

The Efforts of the Ottoman Empire to Confirm Kuwait's Subordination to the Basra Province until 1914

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Abstract

Britain began its increasing interest in the Arabian Gulf region in the year 1763, and this was accompanied by an increase in the importance of Kuwait after the disasters that befell the Iraqi city of Basra after the spread of the plague epidemic there, and then its occupation by the Persians in 1776. Therefore, the role of Kuwait emerged as a commercial center competing with Basra, and this raised Both Britain and the Ottoman Empire increased the conflict of interests in the region.

In light of this, the Ottoman Empire and its local administrations in Baghdad and Basra sought to re-impose their actual presence on the sheikhdom of Kuwait, which represented for them the final station of the Berlin-Baghdad railway project, as well as to distance the growing British influence in the Arabian Gulf, through which it deliberately interfered in Kuwait's internal affairs. And encouraging its sheikhs to rebel against the central authority of the Ottoman state, which they followed, leading to placing Kuwait under British protection. Therefore, several attempts were made to return Kuwait to the fold of Ottoman Iraq, and to bring it back under the authority of the Basra state. These attempts continued until the outbreak of World War I.

The beginning was an attempt by the Ottoman governor Namik Pasha in 1866, while the last attempt was on August 2, 1990. We do not rule out that the attempts will be repeated in the future, especially since the recent demarcation of the borders imposed on Iraq cut off additional parts of Iraqi lands that were annexed to Kuwait. This in itself will be sufficient reason to move the issue forward, whether in peace or war, whether that is in the near or distant future.

It seems that the main reason for the failure of these attempts was that the Ottoman Empire was unable, under the general circumstances at the time, to directly confront the British forces in the Arabian Gulf, so it stood unable to intervene directly, and this is what prompted it to seek the help of its agents in the region who were dissatisfied with Sheikh Mubarak to end his authority in Kuwait. This was not enough, as the British pledged to protect Sheikh Mubarak in order to serve their growing interests in the Gulf and their quest for complete control over the entire region, and this is what happened later.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire, World War I.

Introduction

First: Britain's efforts to separate Kuwait from the state of Basra:

Since the year 1763, the Arabian Gulf region has witnessed increased British interest, after the end of the Seventy-Year War, according to which France ceded its colonies to Britain, and subsequently gained Kuwait after the weakness of Basra and the spread of

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the plague epidemic, and its occupation by Karim Khan Zand in 1776 added importance as a commercial center competing with Basra.

Talking about the British presence in the Arabian Gulf region means talking about British policy and the extent of its ambitions to separate Kuwait from the state of Basra in Ottoman Iraq. This policy went through several roles, the first of which was that it used the port of Kuwait as an alternative to serve its interests in the event of confusion regarding the conditions and stability of Basra. Which would endanger its interests in the region, or cause disputes between the Ottoman governor and the British East India Company.

Then it adopted another policy after it established its presence in the region, interfering in Kuwait's internal affairs, and encouraging the Kuwaiti sheikhs to rebel against the central authority of the Ottoman state, which they followed, while continuing to pretend to be nominally subservient to it. Finally, another policy was taken that increased British intervention as it firmly established itself in the region, by concluding secret agreements with the sheikhs of Kuwait, leading to placing Kuwait under British protection. This was accompanied by the Persians' occupation of Basra, which led to the transfer of Britain's desert mail from the Arabian Gulf to Aleppo via Kuwait, and the headquarters of the East India Company's agency in the Gulf was also transferred from Basra to Kuwait.

On April 30, 1793, the British Agency moved temporarily from Basra to Kuwait, and continued to move between them until August 26, 1795, as a result of the instability of the situation in Basra, the continuation of conflicts between the Ottomans and Persia, and the constant harassment of the British Agency by the Ottoman authorities, and some studies indicate that The transfer of the company's headquarters took place between (1775-1779) following the Persians' occupation of Basra, and the years above were the establishment phase of relations between representatives of the British company and Kuwait, and one of its results was that Kuwait became a center for convoys and the transportation of British goods to Basra and Aleppo. While the company's headquarters moved between Basra and Kuwait between December 15, 1821 until April 19, 1822.

In our estimation, the move of the company's headquarters between Basra and Kuwait, going and returning, was related to the crises and disturbances that Basra was exposed to, while its move to Bushehr was related to the nature and form of the fluctuating relations between the Ottoman Empire and its authorities in the region. As a result of these moves, the company's commercial interests were secured, and British influence in the Arabian Gulf was strengthened in the face of other European competition.

The rapid development of events in Basra accelerated the emergence of Kuwait as an alternative and a dangerous commercial competitor to Basra, so it was chosen as the headquarters of the British East India Company. It seems that the extent of progress in compatibility between bilateral interests in British-Kuwaiti relations at that stage was related to the extent of the mutual benefits that could be achieved. It was achieved at the expense of the commercial and political interests of the state of Basra and Ottoman Iraq. Therefore, a new, close relationship arose and developed between the second Sheikh of Kuwait (Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sabah 1776-1814), and the British side, which was seeking to urge the Sheikh to fulfill his pledges to them in exchange for promises of protection and independence.

The matter was repeated again to persuade the Sheikh of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Sabah (1814-1859), to accept its protection, but it failed, as a result of his country's interests requiring care linked to the Ottoman Empire. But the British authorities found what they wanted in the person of Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, who wanted to get closer to them and get rid of the pressures of the Ottoman Empire, as he was seizing opportunities to harm the Ottoman Empire.

Britain continued to consolidate its influence in the Arabian Gulf by seeking to win the favor of some sheikhs, especially Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, as it sent Captain Baker, commander of the British naval ship Sphinx, in August 1896, who explained in his reports that Kuwait was an independent Arab province, belonging to the Ottoman Empire, deducing this from the presence and continuity of great Ottoman influence there. In addition, he pointed out that when he visited Mubarak Al-Sabah, he found the Sheikh raising the Ottoman flag over his residence.

This explains to us Britain's recognition that Kuwait is still part of the Ottoman Empire and raises the Ottoman flag, at the same time claiming to be an independent Arab province. This contradiction only explains to us Britain's efforts to separate Kuwait from the dependency of the Iraqi state of Basra in a frenetic context to expand its commercial and military interests in the region in general, and to impose its hegemony in the Arabian Gulf by continuing to impose its protection by fragmenting the region by establishing independent sheikhdoms linked to it and under its protection.

The above goal, which is summed up in British interest in Kuwait and linking it to a series of treaties and agreements, is an implementation of Lord Curzon's plan, in which he indicated that the region extending from the Nile Valley through the Near East and the Arabian Peninsula to Iran should be connected links for the British Empire in West and Central Asia., all the way to India, and since this plan includes the British presence and the organization of supervision of the security and stability of the region.

Britain witnessed a change in its policy towards Kuwait, so it wanted the sheikhdom to be assumed by someone who would cooperate with it. Therefore, it encouraged Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah and incited him to kill his two brothers who were opposing British protection. In addition, it claimed that Kuwait was completely independent from the Ottoman Empire, and that the British government did not recognize it. It absolutely believed that Kuwait belonged to the authority of the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time it believed that it was difficult, or even impossible, to deny the presence of Ottoman influence in it, and the result of that was its interference in Kuwait, and the emergence of conflicts to control it.

The first British attempt took place in the year 1805, when the British tried to place Kuwait under their protection under the pretext of protecting it from Wahhabi attacks, but they were unable to do so. British Foreign Secretary Belmoston later stated that Britain's mission in the Arabian Gulf was maritime control, as well as preventing Any other country can control it.

In the year 1835, an era began in the region known as the era of (British security), represented by the signing of the Arab Emirates of the Coast (perpetual peace) treaty with Britain, in which the parties signatory to the peace were obligated not to respond or attack, and to be content with submitting a complaint to the British authorities.

There is no doubt that the main point of the British policy in Kuwait is that it be an end to the telegraph lines and the railway line. In the year 1863, Colonel Pelly confirmed this, pointing out that Kuwait is one of the ships' terminals and the end of the telegraph and railway lines, and this is what explains the motives. The British seriously considered opening a new page in relations with Kuwait by placing it under protection since the era of Abdullah I bin Sabah (1776-1814).

This is also evident from the letter of Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, to his government in India, urging them to offer British protection to Kuwait, as he stated, "Kuwait has an excellent port, and if it comes under our protection, it will be one of the most important centers in the Gulf, in addition to the possibility of By making it the terminus of a railway line from Alexandria or Port Said in the future, it will be in a position to help us protect this line..., as well as the opportunity to strike a fatal blow if

Kuwait comes under our protection. Thus, British protection of Kuwait means concentrating our political interests in the waters. The Gulf and its coasts”.

British ambitions and projects and the changes that were taking place in the Arabian Gulf region worried the Ottoman Empire, especially what was happening in Kuwait, which prompted it to take quick measures to confirm Kuwait's subordination, as it insisted that the quarantine doctor residing there establish a quarantine in Kuwait. This was considered necessary in order to prevent the spread of epidemics and diseases coming with ships and travelers arriving from India and Persia to the ports of the Arabian Gulf. Therefore, those arriving must undergo a stipulated quarantine period in the isolation hospital, and the proposal was made that this quarantine be located in Kuwait., whose administration was at a standstill, so it may require the Ottoman Empire to use the armed forces to enhance the work of its employees and implement the required measures.

Accordingly, Major N. R. O'Connor, Political Resident in Kuwait, addressed the British government, noting that the Health Affairs Officer in Kuwait had received instructions from the Health Authority at the Consulate operating in Constantinople to inform them of the most suitable places for quarantine on the Arabian Coast.

The Ottoman Empire's sending of a quarantine employee to exercise his duty as an Ottoman employee in Kuwait officially indicates Kuwait's subordination to the Iraqi state of Basra, and this is what prompted Sheikh Mubarak, after three years of his rule, to show an approach to courting Britain, asking it to protect him, but the British government did not show any In response to the request at the time, it believes that the time is not appropriate to intervene in Kuwait, which may negatively affect its relations with the Ottoman Empire, and contribute to increasing tension that may lead to a confrontation that is not in the interests of its interests in the region. In doing so, it confirmed its utilitarian orientation in that its interests are always at the forefront.

Based on the above, the British authorities hesitated to accept protection over Kuwait for fear that this would affect their relations with the Ottoman Empire, in addition to the fact that they were not willing at that time to expand the scope of British military duties in the Arabian Gulf region. At the head of those calling for this opinion was Lord George Hamilton (Lord George Hamilton) British Minister of India, so both the Ministry of India and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retracted their position and Sheikh Mubarak's desire to accept protection over Kuwait in late 1898 was ignored.

But after one year, the British documents concluded that the British government's point of view, which believed that the Ottoman quarantine in Kuwait, was only an excuse to confirm the authority of the Ottoman government and its continuity over Kuwait, and this is evident through the confirmation of the governor of Basra, Hamdi Pasha, regarding this issue and the necessity of its implementation. Therefore, the British position changed towards the possibility of protecting Kuwait, through which boats sailing to the south always pass, provided that the agreement remains secret.

Therefore, a protection agreement was signed in secret on January 23, 1899 between Lieutenant Colonel John Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the Governor of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah, and this was done of his own free will and desire to sign a pledge, the most important of which was stated in it: The Sheikh of Kuwait pledged under it to bind himself and his heirs. And his allies not to receive an agent or representative from any country or government in Kuwait, or anywhere else within the borders of his land, without prior approval from the British government. He also commits himself, his heirs, and his subjects not to give up, sell, lease, or mortgage the lands of Kuwait, even if it is forbidden Any occupation of any part of its territory or for any other purpose by the government or nationals of any other country without the prior approval of Her British Majesty's Government in this regard. This pledge applies to any part of Sheikh Mubarak's lands that may now be in the possession of nationals of another government....

Thus, Kuwait entered under British protection, but it can be said that it was more formal protection than actual protection, and the agreement was only ink on paper, as Britain had no desire to enter the Kuwaiti judiciary under its protection seriously, in addition to the problems that it would create for its citizens in Ottoman Iraq..

The protection agreement that was concluded did not continue to be kept secret, and I wanted it to remain secret, as its matter was exposed in 1900 by the German committee that arrived to establish the Baghdad-Berlin Railway. As a result, the Ottoman Empire directed a strongly worded protest to the British government, stating that the agreement 1899 With the Sheikh of Kuwait, it is not binding and invalid, as it was concluded between a foreign state and a subject of the Ottoman Empire. Then it decided to remove Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah from his position by various means. It also sparked a dispute over the borders of Kuwait, so it restored control over Umm Qasr, Safwan and Bubiyan on the grounds that these The areas will become within the scope of the Baghdad Railway.

The position of the Ottoman Empire continued, which asserts that the Kuwaiti judiciary belongs to the Iraqi state of Basra, which belongs to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it can be said that this agreement, which mortgaged Kuwait to Britain, did not grant Sheikh Mubarak the independence that he sought for himself away from the Ottoman Empire, so things remained like this until the outbreak of World War I, in that Kuwait was an integral part of the lands of the Ottoman Basra State, and was subject to... Administratively it has.

As for the positions of other countries regarding this protection agreement, Germany's reactions were different because this agreement was considered the most important event in the history of Anglo-German relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Germany's goals were for Kuwait to be the terminus of the Baghdad railway line. _ The proposed Berlin after it was granted the concession by the Ottoman Empire in 1899 as an initial concession to establish this line.

Russia also strongly protested the agreement, because it would affect its plans in the Ottoman Empire, those related to the Cabines project, planned to be established in Kuwait, in addition to the fact that Russia was very dissatisfied with the British increase in the Kuwaiti judiciary, so it took Russian consuls in both Baghdad and Basra. By going to meet Sheikh Mubarak, one by one, and doing their best to convince him of the great benefits resulting from their friendship with and protection of Russia.

As for the French side, at first it was hesitant about its position, but by the end of 1903, it opposed the project, because it threatened their interests in Syria and Lebanon.

Britain's comment came in the wake of numerous objections to the protection agreement signed with the Sheikh of Kuwait, declaring that the British government did not have any ambitions in Kuwait, but wanted to have friendly relations with its sheikh, and then proceeded to freeze the situation in Kuwait. This gives us a sufficient idea that this secret agreement would not have been based on a valid legal position. It also made clear the ambitions of Britain and the rest of the foreign countries in the Arabian Gulf region, and the extent of the efforts they were making to obtain privileges there. The reactions from the European countries were nothing but... Its fear stemmed from the fact that Britain would monopolize the region and dominate all the privileges, and this is what happened later.

Here it is necessary to know the reasons that prompted Britain and Sheikh Mubarak to conclude this agreement, in which it intersects with the interests of the major powers and challenges them and the Ottoman Empire:

1. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, France's position in the Arabian Gulf constituted a concern for Britain, as France continued to try to achieve what it aimed to achieve, which was to conclude treaties with Oman, in order to fight British influence in

the region, in addition to the fact that France did not have direct relations. With Kuwait, but its presence in Oman made its activity linked to the general situation in the region.

2. The main motive that prompted Britain to take an exceptional interest in Kuwait was to protect its interests represented in securing independence from the Ottoman Empire and the unity of the lands that represented its interests, given that its area of influence in the Arabian Gulf was completely separate from the Ottoman Empire. This interest came as a result of Napoleon's occupation of Egypt, which threatened Navigation routes to India, so it sought to secure that route, fearing for its interests.

3. Another important factor was the suspicions that the British government had that the Russians had the intention of establishing a port or coal station in the Kuwait area, as Russia began to press to gain a foothold in the Arabian Gulf, and had previously enjoyed a wide concession in Iran. This showed us the motive that prompted Britain to change its point of view to quickly place Kuwait under its protection, and to conclude a secret agreement with it, as previously mentioned.

4. The British policy in the region was to conclude bilateral agreements with the local sheikhs in order to establish bases for its fleet, to secure the road to India and keep it open, and when things became clear to Britain that the Ottoman Empire was inclined to build a railway to be implemented by the Germans, and it gave a concession to the Russian Count Kapnest. The year 1898, and in this regard, it can be noted that both the Kapenset project and the German project later insisted on the need for Kuwait or the port of Kazma in Kuwait to be the end point of the railway that will connect Turkey to the Arabian Gulf.

5. In 1899, there was no oil and it was not involved in either industry or transportation. There were expectations for the future of oil because the first field was discovered in Kuwait in the 1930s.

6. As for the Sheikh of Kuwait's motives and justifications for concluding this agreement, they are summed up in his fears of the Ottoman government, after they were angered by his killing of the brothers of Sheikh Muhammad Al-Sabah and Jarrah Al-Sabah. Sheikh Mubarak was also not confident about the intentions of the Ottoman state at that time, even though the Ottomans were the ones who appointed him. His brother's place.

7. The British government had welcomed the Baghdad-Berlin railway project since the beginning of its announcement, and the reason was that the threat in the East until that time had come from France and Russia, and not from the German side, so Britain wanted to contribute to this project. At the political level, it did not want to exclude Germany from the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Britain did not initially object to the participation of its capital in the project while monitoring German movements and controlling related administrative matters. However, Germany was alone in the project due to Britain's preoccupation with the Boer War (1899_1902), in addition to the implementation of the Baghdad-Berlin railway project, the Beit Ling Company, which holds the privilege of navigating on the rivers for its trade and resources in the region.

As for the results that the 1899 agreement led to, as well as the hidden goals that were behind it, by trying to separate Kuwait from the Ottoman Empire, despite it being an integral part of the Iraqi state of Basra, they can be summarized as follows:

1. The agreement helped Britain make it capable in its dealings with the Sheikh of Kuwait, as it imposed more pledges in subsequent years, which had the greatest impact in strengthening Britain's position before the Ottoman Empire in everything related to Kuwait, as all the pledges in the agreement made The Sheikh of Kuwait, for his part, is committed to acting on his own behalf, and on behalf of his heirs and successors, without any significant commitment from the British side.

2. Under this agreement, Britain also faced European competition in Kuwait, as it placed the European countries before a fait accompli. However, this agreement was a direct blow directed at the Ottoman Empire and a threat to its interests in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf. It was also directed against German influence in the Gulf and opened the door for it to intervene. In the affairs of Najd and southern Iraq, and monitoring what is happening around them.

3. The agreement contributed to consolidating the idea of Kuwait's independence, as it prompted Britain to conclude more agreements after it, so it concluded an agreement in 1913 with the Ottomans, as a result of which the Ottoman Empire was prevented from interfering in Kuwait's internal and external affairs despite Kuwait's subordination to the Ottoman Empire and the continuation of raising The Ottoman flag on Kuwait.

4. This agreement, in particular, led to the strengthening of the Beit Ling River Navigation Company in the Tigris and Euphrates, whose influence had begun to decline in its last years that preceded the agreement.

5. Britain issued many new laws that are consistent with its policy. The Ottoman laws that were in effect at that time were abolished, and Basra was made a center for departure to other regions in Iraq because it was the closest point to the Arabian Gulf and close to the oil centers in Ahwaz. In addition, the Ottoman Empire maintained the same British privileges in Kuwait, and at the same time recognized Britain enjoys Ottoman sovereignty over it, on the condition that the Ottoman Empire does not interfere with Kuwait's internal affairs.

Second: The Ottoman Empire's attempts to confirm Kuwait's subordination:

The first Ottoman attempt during the reign of Governor Namik Pasha in 1899:

There were multiple attempts to return Kuwait to the fold of Ottoman Iraq, and to resubmit it to the authority of the Basra Province. These attempts continued even after Iraq's independence and the formation of national rule. The beginning was an attempt by the Ottoman governor Namik Pasha in 1866, while the last attempt was on August 2, 1990. We do not rule out that the attempts will be repeated in the future, especially since the recent demarcation of the borders that was imposed on Iraq cut off additional parts of Iraqi lands that were annexed to Kuwait, and this in itself will be sufficient reason to move the issue forward, whether in peace or war, whether that is in the near or distant future.

Historians did not agree on the subject of this attempt as a (first attempt) for the Ottoman Empire to re-impose its effective control over Kuwait. Rather, they differed in defining that, as some assert that the first attempt was in 1901, at the hands of the governor of Basra (Mohsen Pasha), and the head of the Ashraf of Basra, Mr. Rajab, and others point out that the attempt of the governor Namik Pasha in 1899 was the first that took place under many motives and reasons.

It seems that the residents of Kuwait, as Bedouin Arab tribes, were accustomed to not submitting and submitting to central administrations, so their affairs and the administration of the sheikhdom were managed according to tribal traditions, which were characterized by simplicity and disobedience to anyone. They did not pay taxes or customs duties, so they remained as they were.

In the sixties of the nineteenth century, Kuwait recognized the authority of the Sublime Porte in the borders that conducted its dealings with the countries it dealt with, and if Kuwait's interests conflicted with that recognition, it ignored it. With the increase in British naval activity in the port of Kuwait, and the British's concern for their interests in the region, Lewis Pelly predicted the future of Kuwait. He indicated that its port would become an important anchorage for ships, a telegraph station, and a meeting place for

river ships and steamships, and this prediction came true after Less than two years, that is, in the year 1866.

It is worth noting that Kuwait became an important port for British ships, until this matter angered the governor of Baghdad, Namek Pasha, who threatened in 1866 to send military forces to impose direct Ottoman authority on it. Lorimer points out that the Ottoman authorities in Iraq looked with envy and jealousy at the increase in commercial ships that She visits the port of Kuwait, as Kuwait's commercial prosperity is detrimental to the interests of Basra.

When Governor Namik Pasha saw these developments taking place in the port of Kuwait, which would undoubtedly harm the interests of the state and its local authorities, he decided to take quick steps to confront the situation by applying the aggressive Ottoman administration system in Iraq to the Kuwaiti judiciary. Accordingly, he asked Constantinople to send two armed ships to the judiciary. For the purpose of imposing effective control over it, Major Kimball, the British Resident in Baghdad, subsequently confirmed that the freedom of Kuwait acquired long ago would soon become merely a relic of the past as a result of Ottoman activity. As a result, Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah asked the British government not to stop British ships in the port of Kuwait. We can easily consider the Sheikh's request to come within the framework of maintaining security and protection for it and its ships there. The crisis continued until January 1867, with the Baghdad authorities recognizing Sheikh Abdullah's rule in Kuwait while maintaining its nominal dependence on the Ottoman Empire. From this it is clear that the policy of the governor, Namik Pasha, resulted in the Sheikh of Kuwait's recognition of the Ottoman rights in Kuwait, and the Sultan of Baghdad was content with confirming the Al Sabah family in power as its vassals under Ottoman sovereignty. At the same time, Kuwait was able to partially preserve its local entity by retaining its customs authority..

The second Ottoman attempt during the reign of Governor Mohsen Pasha 1901:

The Ottoman Empire was disturbed by the changes represented by the increasing European presence in the Arabian Gulf region. At the same time, the Ottomans decided to extend the railway lines that connected the parts of the state. The sheikhdom of Kuwait enjoyed a kind of independence, which created an obstacle in maintaining the influence of the Ottoman authorities on the Arabian Gulf, as Kuwait was separated between Al-Ahsa Province and Basra Province because it was located between them, and this would weaken the control of the Ottoman administration over its dependencies. There were also motives for the Ottoman state that pushed it against Sheikh Mubarak and attempted to subjugate him, including the actions of the sheikh himself, especially after he signed the secret protection agreement of 1899 with Britain. This aroused the ire of the Ottomans, as well as the ire of the local forces in the Basra Province, as well as their allies on the peninsula. Arabic ; As a result of Sheikh Mubarak's disobedience and rebellion against the central authority, which was a clear step towards secession, his submission was false, as he was actually pursuing a policy heading towards independence from the governor of Basra, who considered Kuwait a sanjak subordinate to it.

Accordingly, the governor of Basra, Hamdi Pasha, decided to take some appropriate disciplinary measures against Sheikh Mubarak. Some expectations have spread indicating that the Iraqi authorities will carry out military naval action against the Sheikh of Kuwait. This prompted the British authorities to send the ship (Labong) to protect the shores of Kuwait from a possible attack ; After the governor of Basra sent the chief customs officer, accompanied by five soldiers, on December 2, to object to what Sheikh Mubarak imposed customs taxes, which were 5% on all imports coming from the Ottoman ports, including those coming from the port of Basra, and until that time they were exempt from royalties. Completely. But Mubarak refused to receive them, and forced the Ottoman customs employee to return to Basra the next day. At the same time, he rushed to Basra to meet its governor, Mohsen Pasha, pretending to be obedient and loyal to him. In this regard,

Lorimer points out that Sheikh Mubarak sought to conspire against the governor of Basra, Hamdi Pasha, by employing efforts with the captain of Basra to transfer the governor, who was characterized by integrity, uprightness, and severity, which made him unpopular. These efforts succeeded in transferring the governor from Basra, and Mohsen was appointed. Pasha replaced him on May 19, 1901, who was a military officer.

The Ottoman Empire tended to confront Mubarak's actions, define his borders, and eliminate his rule, by inciting local forces against him who were essentially enemies of Sheikh Mubarak. These forces were centered in two directions. The first direction was represented by the Al-Sabah and the Al-Saud, who had openly allied themselves with Britain. The other direction Their enemies were the Shammar princes from the Al-Rashid family, allied with local Iraqi forces opposed to the Al-Sabah family and Britain.

The Ottoman Empire, as usual, followed a policy of incitement to get rid of Mubarak, and it found its purpose in Ibn Rashid, so it incited him to seize Kuwait after growing suspicions about Mubarak's relationship with the British. The Sultan bestowed upon Ibn Rashid the title (Pasha) based on the advice of the governor of Basra to encourage him to attack Kuwait, and it was mentioned that He told him that the English would not interfere between two followers of the state. Promises were made to Ibn Rashid for financial and arms support, and more than that, Ibn Rashid received a promise to rule Kuwait if he succeeded in seizing it.

The Ottoman government agreed with Ibn Rashid to move his forces to Safwan as a means of putting pressure on Mubarak. It also asked Yusuf bin Al-Ibrahim to carry out attacks on Kuwait. The latter was of Iraqi origin, a wealthy man, one of the largest owners of agricultural lands in the state of Basra, and he was close on his mother's side to the first mayor of Kuwait, Muhammad. Al-Sabah, who was assassinated by Mubarak Al-Sabah, and his sons took refuge in Basra, so Yusuf bin Al-Ibrahim adopted them and allied with Al-Rashid to end Mubarak's rule.

Sheikh Mubarak had previously, after he signed a protection agreement with Britain, in the year 1900, carried out a series of attacks inside and in the center of the Arabian Peninsula, to help his ally Abdul Rahman bin Saud against Abdulaziz bin Rashid, but he stopped his aggressive activities under the guidance of the British Resident in Kuwait, who ordered him to stop. So as not to provide a justification for the Ottoman authorities to intervene in Kuwait.

As a result, Ibn Rashid demanded compensation from the Ottoman authorities from the Governor of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, for the losses suffered by his clan due to the aggression, and an attack on Kuwait if the Ottoman authorities did not respond to his demands.

The British side was hesitant to provide assistance to Sheikh Mubarak during his struggle with Ibn al-Rashid, because Britain was afraid of causing problems between it and the Ottoman Empire. The other reason for its lack of cooperation with the Sheikh was its fear that this would lead to it sacrificing the advantages granted to it under the 1899 agreement. Therefore, Britain did not actually intervene until after Mubarak was defeated in the Battle of Sareef. As a result of some false news leaking to the government of India, that Mubarak had been killed in the battle, one of its ships arrived in Kuwait, due to the loss of its position and gains that the sheikh's death might cause.

The enmity between Mubarak and Abdulaziz bin Rashid intensified, and this was helped by the arrival of Yusuf bin Abdullah Al-Ibrahim to Hail, as Mubarak was quick to move Abdul Rahman Al-Faisal to invade the clans of Ibn Rashid, and he was actually able to defeat them in Al-Rawdah. Then, Sheikh Mubarak prepared an army of tribes hostile to Ibn Rashid, as the two groups met in Al-Sarif, but the Sheikh of Kuwait was unable to withstand the forces of Ibn Al-Rashid, trained for war, as well as the Ottoman forces led

by Fayd Pasha, who strengthened Ibn Al-Rashid, and the battle ended with Mubarak's defeat.

Jamal Qasim Zakaria, previous source, vol. 2, pp. 329-330. The Ottoman government of Sheikh Mubarak felt weak after his defeat in the Battle of Al-Sarif, believing that he would easily be led into its administration, so it decided to take advantage of this opportunity to increase its influence over Kuwait ; Rajab Pasha, the captain of Basra, visited Kuwait on the orders of the Ottoman authorities in November 1901, after the governor of Basra telegraphed to him to meet Sheikh Mubarak and to warn him against his recklessness and recklessness in his previous actions, and to withdraw from his error and seek for himself safety by returning to religion and submitting to the Ottoman authority ; There is no doubt that Field Marshal Faydi Pasha was fully aware that Mubarak would not be easily swayed by words without accompanying them with action, as the use of force was the most successful way to subjugate him, so he prepared an army and based its leadership on Muhammad Pasha of Daghistani, and ordered him to march to Basra, where they met. With the governor, Mohsen Pasha, who expressed his opinion to him about the plan that he intended to implement, as he suggested to him that he send a delegation ahead of him to Kuwait to negotiate with Mubarak, and to inform him of the content of the Hamayouni order in a manner of gentleness and kindness.

The Ottoman military forces arrived in Kuwait in early December 1901, to overthrow Sheikh Mubarak and restore legitimate authority there. This force was led by Rajab Pasha, the captain, and brother of the governor of Basra, Najib Bey, on board the Ottoman ship (Zohaf), where the captain of Basra informed Sheikh Mubarak that the Ottoman Empire It was offered to him either to accept Ottoman military protection in Kuwait, provided that it was subject to its orders, or to leave Kuwait and go to Istanbul or wherever he wanted in the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Sultan would pay him a monthly salary, and in the event of failure to respond to her orders in what was stated in the first or second, Ottoman orders will be issued to remove him by force.

It is noted that the Ottoman Empire was not unaware of Mubarak's actions and his secret contacts with Britain, as Mohsen Pasha intended to put an end to his independence and rebellion, and asked Mubarak to accept the presence of the Ottoman garrison in Kuwait, and to establish a revenues house and a telegraph office, but the latter continued to procrastinate, and did not He gave a conclusive answer, so he contacted (Kimball), the British Resident in the Persian Gulf (1900-1904), asking him to inform his government to quickly declare its permanent protection over Kuwait as soon as possible. He also asked him to confront the Ottoman forces and prevent them from landing in Kuwait, and to give them permission to use them. Force if necessary, then Kambal visited Kuwait and informed Sheikh Mubarak that Britain would provide him with protection and assistance on the condition that he adhere to the 1899 agreement, preferring not to officially declare British protection over Kuwait at that time.

On December 23, 1901, Sheikh Mubarak asked for a period of three days after which he would submit his answer to the Ottoman authorities. The next day, the British ship (Robertsett) left the port of Kuwait with a message for the resident of Muhammarah. Based on these movements, the Turkish official withdrew the deadline granted to Sheikh Mubarak, and asked the Sheikh to respond immediately. Soon, the British ship Sphinx arrived from Muhammarah without a written guarantee of protection, and Sheikh Mubarak was asked by the British Resident to inform the Ottoman authorities that the British authorities were forcefully preventing him from expressing his opinion.

The British battleship made it clear to the Ottomans that the Indian government would not allow Sheikh Mubarak to negotiate with you, and asked them immediately to leave Kuwait, otherwise it would fire on the Ottoman ship and sink it with everyone on it. Following this, the delegation returned directly to Basra, and informed Field Marshal Rajab Pasha of Baghdad about the British government's interference in the matter

through its confrontation with them. Since the Ottoman government was avoiding a direct clash with the British government, it issued an Ottoman declaration to maintain the status quo in the sheikhdom, after threatening the British government if its existing forces led by Rajab Pasha and Najib Pasha did not withdraw immediately from Kuwait, or be sent For new forces by its allies, it will send British forces to protect Kuwait.

The third Ottoman attempt in 1902:

The Ottoman Empire did not stop harassing Sheikh Mubarak politically and militarily, and since his properties and orchards in Basra constituted an important economic resource for him, it threatened to seize parts of them for the benefit of his nephews, especially since it was able to extract from his agent in Basra, Abdulaziz Al-Salem Al-Badr, his title deeds to the lands. These properties are spread across Jarulan, Al-Ajiradiyah Island, Kut Al-Zein, Al-Sufiya Al-Dawasir, and Al-Faw.

Accordingly, after the failure of its multiple campaigns against it, the Ottoman authority decided to reduce Sheikh Mubarak's influence in the northern regions of Kuwait and distance him as much as possible from these areas, through which the Baghdad-Berlin railway was likely to pass. For this reason, in the year 1902, it sent a ground campaign, in conjunction with its ally Ibn Rashid, against Mubarak to Umm Qasr, Safwan, Warba, and Boubyan, to submit to its Ottoman authority.

It seems that Germany was pushing the Ottoman Empire to annex the northern provinces to its direct authority, including the coastal areas, in order to exploit the narrow and deep exits of Khor Abdullah and Al-Zubair to be the end of the railway line to be constructed.

After only two months, the Ottomans were able to occupy an island in Salmiya Bay, located 10 miles north of Kuwait. Perhaps the reason for this renewed activity of the Ottoman Empire is due to the discovery of the depth of the narrow water inlets in Khor Abdullah and Khor Al-Zubair, located behind Boubyan Island, as these areas constitute... The alternative and final station of the Baghdad railway line to be established. British reports confirmed that northern Kuwait and Khor Abdullah are likely to turn the shores of this waterway into a railway station in the future.

At the beginning of the year 1902, news came that the Ottoman authorities had established a military barracks in Khor Abdullah, while the reports of the British captain of the ship Sphinx, who was sent to inquire about this issue after his visit to the region between February 14 and 19, 1902, indicated the presence of the Turkish military barracks, and that the Ottoman forces It entered Umm Qasr approximately two weeks ago, and a force of approximately 20 fighters was stationed in the southeastern corner of Bubiyan Island.

The effect of Ottoman control over these areas and the establishment of garrisons in them, in addition to Ibn Rashid's attack on Kuwait from Basra, created a kind of fear and anxiety on the British side. When the British authorities learned of the significant increase in military forces in the Basra garrison, concern prevailed about the Ottoman concentration in (Subaiha and Sabiha), two places near Bubiyan Island, which prompted Britain to confront this attempt, as it issued its orders in January 1902, to two British warships. Moving from Bombay in India to join the British warships stationed in the port of Kuwait.

On February 21, 1902, Britain, for its part, sent an additional warship to the shores of Kuwait, and at the same time claimed in a report that Kuwait had established rights to Bubiyan Island. Britain also submitted a protest to the Sublime Porte against what it called Ottoman violations.

As a result, the British government recognized that Umm Qasr and Bubiyan belonged to Ottoman sovereignty, explaining that the positioning of Ottoman forces in Umm Qasr, Safwan and Bubiyan could not be described as a violation of the agreement to maintain

the status quo, or as a justification for demanding an end to Turkish intervention. The Ottoman Empire responded to this, explaining that Kuwait is part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, and that its submission to the Ottoman authorities is not complete, but that its sheikh enjoys a sufficient degree of independence, so Sheikh Mubarak's fears increased from those statements.

He would approve the current situation in both Umm Qasr and Bubiyan, and he did not hope that there would be no encroachment on the Kuwait region from the Ottoman government. British documents also confirmed that the deployment of Ottoman forces in these areas cannot be considered in any way as not affecting the Sheikh's rights to authority over them. At the same time, Mubarak made a failed attempt to woo the governor of Basra, Nuri Pasha, and offered him a huge bribe in order to stop these preparations, but the governor refused to accept the bribe.

The British government was informed that the Ottoman Empire did not respect Mubarak's rights and that it was reluctant to intervene that was not consistent with the promise it had made to Mubarak in 1899. As for Bubiyan Island, His Majesty the King's government confirmed that it would remain silent over the "Ottoman occupation" of it, and established a barracks there. It may weaken the claims of the Sheikh of Kuwait in this region, in addition to confusing the current situation in Kuwait, as I made clear that the Sheikh's claims to (Umm Qasr) do not warrant support, while Britain has expressed its willingness to resist the Turkish advance in Subiya".

The British men began presenting proposals regarding the issue of Bubiyan and Umm Qasr, as one of the proposals called for insinuating that Bubiyan Island belongs to the Emir of Kuwait, and this is in the event that the Turkish forces did not withdraw, and also pushed the Sheikh of Kuwait to establish a garrison on the northern coast to balance the force with the Ottoman garrisons located in Umm Qasr, Qasr and Al-Ghaith, and that these measures are necessary to preserve British interests there. If the Turkish force does not withdraw, the British government must oblige the Emir of Kuwait to establish a garrison on this island. The Indian government believes that the Sheikh will feel extreme resentment regarding the temporary withdrawal of Captain Knox from Kuwait, which will take place soon. Accordingly, there is another reason to strive to find a satisfactory solution. For the issue raised on Bubiyan Island.

After appointing S. C. Knox, who was sent to perform the mission of Assistant for Political Affairs in the capacity of political agent in Kuwait, Major Knox confirmed that by expressing his opinion about the Turkish military garrison remaining on Bubiyan Island, the British government could completely refuse and provide any specific guarantees regarding the presence of the British Resident in Kuwait. This will happen even if Major Knox withdraws during this period, as the Turks will gradually view his appointment as a *fait accompli*, and their refusal to withdraw their soldiers from Bubiyan Island will enable the British government to verify the Ottoman government's intention to establish military garrisons on the island.

On May 3, 1902, Mubarak submitted a protest to Britain, claiming that these places were within the borders of Kuwait. As for Umm Qasr, it was only a name given to a simple center at the end of Khor Subiya that included a palace built by Ibn Rizq in the days of the morning. Boubyan was owned by the Kuwaitis because they had set up fishing nets there a long time ago. While the Ottoman authorities confirmed that they had control over these areas by virtue of them belonging to them and falling within the borders of their sovereignty, in addition to that, Sheikh Mubarak's "protest" was not heeded by the Ottoman Empire, but rather it ordered its soldiers to impose restrictions on the Kuwaitis, especially on Bubiyan Island.. As a result, Britain asked Sheikh Mubarak to send Ubaid al-Ghurba, Sheikh Fakhd al-Ghurba from Hawazin, to present to it the documents in his possession. Likewise, it will send to Sheikh al-Dasani, and ask him to present the agreements and receipts in his possession to prove the arguments for the ownership of the

region. His. Knox also asked Sheikh Mubarak to send him one or two documents proving this from members of the region. The Sheikh's response came on the 25th of Jumada al-Awwal, in which it was stated that Ubaid al-Gharba did not have any document despite the presence of members of this family for hundreds of years in this region.

Knox's British political response to Sheikh Mubarak confirms that everything he said about Warba Island has become known and clear that it belongs to them, and that it is a gathering place for the people of Kuwait to practice net fishing for two hundred years, and it is a source of livelihood for the poor fishermen of the people of Kuwait, and that the island is an integral part of Kuwait. But your words must be supported by evidence, arguments, and evidence, that this island is the place where the fishing nets of the people of Kuwait are set, and without a doubt, Mubarak will find evidence from some elderly people on this subject. Through the investigations of the political agent in Kuwait regarding the rights of the Sheikh of Kuwait on Warba Island, he concluded that these were demands of a questionable nature and without convincing evidence.

British documents confirmed the issue on the part of the Awazem regarding Warba Island, as they explained that there are no fishing nets on Warba Island, but rather fishing nets on Bubiyan Island, while some of the Awazem members who have fishing nets on Bubiyan Island confirmed that they have fishing licenses. There are written Ottoman documents, recommendations to their residents, sale deeds for places where they have the right to set (fishing nets) on the island, and purchase documents. This shows that Warba Island, through investigations by British political agents, is part of Basra, not Kuwait.

Until May 16, 1909, the issue remained under scrutiny and investigation, and no evidence was obtained to prove the ownership of Warba Island to the Sheikh of Kuwait. Despite the failure to reach satisfactory results for the Sheikh of Kuwait and his British successors, this remains evidence of the great British role and its continuous interference in its attempts to separate Kuwait from... For their interests in India and the Arabian Gulf.

Mubarak felt the failure of the British government to support his claims regarding those areas, meaning that the British government had moved from its sharp attack after restricting him to the treaty to coldness, as a result of the political change that took place at that time after the signing of the protectorate, and thus Britain achieved what it wanted in controlling Kuwait. With it, it could put pressure on the Ottoman Empire, so it did not present any position on Mubarak's claims, but rather left matters alone.

But later, in the year 1904, the British government issued a statement on the necessity of withdrawing the Ottoman forces from the island, to replace them with the forces of Sheikh Mubarak, and also promised to help him establish a military center on Bubiyan Island, to balance the Ottoman garrison in Umm Qasr, but Mubarak feared the consequences of that unless it is provided with adequate protection, as the Sheikh requested that British ships visit Kuwait from time to time.

In September 1902, the Ottoman Empire, in conjunction with Yusuf bin Ibrahim and the sons of Sheikhs Muhammad and Jarrah, who were killed by Mubarak, planned a new attempt to return Kuwait to direct Ottoman authority by sea and eliminate the rule of Sheikh Mubarak, after it became clear to Yusuf and the sons of the two sheikhs that the conditions of the Ottoman Empire did not allow it to carry out campaigns. Another official military force was launched against the Sheikh of Kuwait, and it was necessary at that time for it to adhere to complete neutrality, so I telegraphed to them that they would launch a campaign to seize and surprise Kuwait City, assassinate the Sheikh, and take over affairs.

Accordingly, Yusuf bin Ibrahim decided to launch a naval campaign against Kuwait, where he gathered a force of Arabs on the eastern coast led by Utba bin Muhammad and Hamoud bin Jarrah, two of the Sheikh's nephews, well-armed with rifles, with sailing ships from the Shatt al-Arab, and departed. In September 1902, those ships, loaded with

men, weapons and sabotage machines, headed towards Kuwait after receiving a non-objection from the governor of Basra, Mustafa Nuri Pasha. News of them soon reached the British Navy, which revealed their movement, so Armstrong, commander of the ship, sent (Labonge) ship to the sheikh to inform him of the route of those ships, so that he can take caution, precaution, and adequate preparation to meet that expedition ; He fortified the city and sent eyes and spies to find out the strength of the numbers.

News of the clash indicates that on September 5, 1902, the British armed ship discovered the location of the Ottoman ships in Khor Abdullah, and they disappeared in the grass and tall weeds. The British ship was able to chase the two ships while carrying (100-150) armed men, and it was not raising any flag, as They were seized and burned.

This was the last effort of the Ottoman Empire to regain Kuwait, which contributed to increasing British intervention in the country, protecting the Sheikh from his enemies, and forcing the Ottomans to withdraw from the coast of Kuwait.

It seems that the main reason for the failure of this attempt is that the Ottoman Empire was not able, under the general circumstances, to prevent the confrontation with the British forces in the Arabian Gulf on the one hand, and on the other hand, it was forced to adhere to the statement it had made to maintain the current status of Kuwait and not seek to change it. Therefore, the Ottoman authorities were unable to intervene directly, which led them to seek the help of their agents in the region who were dissatisfied with Sheikh Mubarak to end his authority in Kuwait. This was not enough, as the British had pledged to protect Sheikh Mubarak in the service of their growing interests in the Gulf and their quest for complete control over the region. All in all, this is what happened later.

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Ind. O.F. Foreign office, April 11th 1905, no;114, 11th April 1905.

Ind. O.F. Government of India foreign department, Simla, the 6th September 1904, no;1597, 6th September 1904, p.9.

Ind. O.F. India office to foreign office, no;1, 7th October 1908, File No;

Ahmed bin Rizq: He was born to a Turkish mother and lived while traveling. It is claimed that he built the Al-Jasar fort and dug wells. He also practiced the pearl trade after he resided in Kurdlan, near Basra, and this confirms that he is a subject of the Ottoman Empire.

Ind. O.F. Dated Kuwait, the 29th June 1908, from major Knox, political agent Kuwait, to major p.z.cox, c.i.e., political resident in The Persian Gulf, Bashire, no;347, 29th June 1908,

Mustafa Abdul Qadir Al-Najjar, Nizar Abdul Latif Al-Hadithi, previous source, p. 29.

Jamal Qasim Zakaria, previous source, vol. 2, p. 339.

Hussein Khalaf Khazal, previous source, vol. 2, p. 60.

Ind. O.F. Dated Bushire, the 7th (received 20th), July 1908 from captain A.P. Taevor La, first assistant resident, in charge current duties, to S.H. Butler, esq, c.i.e. Secretary to the government of India in the foreign department, Simla, No;2119, 20th July 1908

Ind. O.F. Translation of letter, dated 23rd June 1908, from major Knox, political agent Kuwait to sheikh Mubarak -us- subah, Ruler of Kuwait, no;79, 23rd June 1908.

Ind. O.F. Dated 7th June 1908, From Major S. G. Knox, political Agent, Kuwait, to Sheikh Mubarak As Subah, No;59, 7th June 1908.

Ind. O.F. Government of India, Foreign Department, Secret, External, To The Hon,ble Viscount Morley of Blackburn, O.M., his Majesty's S. Secretary of State for India, no: 168, the 10th September 1908, File No;

Ind. O.F. India Office to Foreign Office, no;1, 7th October 1908.

Ind. O.F. Government of India, foreign Department, Secret, External, To The Right hon. ble viscount morley of Blackburn, O.M., his majesty's secretary of state for India, no: 68, the 6th May 1909, File NO;

- Hussein Khalaf Khazal, previous source, vol. 2, pp. 60-61.
- Jamal Qasim Zakaria, previous source, vol. 2, p. 339.
- Hussein Khalaf Khazaal, previous source, vol. 2, p. 63.
- C. C. Lorimer, previous source, Historical Section, vol. 3, p. 1550.
- Hussein Khalaf Khazal, previous source, vol. 2, p. 339.
- Khaled Yahya Ahmed Al-Jubouri, previous source, p. 33.
- C. C. Lorimer, previous source, Historical Section, vol. 3, p. 1550.
- Hussein Khalaf Khazal, previous source, vol. 2, p. 339.
- C. C. Lorimer, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1550-1551.
- Thaer Yousef Issa, previous source, pp. 47-48.