of the host society against them (Waever, 2007: 86; Bigo, 2002: 80; Buonfino, 2004: 27-28).

Othering means that ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed as homogenous groups with assigned characteristics turned into hierarchised binary oppositions (Seidman, 2013: 4-5). The other is excluded either as an inferior alien or as a foe. This conflicts with both multiculturalism (which claims that it is impossible to judge a culture with reference to another as all are inherently worthy of recognition and respect) and integrationism (which claims that it is possible for cultures to coexist and transform each other). In terms of integration policy, othering can foster either exclusionism or assimilationism. Since securitisation magnifies the threat aspect, it can be expected to result in a politics of exception.

### **Methodology**

Securitisation is contingent on certain discursive and policy characteristics. Given the focus of this paper on integration, the following discursive framework was expected to be revealed: (1) the construction of an understanding of citizenship and nationhood through othering Muslims (referent object); (2) the assertion that unless they are integrated, Muslims pose a threat to the defined collective identity (content of securitisation). Since securitisation conflicts with integration, the immigrant incorporation framework was expected to be repositioned towards assimilationism (policy dimension). The Copenhagen School is criticised for its insufficient focus on the context, process, and institutionalisation of securitisation, which may help decipher its hegemonic nature (Bigo, 2002; Balzacq, 2010; Huysmans, 2011; Guzzini, 2011). To reveal whether securitisation has become dominant, the paper assessed the continuity of discourse and policy over fourteen years.

Securitising actors are defined as those who possess the social or political capital to provide consent for the discursive framework that justifies security-related policies as a facilitating factor for successful securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998: 31, 33). To reveal the dominant political discourse that frames actual policies, the securitising actors selected for this study were the Prime Minister, Home Office Secretary, and Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Secretary due to their power to shape both discourse and policy at the intersection of security, immigration, and integration. The research period included two Labour governments followed by a Conservative-led coalition.<sup>3</sup> Public speeches from governments and shadow cabinets were collected by screening the mainstream British media, web archives of related government offices, and House of Commons

---

<sup>3</sup> All three positions were held by Conservatives in the coalition government. The Deputy Prime Minister position was held by the Liberal Democrat Party, so Clegg’s speeches were examined as well.

sittings.<sup>4</sup> Bureaucratic texts were included to reveal the institutionalisation of discourse and policy.<sup>5</sup> The texts were re-examined to decipher intertextuality (recurrent signifiers on identity, security, and integration, chains of significance, justifications, presuppositions, and omissions).

For the Copenhagen School, a successful securitising move results in legitimising a ‘politics of exception’, which dedicates the nation’s energy and resources to the securitised issue. It involves measures taken outside normal political processes, which may include suspending human rights (Buzan et al., 1998: 24, 33). The Paris School argues that securitisation may also result in a ‘politics of unease’. In this case, security grammar becomes institutionalised. Instead of a state of urgency, a state of vigilance is reproduced through routinised bureaucratic language and practice (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). This paper evaluates the policy outcomes of securitising moves with respect to both the conditions of politics of unease and politics of exception. Immigration and counter-terrorism policies are included in addition to measures specific to integration.

### **The British Context Prior to the 2001 Riots**

Since the 1960s, Britain’s immigration regime has been characterised by a ‘two-tier’ policy initiated by Labour and accepted by Conservatives. Immigration policy gradually became more restrictive, especially towards the non-white New Commonwealth. The racial discriminatory effect of immigration policy was counter-balanced by progressive anti-discrimination legislation<sup>6</sup> and respect for the cultural difference of those who had already settled. In a society experiencing frequent race riots, governments argued that maintaining ‘good race relations’ depended on minimising the number of newcomers (Joppke, 1999: 102-103; Favell, 1998: 110-113). Because of this policy linkage and its underlying assumptions, the immigrant incorporation framework was more conservative than it seemed, oriented towards public order (Favell, 1998: 117-201).

British citizenship has been characterized as ‘liberal but thin’, enabling most Muslim immigrants to become citizens (Hansen, 2003). The immigrant incorporation model was shaped by a pluralist tradition close to multiculturalism (Favell, 1998; Koopmans et al., 2005: 235). However, this framework did not provide the same rights and advantages for Muslims as other ethnic and/or religious groups<sup>7</sup> (Grillo, 2009: 52). Neither was it embraced by Conservative governments or Labour voters (Favell, 1998: 104-106). During the 1980s, when Muslims started to mobilise around religion, their demands regarding education (Honeyford Affair) and protection against expressions insulting their religion (Rushdie Affair) were not accepted as demands for parity with other communities. These demands and protests against Britain’s foreign policy towards the Islamic world (beginning with the Gulf War and Bosnian crisis) were received with suspicion and led to the questioning of multiculturalism itself. British Muslims started to become internal others, situated

---

<sup>4</sup> The texts were scanned for keywords, such as “migration”, “citizenship”, “asylum”, “integration”, “cohesion”, “extremism”, “terrorism”, and “British”. In addition to the actors’ press releases, 10 House of Commons sittings were found to be relevant before 7/7. Between 7/7 and the 2015 general elections, there were 30 sittings on security and/or counter-terrorism, eight on counter-radicalization and/or terrorism prevention, 14 on asylum, immigration and citizenship, and three on identity cards.

<sup>5</sup> For the bureaucratic discourse, reports and policy papers on security, immigration and integration published in relation to the public speeches of politicians were examined. The selection was facilitated by the existing academic literature and cross-references within the texts. A comparative reading of texts chosen for their depth or comprehensiveness was preferred over content analysis of systematically collected data.

<sup>6</sup> Known as the ‘race relations’ framework, British anti-discrimination legislation was based on the Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, 1976, Amendment Act of 2000) until the Human Rights Act (1998). Amendments increased the scope to include indirect and institutional racism and set up a monitoring mechanism.

<sup>7</sup> Case law extended anti-discrimination legislation to include ethnicity and religion (indirectly through ethnicity) (Solomos, 2003: 80-92). Religion was only directly included in the legislation much later with the Equality Act (2010).



against liberal democratic values and associated with violence, while their national belonging and loyalties were doubted (Modood, 2003; Grillo, 2009). This othering took on security characteristics in 2001.

### **Integration for Public Order: the 2001 Riots in Britain**

The association of British Muslims with violence remained hypothetical before 2001. Since the late 1950s, Britain had experienced ‘race riots’ in inner-city areas where immigrant communities were concentrated. Constructing a potentially violent racial other, leading to a restrictive immigration policy and, conversely, the development of anti-discrimination law, these riots typically involved blacks (Solomos, 2003: 55-62, 143-168). Six months prior to 9/11, the northern cities of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford experienced widespread riots. This time Muslims were the main actors besides whites.<sup>8</sup>

According to official reports,<sup>9</sup> the riots started as protests against extreme right-wing groups before turning into clashes between white and Asian<sup>10</sup> youth, clashes with the police, and damage to property. Although the role of racist provocation was acknowledged, non-white communities were held responsible as well. Three structural reasons were given for the riots: deprivation, racism, and segregation of communities. The Cantle Report, which the government relied on for later policy, prioritised tackling segregation, expressed as ‘parallel lives’:

“Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges” (Cantle, 2001: 9).

In this narrative, the riots were linked to ignorance and the resulting fear and animosity between communities. Ensuring public order depended on a new policy approach to integration, named ‘community cohesion’. It rested on the concept of ‘active citizenship’, proposed by Home Secretary David Blunkett as a cure for the ‘traditional weakness of political citizenship’ (Blunkett, 2001). British citizenship was constructed as multicultural yet united around the nodal point of ‘shared values’ (Cantle, 2001: 18-19). It was assigned a symbolic quality to create belonging, through increased participation and engagement starting at the local level (Blunkett, 2002). The framework and terminology of the Cantle Report (2001) were adopted by Labour political actors and policy documents, with the Conservatives’ support.

At first glance, the discourse on collective identity and integration did not exclude Muslims. However, a closer look at its presuppositions, preferences, and emphases suggest prejudice, if not othering. The political and bureaucratic discourse constructed Muslims through a ‘logic of equivalence’ that homogenised the ‘other’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000: 10-11). It emphasised the culturally different character of immigrant communities. Instead of protection from racism, Muslims were expected to initiate interactions with the white community to overcome their ignorance. Politicians’ discourses (Blunkett, 2001, 2002; Hansard, 2002a, 2002b), riot reports

<sup>8</sup> The 1995 Bradford riot involved Asians/Muslims as well, but the events were not as wide-spread.

<sup>9</sup> Published in December 2001, the Cantle and Denham reports were national reports initiated by the government. The Clarke (Burnley) and Ritchie (Oldham) Reports were prepared by local Labour authorities. The Ouseley Report (Bradford) was published in July, but included the 1995 riot.

<sup>10</sup> In line with the race relations terminology of the time, ethnicity and culture were the preferred signifiers over religion, even though the community in question was predominantly Muslim, with origins from the Indian subcontinent.

(Cantle, 2001; Denham, 2001), and policy papers (Home Office, 2002, 2005) emphasised three signifiers within the chain of significance around the nodal point of ‘shared values’ defining Britishness:

- *Duties, allegiance, and belonging to Britain:* Allegiance to one’s country of origin is acceptable, so long as Britain comes first. This should be demonstrated by performing citizenship duties.
- *Proficiency in English:* English signifies belonging to Britain, as well as facilitating socio-economic integration. The language of the country of origin can be learned and used provided it is not prioritised over English.
- *Respect for the equal status of women:* There are those whose belief or the culture of their country of origin precludes respect for the equal status of women and their rights. This violates citizenship values. Women’s participation should be encouraged.

These were not pronounced for the white British, whose commitment to these values was not questioned. Rather, Muslims were openly criticised for uniculturalism while tacitly criticised for their religious culture. Blunkett’s speech interpreting 9/11 as an attack on societal values and modernity itself illustrates how Muslim immigrants’ identity was considered unmodern, irrespective of what Islam is:

“People who talk about a clash of civilizations also imply the West has a moral superiority over Islamic culture. This is scarcely credible ... This is not to say ... that there isn’t a continuing tension between modernity and the cultural practices of some of those entering highly advanced countries ... They are making a journey in the space of a few weeks or months, which it has taken us hundreds of years to make ... now rejected [norms in Britain], remain acceptable from particular cultures of varying religions” (Blunkett, 2002).

Immigration policy changed dramatically, becoming more restrictive. One reason was national security. The state of emergency following 9/11 led to a spillover of anti-terrorism legislation into immigration law. Although legislated through ‘normal’ political processes, anti-terrorism measures gave the executive extraordinary powers, indicating a politics of exception, especially between 2001 and 2004 (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008). Another reason was the perceived cost to the economy and public order. Expressed as ‘managed migration’,<sup>11</sup> restrictions were defended with the argument that Britain would accept only those with the capacity to benefit the British economy and integrate into British society. Formerly a matter considered after immigration took place, integration turned into a precondition for refugee status, economic migration, permanent settlement, and naturalisation. Indicators of integration were language, values, and belonging. Higher levels of proficiency in English were expected. The ‘Life in the UK’ test was introduced to examine knowledge of British history, politics, values, and social norms.<sup>12</sup> A citizenship ceremony was initiated with a revised citizenship oath (Home Office, 2002, 2005). Legislated as a bipartisan policy

---

<sup>11</sup> The concept did not exist in the Blair government’s 1998 white paper on immigration and asylum.

<sup>12</sup> The test covered appropriate behaviour in various social situations, including those in pubs.



with the consent of the Conservative opposition,<sup>13</sup> this new framework indicated a politics of unease.

Integration policy changed as well. Informed by the reports, the government set out to foster community cohesion based on a thicker notion of citizenship, demonstrating a retreat from the previous framework closer to multiculturalism (McGhee, 2006; Kundnani, 2007). Good community relations took priority over anti-discrimination and public support of minority religious and cultural institutions. At the local level, cohesion criteria were introduced to public projects, making single community support the exception rather than the rule.<sup>14</sup> Although measures to promote integration to a pluralist conception of collective identity cannot be defined as politics of exception, they were exceptional in the British context, where non-intervention and support for cultural/religious communities had historically been the rule – as opposed to the civic-republican/assimilationist<sup>15</sup> model. Muslims' relative disadvantage in enjoying such protection and support after the 2001 riots reveals a politics of unease.

One of the most interesting findings of this study is that although it was Labour that had initiated and developed an inclusive immigrant incorporation regime for Britain (Solomos, 2003), it was Labour governments rather than the right that articulated a 'tougher' stance on immigration and integration. For example, BNP leader Griffin remarked that he could use Blunkett's call for immigrants to embrace British norms and values as propaganda material in his own campaign (BBC News, 2001).<sup>16</sup> Although it is evident that the centre right had embraced a more restrictive attitude towards immigration and cultural plurality to contain the rise of the far right (Boswell, 2003), it is quite unexpected in the case of the centre left.<sup>17</sup>

### **Integration for National Security: the 7/7 London Terror Attacks**

The 2005 London terror attacks marked a watershed moment in British integration policy regarding Muslims. The threat of home-grown terrorism turned attention towards British Muslims as a source of violence, but this time as potential terrorists. The securitising move made by Blair, who considered radical Islamist terrorism as an attack on British values and way of life, linked Muslims' socio-political integration to fighting terrorism:

“We know that this fringe of extremism does not truly represent Islam. We know British Muslims, in general, abhor the actions of the extremists ... But coming to Britain is not a right ... staying here carries with it a duty ... to share and support the values that sustain

<sup>13</sup> This was a continuation of the former two-tier approach of Labour and Conservatives to immigration and integration, although the contents of integration had changed (see Hansard, 2002b, 2004). The two-tier structure was maintained after 7/7 as well.

<sup>14</sup> The Cantle Report was critical of anti-discriminatory treatment and support of Muslims as a group since it aggravated the contempt of deprived white communities in riot regions (Cantle, 2001: 25-28, 38).

<sup>15</sup> In this model, illustrated by France, immigrants are expected to assimilate to civic values of citizenship as individuals rather than as communities (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003: 15).

<sup>16</sup> In fact, Blunkett justified the introduction of integration criteria and restrictive measures to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) with the assertion of not playing into the hands of the National Front and BNP (Hansard, 2002a: c. 1031).

<sup>17</sup> It should be noted that this stance was confined to the Labour cabinet. When Blunkett used the term 'swamped' in a context regarding Muslim immigrants – a heavily loaded term since Thatcher's use in a speech defending the restriction of New Commonwealth immigration on the grounds that cultural difference would harm race relations (Thatcher, 1978), he was criticised by Labour parliamentarians themselves, pressuring the government to clarify and apologise (Hansard, 2002b: c.376).

the British way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people have no place here” (Blair, 2005).<sup>18</sup>

Declaring ‘ideological war’, the Blair government initiated its Prevent strategy as part of its counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, made up of four components: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare (HM Government, 2006). Prevent rested on the argument that to prevent further attacks, the ideological and socio-political appeal of radical Islamist terrorism for the British Muslim community should be combated with their cooperation. The first Prevent framework was published in 2007 with the slogan ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ (DCLG, 2007). Renewed by the Brown government (HM Government, 2008a, 2008b), the strategy was revised and maintained by the Conservative-led coalition (HM Government, 2011).

The bureaucratic discourse of CONTEST and Prevent documents and the related political discourse constructed a potential radical Islamist/terrorist<sup>19</sup> against a liberal-democratic and pluralistic British citizenship identity referred to as ‘shared values’, similar to the discourse following the 2001 riots. Shared values were listed as the rule of law, freedom of expression, equal opportunity, responsibility, and respect towards other cultures/religions, democracy, human rights, and gender equality, in almost the same order and terminology by the Blair, Brown, and Cameron governments (DCLG, 2007: 5; HM Government, 2008b: 60; 2011: 5, 13, 34, 44, 53, 58, 68, 71). The main difference in the construction of Britishness was the de-emphasising difference, the multicultural aspect of citizenship, by focusing on what was regarded as common between British society and the Muslim community.

Three methods were adopted for overcoming radical Islamist/terrorists and their ideology: ideological struggle, strengthening the mainstream Muslim community, and individual intervention. The ideological struggle involved refuting radical Islamists’ arguments about Islam and the West. Like Blair’s comments above, governments acknowledged that Islam itself was neither irreconcilable with Britishness nor condoning of violence. The problem was the ideology of terrorist groups who abused religious sentiments. Cognisant of the inappropriateness and contradiction of defining Islam themselves, governments declared support for Muslim scholars and ideologues to defend ‘real Islam’. The second method was disseminating a counter-narrative to violent extremists’ arguments by strengthening knowledge and acceptance of citizenship values. In line with the argument that the majority of Britain’s Muslims were from the religious and ideological mainstream, governments supported organisations and individuals to promote community cohesion (Labour governments) and to prevent the spread of extremist propaganda and recruitment (all governments). The third method was the detection of ‘vulnerable individuals’ – marginalised, alienated youth – at risk of recruitment by terrorists,<sup>20</sup> and early intervention<sup>21</sup> (DCLG, 2007; HM Government, 2008a, 2008b, 2011).

All methods included elements of community cohesion based on active citizenship. The discourse around Prevent presented integration as the main problem and solution for security, much like during the period following the 2001 riots. Whereas the definition of collective identity and

---

<sup>18</sup> In this speech, the integration criteria for naturalisation, which entered in force prior to the attacks, were mentioned among the list of security measures.

<sup>19</sup> The Blair, Brown, and Cameron governments disagreed on terminology. The Blair government juxtaposed Islamist extremism with terrorism, the Brown government specified the threat as ‘violent extremism’, whereas the Cameron Government preferred the term ‘supporting terrorism’. However, the linking of Islamist extremism and terrorism was maintained.

<sup>20</sup> The Muslim community was held responsible for this detection as well as field workers engaged with disadvantaged youth.

<sup>21</sup> Intervention methods were mentoring, facilitating education and employment, and providing psychological support.





integration remained the same except for de-emphasising plurality, the post-7/7 discourse differed in the construction of the Muslim as a potential other. Muslims were referred to as citizens, although their integration was still considered problematic. Muslim identity was constructed through a ‘logic of difference’ that takes into account the heterogeneity of the othered group (see Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000: 10-11). The mainstream Muslim community was identified as belonging to Britain and upholding its values whereas the Muslim ‘other’ was described as deviating from true Islam in opposition to both British identity and the identity of the integrated majority of Muslims. The discursive and policy framework of Prevent was maintained by both Labour and Conservatives during their terms of government and opposition. The Conservative-led coalition criticised Labour governments for cost-effectiveness, observance of cohesion criteria by the Muslim community organisations funded through Prevent, and reducing Muslims’ integration problems to counter-terrorism. However, the consistency of these arguments is doubtful. Although the Conservatives declared that they would separate integration policy from Prevent (HM Government, 2011: 24-25), the link was maintained in the coalition’s Prevent and integration policy documents (HM Government, 2011: 13; DCLG, 2012: 4-5).

The policy trend on immigration and integration established by the Blair government in 2001 continued in this period. Governments introduced further restrictions on immigration based on economic and security concerns. They raised the criteria for integration – higher scores for English language proficiency and a revised Life in the UK test – for all immigrants.<sup>22</sup> Counter-terrorism measures continued to empower the executive over the judiciary, and enable inhibition of freedom of speech and violation of human rights of both immigrants and citizens (Epifanio, 2011),<sup>23</sup> thereby exhibiting elements of a politics of exception.<sup>24</sup> The Cameron government established a further link between Muslim integration and counter-terrorism by inserting Prevent into the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015), which gave the policy statutory status (Part 5).<sup>25</sup> The use of executive powers are conditioned upon respect for civil liberties and democratic control. However, Muslims’ integration is subjected under constant surveillance. Therefore, the act can be regarded as a means for a politics of unease rather than exception.

As in the former period, integration measures indicated a politics of unease towards British Muslims as a potential threat until they demonstrated otherwise. This became more apparent with the Prevent strategy, which linked integration to national security directly during Labour governments and indirectly during the Cameron government. Much of the financial support for projects related to Muslim identity and integration implemented under Prevent meant that the security bureaucracy gained power over integration – normally the responsibility of DCLG. Thus, Muslim community organisations in need of government support had to prove that they were integrated and would work towards strengthening integration. They faced unprecedented scrutiny,

---

<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, the Brown government introduced a points-based system of ‘earned citizenship’, in which applicants for permanent settlement and citizenship would gain points through their activities, such as volunteering, as proof of integration (Kostakopoulou, 2010: 834-835). The system was abandoned by the Cameron government.

<sup>23</sup> The most controversial of these measures were ‘stop and search’ and control orders (changed into TPIMS by the Cameron government).

<sup>24</sup> The Cameron government eased the severity of some of these measures for citizens, although they were still in effect for immigrants.

<sup>25</sup> The act renders a general duty of terrorism prevention on various specified authorities, empowers the Secretary of State to issue guidance and directions, and monitor further and higher education bodies (Chapter 1, Art. 26-35). It requires local authorities to set up panels that include the police force to detect and deal with vulnerable individuals (Chapter 2, Art. 36-41).

especially during the Brown government, which was criticised for confusing Pursue<sup>26</sup> with Prevent (e.g. Johnson, 2010).<sup>27</sup>

### Conclusion

The findings demonstrate that the socio-political integration of British Muslims has been securitised by mainstream political and bureaucratic discourse since 2001. Their alleged lack of integration was presented as a matter of societal security with the referent object of collective identity. British values and way of life were claimed to be under threat. This threat was also constructed against public order (the 2001 riots) and national security (7/7). By linking integration to more classical security fields, these securitising moves facilitated a sense of priority, making it relatively straightforward to institutionalise securitisation.

The collective identity constructed through securitisation was not ethnic but civic, defined by citizenship values of a liberal-democratic, pluralistic polity. Muslims were included as long as they embraced these values and put these into action. However, the inclusiveness of the discourse was clouded by being situated within a security context. As a two-way process, integration has to be volunteered for. However, it is difficult to imagine the Muslim community being eager to demonstrate their belonging, given their stigmatisation as outsiders over three generations of settlement and assumptions that elements of their religious culture are incompatible with Britishness.

Britain's current system makes integration a precondition for acceptance within actual and symbolic borders. This reflects a bias towards Muslims since these changes were made after the 2001 riots and 9/11, which made Muslims the focus of the immigration and integration agenda. The changes in integration policy – a retreat from multiculturalism, the introduction of cohesion criteria for public funding, and close scrutiny of community organisations – and the linking of integration to counter-terrorism policy reflects a politics of unease. This characterises Muslims as a potentially violent other who has to be constantly monitored and, if necessary, intervened against.

The institutionalisation of the state of vigilance towards Muslims creates a dilemma regarding governments' assertions of promoting integration. For developing community relations and a sense of belonging, the state has to be open to dialogue that empowers British Muslims as an equal party. Improvements have been made since the 2001 riots and 7/7. Advisory bodies and forums for dialogue were established to develop inter-community relations and the relationship between the government and the Muslim community. Nonetheless, the British state ultimately decides on strategies and policies. Taking account of Muslims' concerns is optional.<sup>28</sup>

Resting on the reasoning that securitisation of integration conflicts with integration due to its othering characteristics, this paper determined how British Muslims' integration has been securitised by the political mainstream, and whether this has been sufficiently institutionalised to

---

<sup>26</sup> Like Prevent, Pursue aims at stopping terror attacks before they happen. Whereas Prevent targets individuals and communities vulnerable to the terrorists' ideology and promotes a counter-narrative, Pursue targets suspects using the law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

<sup>27</sup> The Cameron government continued this approach despite its criticism of the Brown government (The Guardian, 2011).

<sup>28</sup> For example, during the establishment of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Labour's DCLG Secretary stated that foreign policy was "not a 'root cause' of extremism and could not be tailored for any one section of the community" (BBC News, 2006). The Brown and Cameron governments suspended relations with the Muslim Council of Britain, the most representative umbrella organisation for British Muslims in terms of the number of affiliate organisations.



constitute a dominant discursive and policy framework. Consequently, the responses of the Muslim community<sup>29</sup> and the effects of securitisation on their actual integration<sup>30</sup> were excluded, which merit further research.

## References

- “Blair backs Blunkett on race”. (2001, December 10) BBC News. Retrieved from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/1700370.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1700370.stm)
- “UK 'must tackle ethnic tensions'”. (2006, August 24). BBC News. Retrieved from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/politics/5280230.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5280230.stm)
- “Universities 'complacent' over Islamic extremism, warns Theresa May”. (2011, June 6). The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jun/06/universities-attacked-over-islamic-extremism>
- Ahmed, S. (2018, November 17). “British Muslims perceptions of social cohesion: From multiculturalism to community cohesion and the 'war on terror'”. *Crime, Law and Social Change* (pp.1-15). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-018-9804-9>
- Balzacq, T. (2010). “Constructivism and securitization studies”. In: M.D. Cavelty and V. Mauer (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* (pp.56-72), New York: Routledge.
- Bigo, D. (2002). “Security and immigration: towards a critique of the governmentality of unease”. *Alternatives*, 27: 63-92. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S105>
- Blair, T. (2005, August 5). “PM's press conference”. The National Archives. Retrieved from <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040105034004/http://number10.gov.uk/page8041>
- Blunkett, D. (2001, December 14). “It's not about cricket tests”. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/14/race.uk>
- Blunkett, D. (2002, September 15). “What does citizenship mean today?”. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/15/race.thinktanks> <https://doi.org/10.1088/2058-7058/15/7/22>
- Boswell, C. (2003). *European Migration Policies in flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*. London: Blackwell Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470752845>
- Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. London: Harvard University Press.
- Buonfino, A. (2004). “Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of immigration in Europe”. *New Political Science*, 26(1): 23-49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0739314042000185111>
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Cantle, T. (2001). *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*. London: HMSO.
- Castles, S. & Miller, M. J. (2003). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Ceyhan, A. & Tsoukala, A. (2002). “The securitisation of migration in western societies: ambivalent discourses and policies”. *Alternatives*, 27: 21-39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754020270S103>
- DCLG (2007). *Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government Publications.
- DCLG (2012). *Creating the Conditions for Integration*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government Publications.
- Denham, J. (2001). *Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion*. London: HMSO.
- Entzinger, H. & Biezeveld, R. (2003). *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration*. Rotterdam: European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations. Retrieved from [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/legal-migration/pdf/general/benchmarking\\_final\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/legal-migration/pdf/general/benchmarking_final_en.pdf)
- Epifanio, M. (2011). “Legislative response to international terrorism”. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(3): 399-411. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311399130>
- Favell, A. (1998). *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. London: Macmillan.
- Freeman, G.P. (2004). “Immigrant incorporation in western democracies”. *International Migration Review*, 38(3): 945-969. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00225.x>

<sup>29</sup> Kastoryano's (2002) comparative study of the conflict over identity between Muslim communities and states in Western Europe is a helpful example.


<sup>30</sup> Ahmed's (2018) fieldwork on British Muslims' perceptions of cohesion policy, and the 'war on terror' and its impact on integration is illustrative.

## 176 *The Securitisation - Integration Dilemma: The Case of British Muslims*

- Grillo, R. (2009). "British and others: from 'race' to 'faith'". In S. Vertovec, & S. Wessendorf (eds.) *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices* (pp. 50-71), London: Routledge.
- Guzzini, S. (2011). "Securitisation as a causal mechanism". *Security Dialogue*, 42(4-5): 329-341. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611419000>
- Hansard (2002a, February 7). "Nationality, immigration and asylum". HC Deb Vol. 379, cc.1028-1041.
- Hansard (2002b, April 24). "Nationality, immigration and asylum bill". HC Deb Vol. 384, cc.341-432.
- Hansard (2004, July 22). "Managed migration review". HC Deb Vol. 424, c.65WS.
- Hansen, R. (2003). "Citizenship and integration in Europe". In: C. Joppke & E. Morawska (eds.) *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation States* (pp. 87-109), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- HM Government (2006). *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy*. CM 6888. London: HMSO.
- HM Government (2008a). *Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery*. Ref: 288113. London: HMSO.
- HM Government (2008b). *The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England- Stopping People Becoming or Supporting Terrorists and Violent Extremists*. Ref: 288324. London: HMSO.
- HM Government (2011). *Prevent Strategy*. CM 8092. London: HMSO.
- Home Office (2002). *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*. CM 5387. London: HMSO.
- Home Office (2005). *Controlling Our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain: Five Year Strategy for Asylum and Immigration*. CM 6472. London: HMSO.
- Howarth, D. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000). "Introducing discourse theory and political analysis". In: D. Howarth, A. J. Norval & Y. Stavrakakis (eds.) *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (pp. 1-23), Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Huysmans, J. & Buonfino, A. (2008). "Politics of exception and unease: immigration, asylum and terrorism in parliamentary debates in the UK". *Political Studies*, 56(4): 766-788. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x>
- Huysmans, J. (2011). "What is an act? on security speech acts and little security nothings". *Security Dialogue*, 42(4-5): 371-383. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418713>
- Johnson, A. (2010, January 5). "Home secretary's statement on the attempted terrorist attack on the US and the implications for aviation and border security". The National Archives. Retrieved from <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100408115145/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/alan-johnson-terrorist-attack.html>
- Joppke, C. & Morawska, E. (2002). "Integrating immigrants in liberal nation - states: policies and practices". In: C. Joppke & E. Morawska (eds.) *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation States* (pp. 1-36), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230554795\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230554795_1)
- Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the Nation-state: The United States, Germany and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198295405.001.0001>
- Kastoryano, R. (2002). *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kastoryano, R. (2003). "Transnational networks and political participation: the place of immigrants in the European Union". In: M. Berezin & M. Schain (eds.) *Europe Without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age* (pp. 64-89), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Khan, M. A. M. (2007). "Islam and the new Europe: the remaking of a civilisation". *Global Dialogue*, 9(3-4): 19-32.
- Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. & Passy, F. (eds.) (2005). *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Kostakopoulou, D. (2010). "Matters of control: integration tests, naturalisation reform and probationary citizenship in the United Kingdom". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5): 829-846. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691831003764367>
- Kundnani, A. (2007). "Integrationism: the politics of anti-Muslim racism". *Race and Class*, 48(4): 24-44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396807077069>
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McGhee, D. (2006). "Getting 'host' communities on board: finding the balance between 'managed migration' and 'managed settlement' in community cohesion strategies". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32(1): 111-127. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830500335341>
- Mitri, T. (2007). "Christians and Muslims: memory, amity and enmities". In: A. al-Azmeh & E. Fokas (eds.) *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence* (pp. 16-33), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809309.003>



- Modood, T. (1997). "Introduction". In: T. Modood & P. Werbner (eds.) *The Politics of multiculturalism in the new Europe* (pp. 1-15), London: Zed Books.
- Modood, T. (2003). "Muslims and the politics of difference". *The Political Quarterly*, 74(supp. 1): 37-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2003.00584.x>
- Modood, T. (2005). *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Seidman, S. (2013). "Defilement and disgust: theorizing the other". *American Journal of Cultural Sociology*, 1(1): 3-25. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ajcs.2012.3>
- Solomos, J. (2003). *Race and Racism in Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-4065-0>
- Squire, V. (2005). "Integration with diversity in modern Britain': New Labour on nationality, immigration and asylum". *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 10(1): 51-74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931052000310245>
- Thatcher, M. (1978, January 27). "TV interview for Granada world in action". Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Retrieved from <http://www.margareththatcher.org/document/103485>
- The Muslim Council of Britain (2015). *British Muslims in Numbers: A Demographic, Socio-economic and Health Profile of Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census*. Retrieved from [http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport\\_2015.pdf](http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf)
- Triadafilopoulos, T. (2001). "Illiberal means to liberal ends? Understanding recent immigrant integration policies in Europe". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 37(6): 861-880. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.576189>
- Waever, O. (2007). "Securitisation and desecuritisation". In: B. Buzan & L. Hansen (eds.), *International Security Volume III: Widening Security* (pp. 66-98), London: Sage Publications.
- Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M. & Lamaitre, P. (eds.) (1993). *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Williams, M. C. (2003). "Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics". *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4): 511-531. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x>
- Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



Please visit  
[www.tplondon.com](http://www.tplondon.com)  
*...fostering research, widening reach...*

