Iraq's Relations with Neighboring Arab and Regional Countries After 2003 and Their impact on The Iraqi Internal Situation

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Abstract

Iraqi relations with neighboring Arab and regional countries have gone through many crises as a result of historical and political circumstances and disputes, some of which led to the outbreak of wars that destroyed and exhausted both parties, including the "Iran-Iraq War" 1980-1988 AD, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (the Second Gulf War) 1990 AD, some of which were due to disagreements over some transgressions, as happens with Turkey in the disputes over water sources and its disputes with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which renew from time to time. The impact of these events and disputes continued after 2003 AD after the fall of the Baath regime, which caused these problems for Iraq with other countries, and their effects led to the exploitation of What is happening to Iraq is an exceptional circumstance in which it requires concerted international efforts to build a strong institutional state. Terrorists entered Iraq across the borders of some countries, carried out acts of violence, and cooperated with terrorist groups and Al-Qaeda leaders, which took Iraq as their base after the American occupation of Iraq to carry out their terrorist attacks under the pretext of jihad to expel Foreign forces from Iraq, all of this led to the deterioration of these relations and the difficulty of their return and continuation of a single pace of stability in a way that benefits all parties, despite the periods of détente in Iraqi relations with neighboring countries, the exchange of some visits by officials and presidents, and the exchange of economic and commercial benefits that occurred with neighboring Arab and regional countries.

Keywords: *Iraqi relations, Kurdistan Workers, borders.*

Introduction

The changes that occurred in the internal situation in Iraq had direct repercussions on Iraq's external relations with neighboring Arab and regional countries, some of which were due to the fear of some governments that the regime change in Iraq by the United States of America might be the beginning of endless changes in the existing regimes in the Middle East region. There were different reactions and confused relations with this change, and there were direct and indirect interventions in the internal Iraqi situation, despite some attempts at rapprochement between Iraq and neighboring countries, the most prominent of which was the signing of many contracts in the field of economic and commercial cooperation to develop the infrastructure in Iraq after the April 2003 war, with Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. If these relations were exploited and developed on the political side as well, they would have played a major role in stabilizing the Iraqi internal situation, because Iraq is going through an exceptional situation in which it needs the concerted efforts of all internal and external efforts to return it to its true historical and

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political position in the Arab world. The research touched upon Iraq's relations with influential Arab countries within Iraq, it included Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and highlighted the effects of unstable relations with these countries on the deterioration of the political and security situation directly. The research also touched upon Iraq's relationship with the regional neighboring countries represented by Turkey and Iran.

Iraq's Relations with Neighboring Arab and Regional Countries After 2003

The great change that took place in the regime of government in Iraq after the ninth of April 2003 AD did not only change the internal situation in Iraq and was not limited to overturning the political equation at home, but it went beyond that to change many of the features of politics in the region and change the regional balance in an unnatural way. The changes extended to include international relations in the region in general, and Iraq's international relations specifically, especially Iraq's relations with neighboring countries [i].

There is no doubt that the American occupation of Iraq carried within it goals that went beyond the borders of Iraq to include the borders of the region with all its countries. This is what the countries of the region that are geographically neighboring to Iraq realized, as this prompted them to intervene in Iraqi affairs, taking advantage of the state of chaos that occurred in order to achieve their goals. Therefore, regional interventions were formed a factor of confusion for the Iraqi situation in various fields, especially in the field of Iraqi national security [ii].

As for the Arab countries, especially those neighboring Iraq, they had almost obvious concerns after the change of the previous Iraqi regime at the hands of American forces, as the new regime produced many variables that these countries consider to directly or indirectly affect their political situation, the most prominent of which are:

1-   The Arab countries' fear of transferring the experience carried out by the United States of America in Iraq.
2-   The arrival of a government with a Shiite majority that may in the future emulate the regime of the Islamic Republic in Iran, in addition to its fear of the expansion of the influence of the Islamic Republic in the region [iii].

The political violence operations in Iraq were linked logistically to neighboring geographical countries, and this situation helped facilitate the provision of aid and assistance to forces opposed to the political regime, and facilitated infiltration operations to carry out acts of sabotage and destructive activities. Regional intervention varies in terms of goals and form, the most dangerous of which is intelligence intervention by infiltrating the Iraqi state apparatus, especially the security apparatus, and controlling the decision-making process within the political and military establishment in a way that serves the interests of its countries. What deepens the interference of regional and international powers in Iraqi affairs is the presence of differing sectarian agendas for the Iraqi political forces, which prompts them to exploit this political conflict for the purpose of weakening The political forces that did not want to dominate the Iraqi arena, which made the future of Iraq face a real threat from regional countries [iv].

The most prominent of these countries that had a wide influence inside Iraq after 2003 are the neighboring Arab and regional countries, including:

1-Iraqi Relations with Neighboring Gulf Countries Kuwait and Saudi Arabia:

Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations went through two historical turning points that determined the strategic and foreign political paths for both parties. The first turning point was the "Iraq-Kuwait War" in 1990, which ended with Security Council Resolution (660), which was translated by the United States of America by leading a military coalition against Iraq on (December 17, 1990). These events determined the nature of the continuing tension in the

relationship between the two countries until the second turning point, which was represented by Kuwait's support for the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 by allowing it to use its lands[v] . The Kuwaiti regime contributed with all its political and financial powers to pushing the United States to wage war again against Iraq and occupy it. The Kuwaiti regime's participation went beyond financing the costs of the war in billions of dollars to compensating the families of dead American soldiers with generous sums. This contribution went beyond setting up airports and providing logistical facilities for the invading forces until the land of Kuwait became a focal point for the gathering of these forces and their departure towards Iraq [vi].This was followed by positions and problems with governments during the transitional period, despite Kuwait's attempts to resume its diplomatic relations with Iraq, which began with the visit of former Iraqi Prime Minister (Iyad Allawi) in 2004 to Kuwaiti lands, and then the appointment of (Muhammad Hussein Bahr Al-Ulum) as Iraq's ambassador to Kuwait [vii].

After the occupation of Iraq, armed groups in Kuwait took advantage of Kuwaiti juveniles and were able to influence some of them to go to jihad in Iraq according to their thinking. Three Kuwaiti juveniles confessed after their return from Iraq as a result of their interrogation that they wanted to wage jihad in Iraq. They asked the fugitive accused, wanted in connection with the case of jihad in Iraq, Khaled Al-Dosari, to facilitate their affairs. He provided them with money (500) Kuwaiti dinars for each of them and directed them to go to someone in the Jahra area. The latter contacted their coordinator in Syria and then, before moving to the Iraqi-Saudi border, they spent three days in the Syrian capital, Damascus, and there they were then transferred by that coordinator to the Al-Deir border area. They were brought into Iraq and received in Iraq by extremist elements, then they were transferred to Fallujah. After they refused to wage jihad, they transferred them to live in some houses [viii].

These Kuwaiti positions indicate a broad negative role characterized by the active participation of men and money to sabotage the Iraqi reality and introduce suspicious elements, in addition to their demands for old financial compensation despite the tense Iraqi situation. These events represented Kuwait as an example of an undisciplined neighbor destabilizing a sovereign state in order to achieve special political interests.

As for Iraqi-Saudi relations after the American occupation of Iraq and after the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003 AD, the Saudi government welcomed this political transformation in Iraq in line with the position of the Arab League, and it officially welcomed this transformation during the era of the interim Iraqi government in 2004 AD, and the Prime Minister at the time (Iyad Allawi) visited Saudi Arabia on 7/27/2004 AD. These visits focused on discussing the overall Iraqi-Saudi relations and ways to develop them, and emphasizing the importance of overcoming obstacles in the relationship, as well as discussing the outstanding issues between the two sides, most notably the Saudi debts owed by Iraq, border control, and others. Despite all these repeated Iraqi attempts to open up to the Kingdom, the Saudi response was Not serious [ix], as there were positions supportive of violence in Iraq. On November 6, 2004, twenty-six Saudi Islamic scholars signed an open letter in which they called on Muslims to fight the United States in Iraq and consider this a jihad. Official Saudi figures show that three Thousands of Saudis have gone to Iraq since the beginning of the rebellion[x] .

In the same context, Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi politician and advisor to the Saudi king for national security affairs, wrote an article in the Washington Post in December 2006 in which he said, "His country will not remain silent about the slaughter of Sunnis in Iraq and will support the Baathists and former army officers among them with money and weapons , and armed factions will be established if necessary to confront the Shiite sectarian militias." This is exactly what Osama bin Laden and his representative in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, wanted, i.e. to expand the scope of the war and involve neighboring countries in it [xi].

This is evident from the tendentious propaganda that accuses other majority sects of these crimes without the slightest evidence. This reflects a lack of understanding of the Iraqi reality, and the desire of these countries to achieve political interests at the expense of the Iraqis, and to support terrorism and instability for Iraq in this time period.

After the wave of violence that Iraq witnessed in mid-2004, many accusations were made against Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi side confirmed its commitment to preventing any infiltrator from entering Iraqi territory, and this was confirmed by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, who said, "We will deter and prevent anyone from going directly to Iraq via Saudi territory." The intensity of tensions in Iraqi-Saudi relations increased in the midst of the security crisis that Iraq witnessed during the years 2006, 2007 and 2009, when there were accusations of the Saudi political system by official parties of supporting armed groups inside Iraq, but relations witnessed a kind of rapprochement in 2009 when it was reopened the Iraqi Embassy in Riyadh, and Ghanem Al-Jumaili was accredited to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 25, 2009. However, the general nature of Saudi-Arab relations during this period did not show significant improvement or stability after the year 2003 AD[xii] .

This is evident from the tendentious propaganda that accuses other majority sects of these crimes without the slightest evidence. This reflects a lack of understanding of the Iraqi reality, and the desire of these countries to achieve political interests at the expense of the Iraqis, and to support terrorism and instability for Iraq in this time period. The relationship between Iraq, on the one hand, and both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, can be classified as confused. Despite the demise of the previous Iraqi regime, the positions of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continued to be politically unclear, as the two countries continued to demand compensation from Iraq for the Gulf War despite the miserable conditions it faces , and it is expected that this will be reflected in the future of the relationship between Iraq and the two countries in the foreseeable future. In light of this scene, there are no successful solutions on the horizon for the actual issues that control these relations, the most important of which are: Borders, oil, financial consequences, and the situation becomes clearer in the relationship with Saudi Arabia due to its direct interference in Iraqi affairs and its funding and support of parties that support terrorism in a non-public manner and its explicit support for spreading Wahhabi [xiii] and Salafist thought and this is what makes it likely that the relationship with Saudi Arabia will worsen and the diplomatic solution will remain in place as a result of the foreign presence in the region in general and Iraq in particular, which will exploit this tension in serving its set goals and in the context of mutual benefit from these relations for the benefit of its orientations and supporting interest in its foreign policies [xiv].

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2- Iraqi-Syrian Relations:

Iraqi-Syrian relations have long been characterized by both hostility and coexistence. Conflicting positions on important issues played a role in this fluctuation in relations between the two countries, until these relations improved at the end of the rule of Hafez

al-Assad, when the borders between the two countries were opened in 1997.The economy was the essential factor in the Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement, and this resulted in mixed interests, until economic and trade relations grew significantly with President Bashar al-Assad assuming power. President Bashar al-Assad is more concerned with rearranging the Syrian house from the inside and revitalizing the sagging economy than the old disputes that existed between the two ruling wings of the Baath Party in the two countries, which led to the severing of diplomatic relations in most cases [xvi].

Syria is one of the countries most affected by the events in Iraq and its influence on it as well. After the American entry into Iraq, Syria became one of the biggest losers after the change process, especially the economic loss represented by the loss of the Iraqi market and the immediate loss of the quantities of oil crossing its territory, which were cut off by the American forces in April 2003, in addition to Syria's feeling of anxiety about the presence of American forces next to it, and great concern about the American desire to change regimes in the Middle East, therefore, after the occupation of Iraq, Syria sought to strengthen its influence in Iraq and thwart the American project in Iraq and the Middle East by working on two axes:

1-   The first axis: making Syria the main gateway for foreign extremist fighters to enter Iraq, which prompted the United States of America to accuse Syria of being lenient in the issue of terrorists entering Iraq.
2-   The second axis: Syria's embrace of many leaders and members of the dissolved Iraqi Baath Party [xvii], and providing support to them, as they found in Syria a safe haven to resume their political and armed activity against the new political regime in Iraq and the United States of America together [xviii].

After the launch of the coalition forces' attack on Iraq, Syria became the first entry gateway for terrorists into Iraq, and on July 29, General Richard Meiser, Chief of Staff of the US Army, indicated that the majority of foreign fighters to Iraq originate from Syria, and that there are at least 80 fighters who underwent several months of training in a Syrian camp [xix], Syria has become the main crossing point for jihadists, and an active environment for mobilization and recruitment. Thus, Syria has become the most important gathering and transit center for jihadists wishing to join the ranks of the Iraqi resistance [xx].

After the Iraqi interim government was formed in 2004, the head of the interim government, Iyad Allawi, visited Syria and met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He described his talks with al-Assad as compatible, noting that the talks addressed important issues related to common security and bilateral relations between the two countries. On the other hand, Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Otari affirmed that his country is keen on the unity of Iraq's land and people, and pointed out that the instability of security in Iraq will have repercussions on national security in Syria, stressing that Syria opposes any infiltration process from Syria into Iraqi territory and vice versa. Iraq and Syria have agreed to form a joint security committee charged with controlling the border between them, which is 600 kilometers long, and developing economic relations between them [xxi].

Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara also announced on the sidelines of the Arab Foreign Ministers Conference in Istanbul the restoration of diplomatic relations with Iraq, severed since 1980.On the other hand, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari welcomed the decision to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries after they were severed more than two decades ago. However, the Iraqi Foreign Minister returned to confirm that relations between Iraq and Syria are not well due to the lack of cooperation to control the borders and prevent the infiltration of foreign fighters into the Iraq [xxii].

3-Iraqi-Turkish Relations:

The continuing fear of the emergence of a Turkish separatist reality in northern Iraq was the most important factor in the Turkish government's refusal to deal with American calls to participate in the war against Iraq and open a northern front to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, based on the belief that this war might lead to the division of Iraq and its intervention in a civil war may harms Turkish national security, especially in light of the strong alliance that emerged before the war between the Iraqi Kurdish parties and the United States and the failure of President Bush's administration to provide sufficient guarantees to the Turkish side regarding the future of the Kurdish issue in Iraq [xxiii].Turkey opposes granting the Kurds broad autonomy that could later open the door to complete independence and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, on the basis that formally establishing such a state would encourage Turkey's Kurds to achieve separation from Turkey or at least establish self-rule [xxiv].

Despite the development witnessed by relations between Iraq and Turkey in economic and commercial terms after 2003, these relations were marred by a lot of complexity, especially in light of the foreign presence in Iraq, which introduced many variables that disturbed the nature of relations between the two countries, including the issue of the Labor Party. Kurdistan Region and the issues of Kirkuk and Turkmen. The issue of the Kurdistan Workers' Party still constitutes an obstacle in Iraqi-Turkish relations. After the fall of the previous regime in Iraq, Turkey's fears of the activity of that party began to increase. It seems that the Kurdistan Workers' Party took advantage of the deteriorating conditions in Iraq after 2003, as it launched its attacks in Turkey[xxv].

The Turkish government accuses its counterpart, the Iraqi government, after 2003 of not taking the necessary measures to prevent the Kurdistan Workers' Party from launching attacks on the Turkish army from Iraqi territory, despite the pledges made by Iraqi officials to the Turks that Iraq does not allow any attacks launched from Iraqi territory. There is no doubt that the Iraqi government is not It is able to stop attacks launched from its territory for several reasons, including:

1-   The rugged terrain among the high mountains in which the Kurdistan Workers' Party is based.
2-   This area from which the attacks are launched is located within the geographical borders of the Kurdistan region, which enjoys almost complete independence from the central government.
3-   The weak capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces in terms of armament and numbers made these areas outside their control [xxvi].

The year 2008 witnessed turmoil in Iraqi-Turkish relations, as Turkish ground forces, for the first time during the American occupation of Iraq, launched a large-scale ground attack on the positions of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in the Qandil Mountains on February 23, 2008. Perhaps what facilitated the Turkish forces' incursion into northern Iraq is the deteriorating political and security situation there, in addition to the failure of the political forces to agree to launch a comprehensive political reconciliation project through which the ethnic and religious segments will be reassured that their rights and demands will be protected [xxvii].

Iraqi-Turkish relations were also greatly affected by internal balances and the European and American positions on Turkey, as well as developments in the political scene, as the Iraqi government and parties to the political process were wary of Turkish initiatives regarding the call to deploy Turkish forces in Iraq, so they rejected this proposal so that it would not be a precedent for other neighboring countries to intervene in Iraq's internal affairs [xxviii].

The issue of the Turkmen and their future also entered Turkish political concerns after the year 2003 AD, and this was confirmed by Turkey's special representative for Iraq (Osman

Kurtuk) that the situation of Kirkuk heralds confrontations and security tension as a result of ethnic frictions. Therefore, it is not an Iraqi issue because its repercussions may be reflected in neighboring countries. Ahmed Davutoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that his country is ready to go to any lengths to intervene in order to protect the Turkmen in Kirkuk [xxix].

The Turkish measures regarding water also caused a crisis between Iraq and Turkey, and Turkey began to use it as a pressure card on the Iraqi government. This issue was escalated after 2003 by exploiting the collapse of Iraq's economic structures and the state of violence and chaos that the political and social situation witnessed after the American occupation of Iraq, despite the fact that the crisis Water is due to the accumulations of neglect in water policies by previous governments [xxx].

Turkey's water projects are not just projects to regulate the drainage of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and reduce the risks of floods, as Turkey claims, but rather they are essentially projects with economic, political, and security dimensions [xxxi].Turkey is a non-oil country and does not possess natural gas, which constitutes a heavy burden on the country's budget. It aspires to obtain an oil advantage with the new regime in Iraq through several methods, including using water to obtain the greatest amount of gains [xxxii].

The bilateral crises escalated after 2010 AD due to positions taken by the Turkish Prime Minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) against the Iraqi government, in what the Iraqi government considered interference in foreign affairs[xxxiii].

4-Iraqi-Iranian Relations:

Iraqi-Iranian relations were not at the same pace of friendliness and hostility throughout history, but were interspersed with periods of wars, tension, and coldness.The hostility reached its peak in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, costing both countries great human and economic losses. After the end of the war, these relations began to improve somewhat, although the atmosphere of mistrust is still non-existent between them [xxxiv].

The file of prisoners and missing persons who were arrested during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) is also considered one of the thorny files that put relations between the two parties to a real test. Large numbers of prisoners and missing persons have been recovered by the International Committee of the Red Cross since 1980. The last batch included (50,559) prisoners between June 1998 and May 2003. On June 23, 2003, Iran officially informed the International Committee of the Red Cross that any Iraqi prisoner of war was no longer detained in Iran, and after the occupation [xxxv].

In the same context, Iraq shares with Iran many river basins whose sources are located on the Iranian side, and all or part of them represent a border between the two countries, which has caused many disputes between the two countries. Although most of the disputes over these rivers were apparently economic, they conceal Political and security dimensions, which made the border areas through which these rivers flow hotspots of ongoing conflict [xxxvi].

Before the American war on Iraq, Iran announced its basic principles in the event of a war on Iraq, which are not to participate in military operations against Iraq, not to fight alongside the Iraqi regime, not to fight against the Iraqi forces, and not to obstruct their operations [xxxvii].

Iran has refused to invade Iraq, but it has become at the heart of the Iraqi event, not through the political forces that used Iran as a refuge during the Saddam Hussein regime, but rather through other parties found in the Iranian opposition to the United States of America and its occupation of Iraq (the strategic back) to resist the American invasion [xxxviii].

Iran's relationship with Iraq was strengthened under the new government, and Iran took the initiative to recognize it, and in the year following the fall of Saddam, Iran and Iraq resumed their diplomatic relations, and they reached an advanced level under the government of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, as that government issued an order to pardon Iranian detainees and detainees in Iraqi prisons as a welcome to the visit of Iranian Foreign Minister (Kharazi) to Baghdad. In a remarkable development in bilateral relations between the two countries that had not occurred for forty years, a large Iraqi military delegation headed by Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi visited Tehran, and this visit culminated in the signing of an agreement for military cooperation in the fields of defense and combating terrorism. Al-Jaafari himself also visited Tehran to deepen and strengthen relations between the two countries after they had deteriorated under the government of Iyad Allawi, who accused Tehran of interfering in Iraqi internal affairs. Al-Jaafari provided the necessary reassurances to Tehran, stressing that his government would not allow the Iranian opposition (the Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization)to take Iraqi territory as a starting point for carrying out its operations against Iran[xxxix].One of the most prominent results of that visit was the signing of a joint security cooperation agreement for security coordination, border control, and assistance in rehabilitating the Iraqi army. The graph of Iraqi-Iranian relations continued to rise even after Al-Jaafari left the government and Nouri Al-Maliki took over as prime minister. President Nouri al-Maliki took the initiative to visit Iran and was received by the new Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Al-Maliki pointed out this by saying, "There are no barriers in the way of cooperation between the two countries, and this cooperation is still steady day after day despite American pressure and accusations of exploiting this cooperation to achieve Iranian regional gains " [xl].

The issue of the residents of the city of Ashraf, which includes Iranian opponents from the Iranian Mujahideen movement, remains one of the most important issues that the Iranian government is pressuring the Iraqi government to find a political solution for. Despite the arbitrary security and military measures that the Iraqi government used against the residents of the camp, the Iranian government is still demanding By closing the camp and deporting its residents to Iran or to other countries [xli].

Among the most prominent negative outcomes that resulted from regional intervention in Iraq, which will not end:

1-   The deterioration of the security situation and the lack of internal stability in Iraq, especially with the weakness and modernity of the Iraqi security forces in maintaining the continuity and stability of security.
2-   Attempting to disrupt the political process to give justifications for the continuation of the American occupation of Iraq.
3-   The reluctance of some neighboring countries, especially Kuwait, to exempt Iraq from its debts and the compensation imposed on it in the wake of the Second Gulf War is a clear indication of the desire of those countries for Iraq to remain as it is now.
4-   The attempt of some neighboring countries to maintain a state of international and regional isolation on Iraq by keeping it under the penalty of Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter.
5-   Depriving Iraq of its water shares in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the eastern tributaries of the Tigris River in order to weaken it economically [xlii].

Conclusion:

Iraqi relations with neighboring Arab and regional countries were not at the same pace. This relationship varied according to the circumstances and interests required by each stage of this relationship, until it reached what it is today as a result of the foreign presence and the change in the regime of government in Iraq. Clearly, Iraq's relationship with these countries has been affected at the present time by what happened in different

periods in previous times, which cast a shadow on the internal situation in Iraq and confounded its progress as a result of the changing violence and terrorism that destroyed the country's infrastructure, caused the death of hundreds of thousands of its residents, and disrupted the development and construction of its institutions, and burdened the political establishment. The terrorist groups that entered Iraq were taken by neighboring countries after the fall of the regime as a theater for terrorist operations, which they considered jihadist operations against the occupation forces, but they were terrorist operations that included all groups and sects in Iraq, and no distinction was made between them when carrying out these operations, as most of the borders neighboring Iraq were open and the military establishment was at the beginning of its doubts, and thus these groups constitute the first obstacle in the process of building and stabilizing the situation in Iraq.

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[xxxix]) People's Mujahideen Organization: It is a left-wing organization opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. It pursued a policy of armed violence in 1980 against the symbols and leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and carried out many assassinations and bombings. Then it moved to Iraq under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi to establish an armed militia sponsored by Saddam Hussein's regime before international organizations included it on the list of terrorist organizations and then dismantled its military entity after the fall of the Baath Party regime in Iraq. For details see: Ali Abdul Amir Allawi, the occupation of Iraq. Winning the War and Losing the Peace, 2nd edition, (Beirut: Al Arabiya for Studies and Publishing, 2009), p. 455.

[xl]) Iranian-Iraqi relations, see the World Information Network https:\\m.maraefa.org.

[xli]) Daham Muhammad Al-Azzawi and Yasser Ali Ibrahim, Iraq and Neighboring Countries: A Reading of Conflicting Positions, Proceedings of the Second Annual Scientific Conference of the Department of Political Studies, (Baghdad: House of Wisdom, 2012), p. 125.

[xlii]) Muhannad Sabah Shaker, US policy towards Iraq in light of the security agreement, Master's thesis, (Defense University of Studies: Staff College, Land Department, 2015 AD), pp. 95-96.