Criticism of the Political theses of the Ruling Political Movement in Afghanistan: A Comparative Study

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Abstract

A state of stagnation and intellectual stagnation appears clear in the thought of the Taliban movement, as it is still not open to different readings with regard to its vision and political thought. It has no room to read contemporary political concepts and the possibility of formulating its own vision regarding the concept of the state, as it is still unable to present a thesis. Mature and clear state and governance.

Keywords: *Politics, stagnation, religious principles.*

Introduction

A state of stagnation and intellectual stagnation appears clear in the thought of the Taliban movement, as it is still not open to different readings with regard to its vision and political thought. It has no room to read contemporary political concepts and the possibility of formulating its own vision regarding the concept of the state, as it is still unable to present a thesis. Mature and clear state and governance.

It seems that this is one of the problems faced by many Islamic political movements in the Eastern world in the contemporary era, and it is clear that the general performance of the Islamic movements was modest and confused, for two important factors:

the first: It is that these movements entered politics suddenly, and moved from secret to public in an unexpected way. Hence, it had no plans or policies to guide it in managing public political practice, and all its political heritage related to concealment, deceiving opponents, or even resigning from politics entirely.

The second: The ideology of these movements merges the religious with the political, which makes them look at all issues from a standard perspective that they imagine is the true religion. This perspective constitutes a cognitive barrier to the ability of these movements to understand reality as it is and formulate policies to deal with it that are derived from reality and not from religious jurisprudence. Especially since religion is a set of general principles. Hence, these movements tend to portray their understanding of these principles as a binding law according to which reality must be subjected. For example, some currents see democracy as equivalent to disbelief, while others do not see it as a contradiction with Islam. Two different understandings, each of which attributes it to religion without thinking about the requirements and circumstances of the era. Hence, as they continue to engage in politics, some of these movements may come to a more realistic understanding of the limits of a unilateral understanding of religious principles.

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First: Criticism of the vision of the state and democracy in the Taliban's political thought

The Taliban did not benefit from solid intellectual and theoretical resources in the field of Islamic political thought, religious governance, and other issues related to governance, as the Taliban takes its reading from history without processing, updating, or reviewing, in addition to the absence of a modern written theory of the foundations of governance in the movement.

1-   Criticism of the state's vision in the Taliban's political thought

The Taliban movement was inspired by much of its political thought and its origins from Shah Dehlawi, and we can learn about Dehlawi's political thought by reviewing his two books, Hujjatullah al-Baghiha, and Removing the Secret from the Succession of Caliphs. These two books contained his political ideas and theories related to the state in Islam. The central idea in his political aspirations and visions is the revival of the Islamic Caliphate. In more than one place in these two books, he reviews stations from the history of the Islamic State and sees that the Caliphate in Islam is: "The Caliphate is general leadership in matters of religion, the revival of religious sciences, and the revival of the Sunnah of Jihad and its introductions, such as leadership of the army." Islam, guiding the soldiers, and reviving the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil on behalf of the Prophet (PBUH)." He then explains the four methods for choosing a caliph, which are: pledge of allegiance to the people of the solution and contract, consultation, appointment, and conquest. He believes that there are two types of caliphate: "general and private." What is specific is the succession of the four caliphs whose succession was stipulated by the Messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace): "The caliphate after me is thirty years." The general caliphate is the succession of subsequent caliphs who succeeded in ruling and general caliphate of the Islamic state in subsequent historical stages. Al-Dahlawi does not believe that the application of the theory of caliphate is limited to the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, but rather expands the circle to include later stages of the history of the Islamic nation, and believes that these countries played the role of the caliph in preserving the religion and reviving its features According to Al-Dahlawi, the main function of the Prophet (PBUH) and his main role is to establish the religion, and after his death this task is transferred to the caliph who acts on his behalf. He establishes what he calls the rational evidence for the necessity of the caliphate, as follows: "This is because when each king separated from his city and the money was collected and the heroes joined him, the difference in kingship in their temperaments and the dispersion of their preparations necessitated that there be injustice among them and abandonment of the rightly guided Sunnah, and that some of them covet the city of the other, and that They envy and fight over partial opinions, such as a desire for money and lands, or envy or hatred. When this became widespread among the kings, they were forced to go to the caliph, who is the one who has acquired soldiers and numbers. It is seen as something that is impossible for another man to rob him of his kingdom, for it is only imagined after a general affliction and great effort. And many meetings and spending serious money, without which people become short and habit prevents it. If the caliph is found and his conduct is good in the land, and the tyrants submit to him and the kings submit to him, the blessing will be complete, and the countries and the people will be reassured." In his evaluation of the political experience in Islamic history, he believes that the Rightly Guided Caliphate is the period of the four caliphs. In comparing the caliphate of Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and Muawiyah, the latter is not recognized as a caliphate. But he does not disparage him on the grounds that there was no disparagement of the Prophet (PBUH). After Muawiyah, the caliphate turned into a stubborn king, according to his opinion, and the Umayyad kings did not fulfill their duty towards the nation and did not succeed the Prophet (PBUH) as required. In general, according to Dehlawi, the caliphate is not just a state that manages people's affairs in their worldly lives, but rather it is an authority in the name of religion that works to implement its teachings and revive its laws. He states in several sources that the

Commander of the Faithful (the Caliph) should be chosen by election, not by appointment from any party. The ideal state that Dehlawi aspired to, and this ambition was shared by his students after him, such as Abdul Aziz Dehlawi, Ahmed bin Irfan, and Shah Ismail, is the Caliphate state (In comparing the caliphate of Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and Muawiyah, the latter is not recognized as a caliphate. But he does not disparage him on the grounds that there was no disparagement of the Prophet (PBUH). After Muawiyah, the caliphate turned into a stubborn king, according to his opinion, and the Umayyad kings did not fulfill their duty towards the nation and did not succeed the Prophet (PBUH) as required. In general, according to Dehlawi, the caliphate is not just a state that manages people's affairs in their worldly lives, but rather it is an authority in the name of religion that works to implement its teachings and revive its laws. He states in several sources that the Commander of the Faithful (the Caliph) should be chosen by election, not by appointment from any party. The ideal state that Dehlawi aspired to, and this ambition was shared by his students after him, such as Abdul Aziz Dehlawi, Ahmed bin Irfan, and Shah Ismail, is the Caliphate state (In comparing the caliphate of Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and Muawiyah, the latter is not recognized as a caliphate. But he does not disparage him on the grounds that there was no disparagement of the Prophet (PBUH). After Muawiyah, the caliphate turned into a stubborn king, according to his opinion, and the Umayyad kings did not fulfill their duty towards the nation and did not succeed the Prophet (PBUH) as required. In general, according to Dehlawi, the caliphate is not just a state that manages people's affairs in their worldly lives, but rather it is an authority in the name of religion that works to implement its teachings and revive its laws. He states in several sources that the Commander of the Faithful (the Caliph) should be chosen by election, not by appointment from any party. The ideal state that Dehlawi aspired to, and this ambition was shared by his students after him, such as Abdul Aziz Dehlawi, Ahmed bin Irfan, and Shah Ismail, is the Caliphate state (After Muawiyah, the caliphate turned into a stubborn king, according to his opinion, and the Umayyad kings did not fulfill their duty towards the nation and did not succeed the Prophet (PBUH) as required. In general, according to Dehlawi, the caliphate is not just a state that manages people's affairs in their worldly lives, but rather it is an authority in the name of religion that works to implement its teachings and revive its laws. He states in several sources that the Commander of the Faithful (the Caliph) should be chosen by election, not by appointment from any party. The ideal state that Dehlawi aspired to, and this ambition was shared by his students after him, such as Abdul Aziz Dehlawi, Ahmed bin Irfan, and Shah Ismail, is the Caliphate state (After Muawiyah, the caliphate turned into a stubborn king, according to his opinion, and the Umayyad kings did not fulfill their duty towards the nation and did not succeed the Prophet (PBUH) as required. In general, according to Dehlawi, the caliphate is not just a state that manages people's affairs in their worldly lives, but rather it is an authority in the name of religion that works to implement its teachings and revive its laws. He states in several sources that the Commander of the Faithful (the Caliph) should be chosen by election, not by appointment from any party. The ideal state that Dehlawi aspired to, and this ambition was shared by his students after him, such as Abdul Aziz Dehlawi, Ahmed bin Irfan, and Shah Ismail, is the Caliphate state .

This ambition to establish the caliphate remained alive in the minds of the Deobandis after Dehlawi, and at one time the scholars of Deoband considered the Ottoman sultans as legitimate successors. In our time, the banner of the caliphate was held by Mullah Omar with the support of the Taliban movement, which is considered the legitimate heir to the Deoband School .

As for jihadism and rebellion against the ruler, its origins go back to before Dehlawi. Rather, it is much more than that, as it goes back to Abu Hanifa and the early Hanafi jurists, and here the most prominent thing that should be known from the foundations of the cognitive mind is the opinion of Hanafi jurisprudence on revolution and rebellion against the rulers, so that we can know the extent of the religious influence on political practice. First, the three non-Hanafi schools of thought believe that Rebellion against the

Sultan is an illegal act, and they claimed consensus on it, but it is not true because - according to Zahid's opinion - we find in every era a jurist who sees rebellion against an unjust ruler. Consensus has not been achieved, and we do not know that most jurists are forbidden to revolt against a legitimate ruler, or against a dominant ruler.

Abu Bakr Al-Jassas Al-Hanafi said: "Abu Hanifa's doctrine was famous in fighting oppressors and imams of injustice. That is why Al-Awza'i said about him: 'We tolerated Abu Hanifa in everything until he came to us with the sword, but we could not tolerate him.'" Because in doing so he disagreed with most jurists, and this means that the religious origin of political movements against illegitimate rulers according to the Hanafi school of thought is permissible and sometimes tends toward obligation. Therefore, there is no religious inhibitor or impediment to the formation of armed forces and rebellious groups in Afghanistan because they follow the Hanafi school of thought, which allows them to revolt against the rulers. Foreigners (non-Muslims) if they invade the lands of Islam or Muslim rulers if they exhibit behavior inconsistent with Sharia law or if they rule unjustly and unjustly, in contrast to the other three schools of thought that forbid leaving.

But what is strange is that the Salafists and Hanbalis have shifted from the rule of forbidding rebellion against the Sultan to revolt against those who do not see their opinion. However, what the Taliban is described by is that they did not revolt for the sake of a humanitarian national project. Rather, they presented the Hanafi school of thought as an extremist school of thought. Rather, they created another Hanafi school of thought, which called for one Researchers say that Afghan Islam remained the most strict and closed version. Another researcher said that the Taliban's Islam follows the Hanafi school of thoughtThe traditional conservative, non-reformist, and non-Salafist model, that is, the model thatPeople knew about him in early times, and he mentioned that the Taliban consider the reformists to be Westernized, that is, influenced by the ideas of the West to the extent that they see the Salafists as heretics because they are against the four traditional Sunni schools of thought. However, they welcomed the Wahhabi groups when the Salafists came to fight with them against the Soviets, and thus some Salafist concepts leaked out. To them, despite the fact that the senior Wahhabi scholars of Najd do not see Abu Hanifa as anything other than a Murji' and they forbid imitating the Hanafi school of thought, and they exclude the Maturidism from the term of what is called "Ahl al-Sunnah" and consider itSufi practice (Deobandi) is an innovation and a misguidance. But: the need for the two parties (the Taliban and the Wahhabis) to unite against Iran and Shiism, under the pretext of resisting the Soviet occupation, to give up multiple basics in their ideological component for pragmatic reasons. For this reason, it is not seen as considering these transformations as fixed or strategic, but rather the result of temporary tactical need that, when it disappears, the conflict returns. and quarreling)

The political thought of the Taliban movement is also derived from the intellectual foundations that focused on two main axes: a religious axis and an ethnic axis. Among the components of these axes are the revival of the caliphate model, the fight against the innovations of Western civilization, a return to the pre-modern era and the strict interpretation of religious concepts and military self-righteousness. Believing in the principle of caliphate, the Taliban hastened to identify its future successor in Kandahar before achieving any kind of decisive victory in Afghanistan in The year is 1994.

Opposing elements of Western culture and civilization in general is one of the basic slogans of most Islamic groups, but what distinguishes Taliban fundamentalism is their absolute rejection of Western civilization. The reason is due to their religious factor, as the spirit of worship and holiness has a special place in the Taliban's fundamentalism compared to the theological and religious achievements of the ancestors. People are generally committed to following the ways and sayings of Salafi scholars. What they are accused of is their reliance on the only ideal model of the life of rural communities in the

early Islamic centuries, their dry and evasive behavior towards women, and their attitude towards the social and educational role of women in society, rooted in their Salafist spirit.

Talibanism can be considered an extremist type of fundamentalism because it has the general characteristics of fundamentalism, because it is essentially based on ideological axes that it takes for granted. These axes can be found in the religious-political ideas of Talibanism in the following:

A- Reviving the Caliphate rule model.

B- Fighting the phenomena of Western civilization and completely denying them.

C- A return to our pre-modern era and the strict interpretation of religious concepts.

As a movement that emerged from the Pashtun community in Afghanistan, the Taliban could not be further from the influence of tribal culture. The basis of the Taliban's influence on Pashtun tribal culture is quite evident in their interpretation of religious concepts. The first and most important step in the influence of tribal culture on the religious thought of the Taliban is to choose the model of the political system and ways to legitimize it. For example, the model of the caliphate system in the political thought of the movement. Although it is a truly Islamic model, there is no doubt that it is Islamic, but its choice As the only model of legitimate government among other models in the Islamic world and the New World, it could have other motives; What if a divorced person is at the head of a government system that gives no role to other members of the nation? It has much in common with the traditional tribal leadership system model in rural Pashtun communities.

Violence and inflexibility are other features of the Taliban's political style, which is a product of traditional Pashtun culture. Tribal culture is usually a culture of violence and inflexibility. Hatred and revenge are important principles in Pashtun customs, and the Pashtun tribal people are so famous that if the Pashtun elements take revenge after 20 years, they will think that they acted too soon. The Taliban's violent behavior towards opponents and the people under their rule, especially the Hazaras and Uzbeks, is rooted in their grudges and revenge against their enemies. In addition to the above, there are many other examples in the thinking of the Taliban that were influenced by their tribal customs and are currently applied under the title of Sharia in the areas under their control, such as: xenophobia, opposition to international institutions and regulations, and hostility to urban life and appearances.

In view of the above, the Taliban's political ideology is based on the following:

1- Establishing an Islamic government that continues the caliphateThe worthy caliphs, noting that we are talking here about a government that continues the caliphate, not a government that is likely to claim the caliphate. In fact, the Taliban believes in a government ruled by "leaders" and uses the word "leaders" in its own fundamentalist sense. The proposed Taliban government has a limited population located in a specific geographical area and is governed by only one ideology - which is imposed on everyone - and no one within the scope of this government has the right to oppose or violate the ruling ideology. Is geographic region the only difference between the proposed Taliban government and an Islamic caliphate that does not respect borders and borders? The Taliban's ideology is based on the principle that after eliminating hostile groups and parties, Islam should become the sole ruling religion in society and the current laws of the country should be written on the basis of Islamic law (from the point of view of Salafi thought).

2- The government that assumes leadership of society must be a religious government.

3- The head of state must be a believer in the Taliban's goals and a true believer in its religious and political ideology.

4-   The country's courts must be governed on the basis of Sharia law rather than civil rulings, and must operate independently of other government institutions in approving and implementing rulings.

5-   The Taliban consider democracy a polytheism and do not consider it a reward for society, because democracy gives the right to make laws to people and not to God, according to their description. Therefore, in order to legitimize his views, he uses and cites the views of Sayyid Abu Ali Maududi detailed in the book "The Political Theory of Islam."The Taliban does not consider the drafting of a constitution or regulations to regulate the country's affairs necessary and considers the Qur'an and Sunnah to be the constitution of the Islamic State.

6-   The Taliban does not support the formation of new political parties, and its former leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, explicitly refuses to form a political party because, in his opinion: "This will lead to division in society because factionalism will be possible on the basis of ethnic, tribal and linguistic differences, and this in itself is an example of the prejudices before the pre-Islamic era that caused There are many problems, hostility and hypocrisy between people."

Regarding its revisions and pragmatic or other changes, the researcher in political Islam affairs, Hassan Abu Haniyeh, emphasizes the fact that there are no intellectual revisions in the movement's literature, and it still adheres to its principles and does not want to transform into a liberal emirate. It insists on the rule of Sharia, but the perspectives of Sharia have begun to change. It did not allow photography, and in women's clothing, the movement imposed the Afghan burqa and rejected the niqab. Meanwhile, the expert on Afghan affairs, Tayseer Allouni, confirms that the changes in the Taliban movement are a matter of mere crust, and they will not compromise on the application of Sharia law.

As for the Taliban's structure, it is not a movement that relies on strict organizational structures like some groups in the Arab region, but rather a comprehensive framework of individuals, scholars, tribal leaders, and allied movements within it that owes allegiance and allegiance to the Taliban Emir. The movement does not have a hierarchical structure and structure like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Rather, it is closer to a bloc of people that has a sheikh to whom it submits in obedience and obedience. He is called the Commander of the Faithful. He is currently Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of the Taliban, and he has three deputies (Mawlawi Yaqub, the son of Mullah Omar, Siraj al-Din Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network, and Abdul Ghani Baradar, head of the Taliban's political bureau and one of the founding members of the movement. The Taliban's Commander of the Faithful may not be removed unless he violates Sharia law, or is unable to carry out his responsibilities, and he remains in his position until death.). There are three types of Shura Councils for the movement, with the movement adopting the jurisprudential opinion that says that Shura is informative and not binding: One of those councils is the Central Shura Council of the movement. This council does not have a fixed number and specific members, although the movement announced at the beginning of its formation that it included 70 members.

As a result of the Taliban's political project, there is no basic and consistent source that we may rely on to explain the truth of the Taliban's ideas, convictions, and policies, except for what is scattered here or there, which is definitely not called a reference, document, or argument in scientific terms. But if sources and documents are scarce, what comes to our hands, even verbally from narrators, meetings, or statements, may be enough for us to show what can help us understand, guide, and clarify. In this context, earlier, the Taliban movement distributed a pamphlet In it, she explained a number of her political visions and intellectual visions during her quest to liberate control of Afghanistan from the war leaders in its first military campaign in 1996 AD. These visions and ideas were re-implemented by the movement in their second rule, with minor modifications. These provisions were similar to a draft constitutional declaration, very

simple and naive, presented to people whose only concern regarding everything promised and planned in it was security and the imposition of force on everyone.

"Pashtna" was practiced, perhaps more severely than what King Zahir Shah had practiced before on other races, and with regard to education, it was the last thing the Taliban cared about, especially the education of women, whom the movement did not see as having a right to it or to other areas of life. There is no doubt that this The position stems from the philosophy of Pashtunwali, which sees in a woman only a child-bearer and a caretaker, and is not in any way related to the religion that honored the sons of Adam, both men and women. What the movement did, then, was nothing but the directives of the "Pashtunwali," those tribal Bedouin instructions that do not take into account any right of women to inheritance, contrary to what Islam assumed for them. Likewise, acknowledging the right to take revenge is in clear violation of Islamic law, which does not approve of taking revenge by hand, in a blatant violation of the authority of the guardian, who monopolizes the right to use force and enforce punishments. And last but not least, was the movement keen to implement Islamic law, as it said, on the method of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, and we see that it is far from talking about Islamic law and its simplest applications, which through the spread of Islamic culture necessarily became known from Islamic thought? By this we mean shura, which corresponds to democracy, participation, and institutions according to contemporary governance theorists. This movement, which is always keen to mention shura and political participation, is perhaps a smart move to deceive the Islamic political parties present on the ground, and they soon retreated from it. Therefore, we can only talk about a Pashtun nationalist movement that does not see religion except through "Pashtunwali," that is, its customs and traditions, and does not interpret Sharia law except through the "Deobandi" school, which mixes the Hanafi school of thought with the Hadith school, and Salafi doctrines.

Second: Criticism of the vision of the state and contemporary political concepts in the thought of Al-Qaeda and ISIS:

Al-Qaeda and ISIS are distinguished from the Taliban in terms of political theses, as the two aforementioned organizations adopt political theses that have historical and contemporary theories, and their position is clear on contemporary political concepts, and they have a vision of their own, and below we will try to detail that..

• Criticism of the state's vision and contemporary political concepts in Al-Qaeda's thought:

Al-Qaeda sought to establish an Islamic emirate that would resist Western influence in the world and implement Islamic law in the areas it controlled. The organization follows the doctrine of jihad in the face of the American occupation of Afghanistan, and with the development of Al-Qaeda, its goal has become to confront all regional governments while confronting the distant enemy represented by Western governments. Accordingly, there are five major concepts that establish the thought of Salafist jihadism in general and establish the thought of Al-Qaeda in particular and define its context and scope of action:

The first concept: (the abode of Islam and the abode of disbelief):As the house of Islam is one whose people are Muslims (the countries of Muslims), and the second is those whose people are infidels (the countries of the unbelievers), and the Salafists emphasize the importance of prevailing over the rulings of Islam, which means taking into account the people and their religion in this issue. Also, if the infidels take control of the land of Islam and possess it and prevail over it with their rulings, it will not become a land of disbelief as long as the Muslims there perform some Islamic rituals and display some of the Islamic rulings. Therefore, it will not be a land of war, and the land of Islam will turn into a land of disbelief with the appearance of some of the rulings of disbelief in it. Al-Qaeda used this concept by applying it to Afghanistan, as it is among the countries of Islam whose rulers are characterized by infidelity, and therefore it is transformed into a house of infidelity. Therefore, it must be returned to the house of Islam by implementing the

provisions of Islam by preparing the Islamic army and achieving victory for Islam and expanding the scope of Islam by exporting it. Islam to the rest of the world, all through jihadist operations.

The second concept (unity): It is a central concept in the Salafist system in general, but it comes distinct in the discourse of Salafist jihadism, and this concept is evident in the rejection of ruling by other than what God has revealed and the excommunication of rulers and man-made laws, and it is socially manifested in the ruling conception of society, which has come to be inhabited by the new pre-Islamic era.

The third concept (Jihad is the path of monotheism)That is, jihad was prescribed for the sake of monotheism, based on Abdullah Azzam's saying: Whoever goes to jihad returns with a heart other than the one with which he went, meaning that he will not remain the same vision nor the same representation of the self and the other.

The fourth concept (loyalty and disavowal)It means supporting the believers and supporting them, and disavowing the unbelievers and being hostile to them. However, the jihadi Salafists believe that disavowal does not stop at hatred, but extends to the necessity of atonement, and they write about its complexity and importance, especially with regard to the ruling regimes in the region, which are described by them and in their literature as tyrants.

The fifth concept (Taghooth):Jihadist Salafism almost limits it to ruling by man-made laws, and those who rule by them in the Arab and Islamic worlds. In itself, it is sufficient not only to challenge statutory texts and regulations; rather, he rejected it completely in matters of belief, as well as in matters of organizing relations between the components of the group and the nation.

Based on the above-mentioned concepts, the architect of Salafist jihadism, Abu Musab al-Suri, provides a critical reading of the mistakes made by the Salafi-jihadist movement and Al-Qaeda, regarding their jihadist project, including:

1-   The unilateralism of the approach in the jihadi approach, its lack of comprehensiveness, its confinement to issues of loyalty, disavowal, and governance, and the narrow horizons of library and literary production in the jihadist movement. The jihadist library is small in size and quantity, single in quality and production is very small and almost non-existent. Most of it depends on the narrations and repetitions of the jurisprudence of Imam Ibn Taymiyyah and some of the imams of the Salafi school, and although the calamities are many, and the legal and realistic political fields are wide, and the need to write about them is great, the library of the jihadists was limited either to military books and training and work curricula, or to what I mentioned regarding issues of governance. And issues of loyalty and disavowal.

2-   The weakness of the educational material in the jihadist current's curricula. This area is one of the most deficient areas among the jihadists, and it has decreased with the third generation of the jihadist movement, in contrast to the first and second generations, who were able to achieve a decent level of education for their cadres between the years 1965 and 1985 approximately. Abu Musab says: "I noticed during the second period of the Afghan Arabs under the Taliban that the third generation of jihadists began to be characterized by ignorance and lack of education in most of its segments. All of this led to many of the jihadists' circles, with the absence of the educational curriculum, being characterized by cruelty, cold-bloodedness, and a lack of mercy. Among the jihadists, he reduced Islam, its beliefs, and its rituals to the obligation of jihad, and thought that it was the entire religion, and he reduced jihad to its rulings, etiquette, behaviors, and characteristics required by the status of the pinnacle of Islam. He reduced it to fighting, and he summarized fighting with the patience, perseverance, preparation, and ethics required by witnessing the battles themselves. Even while witnessing battles, you noticed

a lack of patience and perseverance, and a long endurance. They reduced the concept of fighting to shooting.

3-   The absence of the impact of the jurisprudence of reality in the legitimate political approach of many jihadists: Although it is a general feature that characterized Islamic parties and groups at the beginning of the Islamic awakening, some parties and groups advanced in the fields of knowledge and perception of reality, while Salafism in general and the jihadi school were distinguished by a low level of knowledge, cultural awareness, and awareness of reality. .

4-   Not adopting the concept of jihad against the external enemy and entering into the cycle of confronting the regimes.

5-   Inability to determine the legal and dynamic content of a number of basic concepts:

•   The Mujahideen group: What is it? What is its definition? What is the nature of its relationship with the groups around it? What is the legitimacy of the multiplicity of these mujahid and non-mujahid groups? What is the proportion of its powers and content to the general Muslim community? What are the justifications and legitimacy of its existence?

•   The emirate, Shura, and decisions: What are the limits of the prince's powers in his relations with those around him, including the leaders, leaders, and institutions of the group? And therefore the method of decision-making in the group? Shura, its nature and obligation? Is it a private or public emirate?

•   Pledge of allegiance, hearing, and obedience: What is the nature of this pledge of allegiance? What is the content of her contract? And therefore the mutual rights and duties between the prince and the individual or between the individual and the group? How do you solve it? And based on what? What are the consequences of revoking it? When is it permissible and when is it forbidden?

Based on the above, one of the researchers believes that one of the reasons for the intellectual defect of Al-Qaeda and the Takfiri groups lies in the fact that these groups suffer from a defect in the concept of these applied issues. So where lies the error in the approach of these groups in dealing with the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah, especially since they have texts and documents in science as their supports? Legitimate?:

The first thing There is a problem in separating the partial texts from the overall objectives. Some people stopped at the objectives and undermined the details of the rulings, and another party met them. They adhered to the literalism of the partial texts but ignored the overall objectives, and the correct approach is to link the partial text to its overall purpose.

The second thing The pasteurized taking of some details, devoid of their circumstantial and historical context, or not linking them to each other's texts.

The third thing They ignored the laws of gradualism and gradualism. They jumped, for example, to the rulings of the Meccan period. In the Meccan period, they ordered certain things followed by stages in which the legal rulings were graduated, but they jumped beyond these rulings. For example, it is not possible for someone to say that we take the rulings of the Meccan period in terms of permissibility and prohibition, as this matter has been exhausted. from him. We follow the principles of gradualism and progress, but they have closed this door.

Fourth matter The curriculum ignores the conditions related to the jurisprudence of enjoining good and forbidding evil, and the mere fact that this is evil requires them to work to change it with what is called the knowledge of (consequences). What is the outcome? What leads to changing the evil, for example in a country that shows obscene

films or alcohol, so you break them, what are the effects of this action? Does the evil go away or does another evil result in it? They don't look at prognosis. There is ignorance in defining legal terminology and taking certain general terms without referring to scholars.

The fifth matter The biggest flaw in their methodology is that they take this knowledge from the books and pamphlets of scholars or without the method of systematic reception that gives the correct compass for dealing with legal texts. This is one of the biggest evils for someone to read a verse or two or a hadith or two hadiths from which he understands words or opens a network - The Internet and he finds Abu So-and-so said and Abu So-and-so said, then he comes and considers himself in the position of Abu Hanifa or Malik and says: They are men and we are men as if it is a battle over virility or masculinity, then he considers himself an imam and issues the fatwa however he wants, and this is a major defect among the imbalances into which they fell.

Sixth matter: Lack of insightful understanding of reality... You must know that the fatwa is composed of three elements:

1 - The legal text and its purpose. 2- Reality and its consequences. 3- The connection between text and reality.

Seventh matter The word "rule" in most of the Qur'anic context comes in the sense of judiciary and the implementation of its rulings (not) in the sense of political rule as they understand it and deem the nation infidels for its sake.

• Criticism of the state's vision and contemporary political concepts in ISIS thought:

The legal foundations for establishing the caliphate in the discourse of "ISIS" are based on the foundations of the book The Call for Global Islamic Resistance, which was written by Abu Musab al-Suri in 2005 AD. It is one of the important books that explains the thought of ISIS. The book tries to focus a lot on the religious and jurisprudential dimensions of jihad - according to their understanding - and highlights It sheds great light on the current subordination of Muslims and their defeatist psychology, and concludes that the solution consists of two parts:

the first: Clashing with the West and its puppet governments in wars of attrition that extend over long periods of time.

the second"Ultimately working to establish the Caliphate," which would become a homeland for all true Muslims around the world, and would act as a true protector of them and their interests around the world.

In addition to the previous intellectual effort, there is no doubt that any radical organization based on a religious basis needs legal theorists. This is to defend the organization and cover its legal shortcomings and errors, whether in front of the masses or other organizations. ISIS has legal theorists who wrote messages and booklets on the legislation of the succession of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and its validity, and the legitimacy of his organization and their pledge of allegiance together. These messages sometimes took the form of responses and debates against opponents. The most important of these theorists are Bahraini Turki Al-Binali, Mauritanian Abu Ubaidah Al-Shanqeeti, and Abu Al-Hasan Al-Azdi. The letters of the three theorists bore the features of the legal foundations for establishing the Caliphate, and were as follows:

1- Empowerment Both Al-Binali and Al-Azdi mentioned in one of their letters that empowerment was not a condition for the validity of the "Caliphate" contract. Al-Binali says in his comparison between the imamate of "Al-Baghdadi" and the imamate of Ali bin Abi Talib that it was not universal in all Muslim countries, but it was valid." He also compares it to the imamate of Al-Hasan bin Ali and says that Al-Baghdadi invented it, just as Abdullah bin Al-Zubair did, in justifying the absence of the need for

empowerment, and the absence of the need to consult the people of the solution and the contract.

2-   Completion of the pledge of allegiance: In this, Al-Binali says that the pledge of allegiance is not obligatory from all people, nor from all the people of law and contract, and he quotes in this a statement about Ali bin Abi Talib's delay in giving the pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr, and that it may be concluded with one of the people of law and contract, as Al-Ash'ari mentioned.

3-   Permissibility of succession of conquest and seizure The theorists of ISIS defended the legitimacy of the mandate of the conqueror and the oppressor, and they believe that Al-Baghdadi is permitted to do so, especially since he "was empowered in a house of disbelief that ruled by other than Sharia law."

4-   Al-Baghdadi's eligibility for the caliphate: ISIS ideologues stated that "Al-Baghdadi" traces his lineage to the Messenger (PBUH), which gives him the right to the caliphate. Al-Binali also mentions that Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is not unknown, but rather he is one of the distinguished figures, and it is not necessary to know him in person or to pledge allegiance to him when Al-Mawardi. Al-Azdi mentioned Osama bin Laden's praise of Al-Baghdadi, and attributed his lack of fame to the deteriorating security conditions and the necessity of shrouding leaders in secrecy. Moreover, these alleged legal foundations have been rejected by the nation's leading scholars and denied, according to researchers.

In the opinion and thought of ISIS, the caliphate is not only a political entity, but rather a collective legal obligation (a sufficient duty), a path to salvation: "The Muslims committed enough sins when they left the caliphate, and the nation did not taste the taste of "honor" or "victory" after it. "". Accordingly, ISIS's message to Muslims is repeatedly to perform obedience to the correct caliph, "Al-Baghdadi", and to live a true Islamic life as they claim. Once again, it becomes clear that behind this romantic idea of the caliphate lies identity politics, which is the essence of ISIS's ideological framework, which includes affirming the identity of Sunni Islam and redefining true Islam. Adnani's speech may create the illusion that reviving the "Islamic State" means breaking with the current state system. But this is not the case in reality. Just as it was under Saddam's leadership, it is now under Al-Baghdadi's leadership, where the state called the Islamic State in Iraq is a totalitarian state, ruled by an absolute leader who does not tolerate any opposition. As a totalitarian-religious movement, ISIS is ultimately doomed to self-destruct, not only because it has committed all the evil deeds it does, but also because it lacks political imagination and because its ideology conflicts with the ways of life of ordinary citizens and local communities. In addition to ISIS's proficiency in making local and international enemies, it has also expunged politics from its dictionary, and its efforts have been halted to build a contemporary society according to purely utopian lines from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, a view that forcibly imposes the distant past on the present. Accordingly; It is no wonder that ISIS is involved in campaigns to religiously and culturally cleanse the land it controls of all foreign or infidel influence, including traditional Sunni practices that conflict with its fundamentalist and out-of-date interpretation of the Islamic faith. Although the idea of cleansing Muslim countries is strongly rooted in the imagination of Islamic jihadists, ISIS is the first societal movement to attempt to translate ideology into reality. Moreover, ISIS celebrates its brutal practices in a spectacle, as they are manifestations of the devotion of the "Islamic State" fighters through actions, not words, to cleansing the state's lands and restoring the caliphate. But while ISIS's propaganda seems hateful outside of it, its social base responds to it with welcome. Some of ISIS's purpose in producing films that show this cultural cleansing is not only to remind and strengthen the organization's internal unity and its victory strategy, but also to divert attention away from its military retreats in the field. In order to restore the original Islamic state, ISIS fighters believe that Islamic lands must be cleansed of apostates and heretics, regardless of the human or civilizational cost of doing so. What

matters most to them is demonstrating their commitment to a strict and pure ideology. In their attempt to cleanse the Sunni community of foreign cultural influences, ISIS fighters do not hesitate to destroy everything that Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Yazidis, and Christians have produced in terms of cultural and civilizational heritage over thousands of years and which has always been preserved as the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia, which belongs to the entire world. However, their revenge seems more severe against minorities whose members are viewed as infidels and should not enjoy any rights.

• Approaching the concept of the state in the thought of the Taliban and jihadist groups:

The "jihadist" political groups agree to reject the democratic model. It will not give sovereignty to human laws and its system of teachings from Sharia, and rely on the Shura (Taliban) with the model of applying Sharia while Al-Qaeda wants to restore (the caliphate model) and those who do not wish for the rule of the Caliphate must be exterminated. As for the state organization (ISIS). He adopts the pattern of (rule of the victor) away from Shura, and thus three models appear:

The First: The emirate of applying Sharia: It does not adhere to a political/monarchy/republican model. What is important is the application of Sharia (the borders of the emirate are defined) as a state/emirate.

The second Restoring the model of caliphate known in Islamic history. Thus, the caliph will be the caliph of all Muslims, meaning that the aspiration is international and broad.

The Third: The model of the conqueror, which is the model of the Seljuk sultans, the Buyids, the Turks, and the conquering sultans in general, who were approved by the jurists' view that they were among those who deserved obedience, even if they were conquerors.

Some studies believe that the Taliban has turned into a group looking to reform Afghanistan from its purely local perspective. The Taliban does not care about the problem of Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya. Some studies say that some of the Taliban may not have had knowledge of these conflicts, unlike Al-Qaeda and ISIS, whose existence was the focus of the conflict. With the whole world, and perhaps this is what leaked from the idea of the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the globalization of their activities, which may have been transmitted to Al-Qaeda by Abdullah Azzam

Conclusion:

After research, we concluded that there are other differences between the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS, which are as follows:

1- Taliban: Local inclination and local in purpose: that is, it wants to remain in its Afghan geographical space, and its goal is to remain within those borders.

2- Al-Qaeda: Localism, Global Goal:That is, it starts from a certain geographical limitation towards establishing global jihadist networks in different countries, without announcing its alleged state, borders, and geography.

3- ISIS:Global in orientation and global in purpose: ISIS represents an expanding ink stain, meaning that this terrorist organization has an international tendency in its expansion and spread, and has a global goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate to rule the earth, according to its claim.

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