Arresting Immigrants: Unemployment and Immigration Enforcement | Kara Joyner[±]

Abstract

This study provides an examination of immigrant arrests involving two different agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): The Border Patrol (BP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Descriptive time series analyses track yearly changes in immigrant arrests in the decade following the September 11 terrorist attacks (2002-2013). For many DHS jurisdictions, changes in the rates of immigrant arrest closely mirrored changes in the rates of unemployment. First-difference regression models pooling yearly data for the ICE jurisdictions demonstrate that the associations between changes in unemployment rates and changes in immigrant arrest rates were positive and significant.

Keywords: United States; immigration enforcement; Department of Homeland Security; unemployment; unauthorized immigrants.

Introduction

The U.S. is said to be in the midst of a "great expulsion" of immigrants (Ewing et al., 2015). The number of immigrants issued an order of removal, which bars re-entry into the U.S. for at least five years, reached a historic high point of 434,015 removals in 2013 (Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Ewing and colleagues (2015) argue that policymakers facilitated increases in removals over several decades by redefining what it means to be a "criminal alien" and expanding the apparatus of internal enforcement. Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo (2012: 291) argue that the removal program took on a new course in the wake of the September 11 terrorist

attacks and the global economic crisis, as evidenced in the shift toward interior enforcement. Notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expressed in its 2003-2012 strategic plan ("Operation Endgame") the commitment to detain and deport all "removable aliens" residing in the U.S. by 2012 (DHS, 2003). The Great Recession is thought to have escalated immigrant arrests and removals by increasing unemployment rates (Golash-Boza, 2015; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2012). To my knowledge, studies have yet to verify this with time series analyses.

This study fills a major gap in the fields of immigration and criminology by examining how changes in unemployment and other factors are associated with changes in immigrant arrests in the decade following the September 11 attacks. Arrest is a critical outcome for immigrants because it triggers removal. Highlighting the importance of arrest, Motomura (2011:1822) states, "In immigration law, the decision to arrest has been the discretion that matters." This study reviews theory and research on immigration enforcement, paying close attention to the involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigrant arrests. It draws insights from political economy and migration frameworks to develop hypotheses on associations between unemployment and immigrant arrests. Analyses rely on a database produced by the author that pools yearly data corresponding to DHS jurisdictions from several different sources. Using time series analyses that span roughly a decade (2002-2013), this study highlights how changes in immigrant arrests are associated with changes in unemployment rates.

The Context of Immigrant Policing

Increases in immigrant removals are a reflection of how criminal and immigration law have merged in recent decades, a phenomenon labeled "crimmigration" by Stumpf (2006). One feature of this merger is the expansion of the number and types of crimes that mandate automatic removal. Another feature is the greater involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies (LEA) in the enforcement of federal immigration law. However, criminal and immigration law have remained distinct in an important way: immigration law, unlike criminal law, does not afford basic procedural due process rights when it comes to several post-arrest outcomes. For instance, unauthorized immigrants convicted of a felony or misdemeanor offense are denied the right to a hearing before an immigration judge (Stumpf, 2014). Ultimately, immigrants are exposed to the harshest elements of both legislative arenas (Stumpf, 2006).

Unauthorized immigrants who have entered the country illegally have committed a criminal offense (i.e., a misdemeanor), whereas those who are unauthorized for other reasons (e.g., an overstayed visa) have committed a civil offense. Both of these groups are removable but the DHS and its predecessor (Immigration and Naturalization Service) have long prioritized the identification and removal of "criminal aliens," a subgroup of non-citizens with a prior criminal conviction. The Border Patrol (BP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are charged to enforce U.S. immigration law. While the BP has the mission of preventing and detecting illegal entry, ICE is responsible for finding and removing illegal aliens within the interior of the country. Agents from both agencies have the authority to arrest immigrants on federal immigration charges. Highway patrol and police have long been able to assist federal authorities in arrests for criminal violations of immigration law but not civil violations of it (Coleman, 2012b; Motomura, 2011). However, police practices are directly shaped by departmental policies. As of 2007, the majority of police departments in large cities had no explicit policy prohibiting officers from stopping or arresting individuals solely based on the suspicion they were unauthorized (Kent & Carmichael, 2016).

State and local LEA initiated the majority of arrests reported by ICE in every year between 2005 and 2011 and their share of arrests grew considerably over this period (Rosenblum & Kandel, 2011). Two "jail-status" programs are credited for the expansion of LEA involvement in immigration enforcement (Ewing et al., 2015). The 287(g) program allows police and highway patrol to check the immigration status of anyone they arrest after entering into an official agreement with federal immigration authorities (Coleman, 2012b). While established in 1996, this program did not flourish until 2007 and 2008 when over 50 agreements were signed by LEA (Capps et al., 2011); most agreements in this period involved cities or counties in the South or Southwest region of the U.S. (Parrado, 2012). Secure Communities, which began in 2008 and was discontinued in 2014, required local and state agencies to have ICE agents electronically screen the immigration status of any person they arrested and have FBI agents search their criminal records (Cox & Miles, 2013; Stumpf, 2014).

Following an immigrant's arrest, police and prosecutors usually initiate civil removal proceedings rather than press criminal charges (Eagly, 2010; Motomura, 2011). Civil removal is an administrative procedure initiated by DHS agents who determine whether the arrested immigrant falls in a category prioritized for removal (Stumpf, 2014). Based on removals from the Secure Communities data, Pedroza (2013) found evidence that DHS

agents in some states targeted more serious offenders for removal while agents in other states used a universal approach with lower thresholds for removability. For the nation as a whole, Motomura (2011) documented a rough equivalence in the 2009 DHS counts of arrest and deportation (i.e., a voluntary return or a removal), suggesting that an immigrant's arrest invariably leads to deportation. Treyger (2014) argues that programs such as 287(g) and Secure Communities produce "collateral incentives" to arrest immigrants because of their potential for identifying and deporting individuals who are violating immigration law. Studies focused on prior centuries suggest that if police do target immigrants for arrest, it will be most evident for offenses in which the decision to arrest is discretionary (Moehling & Piehl, 2009; Olzak & Shanahan 2014).

A handful of studies have examined how local police worked with ICE agents to enforce immigration laws within specific localities during the Great Recession (e.g., Armenta, 2017; Coleman, 2012b; Donato & Rodriguez, 2014; Varsanyi et al., 2012). These studies documented the use of police discretionary traffic stops (e.g., for failing to use a turn signal) as a pretext for checking immigration status (Coleman, 2012b; Donato & Rodriguez, 2014). Examining LEA in two adjacent North Carolina counties with 287(g) agreements, Coleman (2012b) found that pretextual stops were common in one county (Wake) but not the other (Durham). Donato and Rodriguez (2014) found a significant increase in arrests for minor traffic violations among foreign-born drivers following the passage of 287(g) in Nashville's Davidson County.

For the nation as a whole, increases in criminal alien removals for the category of criminal traffic offenses grew dramatically during the recessionary period (DHS, 2015); this category includes moving violations such as speeding or running a stop sign (Eagly, 2013; Government Accountability Office, 2011: 54). Contrary to the notion that jail-status programs increase incentives to arrest immigrants, the number of arrests made by ICE *decreased* between 2011 and 2013 when the number of counties activated for Secure Communities was increasing. This begs the question of what other factors motivate immigrant arrests. Studies concerning the punishment of new migrant groups around the turn of the twentieth century found evidence that discretionary arrests for minor offenses increased in response to macro-level population shifts, signaling group threat processes (Muller 2012; Olzak & Shanahan, 2014).

The Political Economy of Immigration Enforcement

Studies on immigration enforcement and policy typically are based on a *political economy framework* that highlights the processes through which competing groups interact within various arenas to influence migration flows (Massey, 2009). Its dominant formulation suggests that unskilled native-born workers desire more restrictive (anti-immigrant) legislation and strict enforcement of it, to the extent they feel that immigrants take jobs from native workers and lower their wages (Bonacich, 1972; Fussell, 2014). They are more likely to view immigrants as the source of economic hardship during times of economic distress (Quillian, 1995) and pressure legislators and other authorities for change in enforcement policies and practices (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005). Supporting the dominant formulation of the political economy framework, analyses using time series data from the U.S. and Europe continue to suggest that immigration policy becomes more punitive when unemployment increases and less punitive when it decreases (Makowsky & Stratmann, 2014; Massey, 2009).

Recently, Stageman (2013) identified an additional "extractive" mechanism by which unemployment influences immigration enforcement. Focusing on the period of the Great Recession, he argues that states and localities arrested and detained immigrants in order to maintain a bloated criminal justice infrastructure in a time when both crime rates and tax revenue were declining. After all, state and local governments received considerable funding from the federal government to house immigrants while they were awaiting deportation. Vargas and McHarris (2017) found evidence that federal funding, including funds from the DHS to target terrorists, helped cities afford growth in police spending between the years of 2000 and 2010, particularly cities with large immigrant populations. They argue that the combination of federal aid and immigrant scapegoating incentivized state and local governments to increase police spending.

Few U.S. studies have examined change over time in the arrest or removal of immigrants. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) conducted one of the earliest analyses of Border Patrol arrests, focusing on arrests made along the U.S.-Mexico border. Based on monthly data from 1968 to 1996, they found that the number of arrests increased as wages in the U.S. increased and as wages in Mexico decreased. The fact that BP arrests decreased when the U.S. economy was weaker contradicts the dominant formulation of the political economy framework but fits a *migration framework*. This perspective assumes that BP arrests change in response to migration flows from Mexico, an assumption verified by earlier studies (Donato & Armenta, 2011;

Espenshade, 1995). Mexican migration itself is a reflection of economic conditions in both the U.S. and in Mexico (Villarreal, 2014).

King and colleagues (2012) subsequently examined changes in yearly rates of criminal alien removal between 1908 and 2005 and found evidence that the effect of unemployment rates on immigration enforcement depended on the discretion of immigration authorities. In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act mandated that criminal aliens be removed as expeditiously as possible. The Immigration Act of 1990 further stipulated that they be removed without a hearing before a judge, meaning judges no longer had the authority to offer discretionary relief (i.e. alternatives to removal) for immigrants classified as criminal aliens. King and colleagues (2012) found that criminal deportation rates were responsive to unemployment rates only in the period when deportation for criminal grounds was discretionary (i.e., 1941 to 1986). As IRCA legislated automatic removal for immigrants defined as criminal aliens, changes in unemployment had little bearing on changes in criminal removal in the period following its passage.

Prior research lends support for two competing hypotheses for how unemployment influences immigrant arrests. The migration framework predicts that immigrant arrest rates increase in tandem with migration flows from Mexico to the U.S. and that these flows increase when the U.S. economy strengthens. This framework specifically applies to arrests reported by the Border Patrol, as this agency is responsible for border enforcement. It suggests the following hypothesis: *Immigrant arrest rates will decrease with increases in the unemployment rate.* Not all BP arrests occur along the Southwestern (U.S.-Mexico) border; a very small fraction of them (less than five percent) occur along the Northern (U.S.-Canada) or Coastal border (DHS, 2013). The BP have the authority to arrest within 100 miles of border, an area that covers roughly two-thirds of the U.S. population (ACLU, 2016). While the BP and ICE officially have different missions, their jurisdictions (respectively labeled sectors and field offices by the DHS) overlap along the 100-mile border zone.

The dominant formulation of the political economy framework suggests that unemployment elevates demand for stronger immigration enforcement among unskilled native-born workers and that key authorities like judges and sheriffs comply with their demand. Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo (2012) argue that worsening economic conditions have been an impetus for the shift toward interior enforcement. Another formulation of the political economy framework suggests that declines in tax revenue during the Great Recession increased incentives to arrest immigrants, as

states and localities faced the imperative to balance their budgets (Stageman, 2013). Both formulations apply to interior enforcement and therefore to arrests reported by ICE, suggesting this alternative hypothesis: *Immigrant arrest rates will increase with increases in the unemployment rate*. This framework assumes that police exercise discretion in decisions to arrest immigrants, a reasonable assumption given the context of immigrant policing.

Data

Unit of Analysis

The analyses focus on yearly change in immigrant arrests in the period that overlaps with the time frame of the strategic plan of the DHS (Operation Endgame): 2002-2013. This period precedes the likely impact of the directive from ICE that prohibited the removal of non-citizens solely on the basis of minor traffic offenses (ICE Office of the Director, 2012). One set of analyses uses the U.S. as the unit of analysis while the other uses jurisdictions as the unit. The use of the U.S. as the unit of analysis is consistent with King and colleagues (2012). A complication of using jurisdictions as the unit of analysis is that some states include multiple jurisdictions and many jurisdictions include multiple states. I combine some states and jurisdictions so that I can use state-level data to create both dependent and independent variables. A bigger obstacle is that the BP jurisdictions do not map neatly on to state-level data; many of the BP jurisdictions cut across states and the BP has the authority to arrest only within 100 miles of the border. Thus, analyses of BP arrests are descriptive and focused on a couple of jurisdictions. Some of the jurisdictions cover large regions of the country, possibly producing aggregation bias. (The list of states comprising ICE jurisdictions, along with immigrant arrests rates for jurisdictions in specific years, appears in Appendix A.)

Dependent Variables

Yearly *ICE and BP arrest rates* for the years 2002 to 2013 combine data from the DHS and the Pew Hispanic Center. (Web links to the sources of the dependent and independent variables appear in Appendix B.) The numerator (the number of immigrant arrests) is based on counts of arrest that the DHS posts for each fiscal year and jurisdiction (i.e., BP sectors and ICE field offices). The denominator is based on the number of unauthorized individuals in the states comprising each jurisdiction each year. Following Leerkes and colleagues (2014), I use linear interpolation to estimate the unauthorized population for states in years for which the data were not available. For the sake of comparison (e.g., Dinsmore, 2016), I also compute yearly *arrest rates for the broader population* for analyses that use the

nation as the unit of analysis. These rates are based on the FBI's total counts of arrest that exclude arrests made for traffic offenses. The denominator for these arrest rates is the total population of the nation. Immigrant arrests are also included in these arrest counts for the broader population. All of the arrest rates are natural logged in the models, as logging rates stabilizes their variance over the time series.

The category of "removable alien" includes unauthorized immigrants and immigrants with lawful permanent residency who have committed a felony. Using unauthorized individuals in the denominator underestimates the population of immigrants at risk for an arrest while using the foreign-born population overestimates the population at risk. As discussed below, an alternative measure of immigrant arrest rates that includes estimates of the foreign-born population in each jurisdiction produces a similar pattern of results. With respect to arrests along the border, the at-risk population is less obvious. For instance, this population potentially includes individuals residing in Mexico and Central America.

Independent Variables

Two sets of variables were created: one set for the nation as the unit of analysis and another set for ICE jurisdictions as the unit. The nation-years variables are based on estimates that pertain to the U.S. as a whole while the jurisdiction-years variables are based on state-level estimates. The estimates of the independent variables for analyses using jurisdictions as the unit of analysis entail the summation of yearly state-level data. These variables draw from different sets of estimates because the sums of state-level counts are not necessarily equivalent to the nation-wide counts. For instance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) cautions that the state estimates for the number of individuals unemployed in each state for a given month are not forced to sum to national totals (BLS, 2017). The independent variables are lagged one year. As the arrest rates capture change for years 2002 to 2013, the independent variables capture change from 2001 to 2012.

Unemployment rates are computed by dividing the number of individuals unemployed by the number of individuals in the labor force. As the fiscal year begins in October, September estimates for these variables are selected. The BLS releases a set of counts for monthly employment and labor force participation that are seasonally adjusted to reveal month-to-month change. As this study uses counts from the same month each year, the seasonal adjustment is not necessary and unadjusted counts are used in all analyses. Supplementary analyses (not shown) suggest that the patterns are the same regardless of whether September counts are seasonally adjusted or not. They

also reveal that the patterns based on annual average unemployment rates for the calendar years are similar to those based on the September counts.

A number of other variables are included as control variables. These include variables used in studies of arrest (e.g. Shoesmith & Klein, 2012) and ones highlighted in the political economy frameworks: per capita state and local tax revenue; index crime rates; per capita state and local police officers with arrest authority; and per capita spending on police and corrections combined. The state and local finance variables pertain to fiscal years and are adjusted to 2012 dollars. As Vargas and McHarris (2017) point out, police spending not only covers the salaries of sworn officers but also facilities, equipment, training, and other expenses.

For analyses that use measures of yearly change, I take the natural logarithm of the variables prior to differencing the yearly values. Thus, measures of yearly change in values of the independent variables are in comparable units (i.e., approximating percentage changes when multiplied by 100). Levels of significance for independent variables without this transformation are similar (not shown).

Descriptive Results

Figure 1 shows the number of arrests reported by the DHS for the Border Patrol and ICE in each fiscal year from 2002 to 2013. For sake of comparison, it also shows the number of arrests reported by the FBI for the broader population. Note that the scale for DHS arrests is different, as indicated by the secondary *y*-axis. Partly reflecting the fact that the immigrant population is a small subset of the general population, the number of arrests in the general population far exceeds the number of immigrant arrests. For instance, the FBI reported almost 14 million arrests in 2002 (i.e., 13,750,337), whereas the DHS reported roughly one million immigrant arrests for that same year (i.e., 1,062, 270 = 955,310 + 106,960). A comparison of the values for the three different agencies reveals that percentage change in the number of arrests among the immigrant population has been far more dramatic than percentage change in the number of arrests for the broader population.

The number of arrests for the broader population increased in most years between 2002 and 2006 and then decreased monotonically between 2006 and 2012. The number of arrests made by the Border Patrol (labeled "apprehensions" by the DHS) increased in the immediate years following the September 11 attacks but declined precipitously between 2005 and 2012. Temporal variation in the number of arrests made by ICE (labeled "administrative arrests") is harder to detect because the *y*–axis requires a

large scale to encompass the BP values in earlier years. It appears that change in the number of ICE arrests was fairly constant, with the exception of a large jump in the 2008 fiscal year (October 1st 2007 to September 31st 2008).

Figure 1. Number of Arrests, by Agency and Year

Notes: ICE arrests include those made by LEAs; they also include arrests in which the Field Office is "Unknown."

Reflecting a shift by the DHS towards interior enforcement (Coleman, 2012a; Provine et al., 2016), the number of ICE and BP arrests converged

in later fiscal years. Decreases in the number of BP arrests between 2005 and 2012 are considered to be a reflection of decreases in border crossings originating from enhanced border enforcement and reduced economic incentives to migrate during the Great Recession (Argueta, 2016; Villarreal, 2014). The abrupt increase in ICE arrests in 2008 coincided with the Great Recession that officially began in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009.

Figure 2 shows change in the number of ICE arrests and unemployment rates for the years between 2002 and 2013 for the nation as a whole. ICE arrests that occurred in an "Unknown" jurisdiction are excluded from this figure.

Figure 2. Number of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Arrests and Unemployment Rates, by Year

Figure 3. Change in Employment & Immigrant Arrest: Select Jurisdictions

A. Change in Unemployment and ICE Arrest Rates: Altanta Field Office for GA, NC, & SC ($r = .843$)

• • • • • Δ Unemployment (ln rate t-1 - ln rate t-2)
━━━● Δ ICE Arrest (ln rate t - ln rate t-1)

B. Change in Unemployment and BP Arrest Rates: Detroit Sector for IL, IN, MI, & OH ($r = .881$)

• • • • • Δ Unemployment (ln rate t-1 - ln rate t-2)
━━━ Δ BP Arrest (ln rate t - ln rate t-1)

C. Change in Employment and BP Arrest Rates: San Diego and El Centro Sectors for CA ($r = .550$)

• • • • • Δ Employment (ln rate t-1 - ln rate t-2)
━━━ Δ BP Arrest (ln rate t - ln rate t-1)

Consistent with the dominant formulation of the political economy framework, changes in the number of ICE arrests with a known jurisdiction mirror changes in the unemployment rates. Keep in mind that arrests in 2010, for instance, could have occurred in any month between October 1st 2009 and September 31st 2010. Unemployment rates for this same year are measured in September of 2010, the month that precedes each fiscal year. Thus, subsequent analyses lag unemployment rates one year. As the unauthorized population has fluctuated over time, it is important to consider change in immigrant arrest *rates*, in addition to change in the *number* of immigrant arrests. Subsequent analyses use arrest rates rather than arrest counts.

Figure 3 illustrates how employment and immigrant arrests changed during this period for select jurisdictions. These particular jurisdictions were selected because their patterns most neatly align with the competing frameworks. Figure A focuses on the Atlanta Field Office of ICE which includes Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Changes in ICE arrest rates parallel changes in unemployment rates. Figure B corresponds to the Detroit Sector of the Border Patrol that includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. The strong pattern of association between change in BP arrest rates and change in unemployment rates is also seen here. This pattern suggests that BP arrests along the Northern border are, for the most part, discretionary. Figure C combines the San Diego and El Centro Sectors representing two different parts of California. For this jurisdiction of the BP, gains in employment are associated with increases in arrest rates, lending support to the migration framework. In other words, increases in unemployment rates are associated with decreases in arrest rates. These opposite effects of unemployment in the San Diego/El Centro and Detroit Sectors underscore the importance of distinguishing the effects of unemployment on BP arrest by jurisdiction and border.

Results from First-Difference Regression Models

To formally test whether the associations between rates of unemployment and immigrant arrest are significant, I estimate a series of first-difference regression models with 1-year lags in the independent variables (i.e., King et al., 2012). These models estimate yearly change in logged arrest rates (i.e., $\ln y_t - \ln y_{t-1}$) as a function of yearly change in logged independent variables (i.e., $\ln x_{t-1} - \ln x_{t-2}$). Table 1 shows the results from six different models. Models 1, 2, and 3 are estimated for the nation as a whole and include as dependent variables arrest rates for the broader population, the Border Patrol, and ICE, respectively. These models include only zero-order effects

Table 1. Models of Yearly Change in Logged Arrest Rates

Yearly Change in Logged Variable (One-Year Lag)	U.S. as Unit of Analysis (N = 11)		
	Zero-Order Effects		
	UCR Rates	BP Rates	ICE Rates
	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
% Unemployed	-0.015 (0.053)	-0.268 (0.312)	0.961 * (0.402)
Tax Revenue	0.028 (0.056)	-0.116 (0.342)	-0.312 (0.535)
Crime Rate	0.694 (0.725)	8.250 # (3.699)	-8.228 (6.766)
Police Officers	0.409 # 0.219	-1.527 1.475	4.049 3.970
Police Spending	0.338 (0.346)	-2.281 (2.069)	5.521 # (2.967)
Corrections Spending	0.277 (0.309)	-2.186 (1.811)	5.679 * (2.444)
Total Spending	0.334 (0.343)	-2.481 (2.023)	6.184 # (2.781)

Yearly Change in Logged Variable (One-Year Lag)	ICE Rates with ICE Jurisdictions as Unit of Analysis (N = 182)		
	Zero Order	Multivariable	Multivariable
	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
% Unemployed	0.518 ** (0.172)	0.339 # (0.189)	0.448 * (0.178)
Tax Revenue	-0.579 ** (0.198)	---	---
Crime Rate	-1.082 (1.002)	-0.910 (0.972)	-0.879 (0.980)
Police Officers	0.789 0.832	0.592 0.817	0.629 (0.834)
Police Spending	3.368 ** (1.004)	2.434 * (1.117)	---
Corrections Spending	1.658 * (0.722)	---	1.091 (0.756)
Total Spending	3.348 ** (1.009)	---	---
R-Squared % (Multivariable)	---	14.3	12.9

Notes: The models that include jurisdictions as the unit of analysis include fixed effects for jurisdiction (not shown). The panel for jurisdictions as the unit of analysis is unbalanced due to missing data on ICE arrests for earlier Utah years.
\# p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

due to the small sample size (n = 11 nation-years). Like Model 3, Model 4 shows zero-order effects of variables on ICE arrest rates yet uses jurisdictions as the unit of analysis and includes fixed effects for jurisdiction. The fixed effects control for unchanging characteristics of jurisdictions (Allison, 2005). Models 5 and 6 build on Model 4 by combining independent variables in different sets. When the coefficients from these variables are multiplied by 100, they indicate the approximate percentage change in y per one unit change in x.

Model 1 reveals that changes in the arrest rates for the broader population are not significantly associated with changes in the unemployment rates. Model 2 similarly shows that changes in Border Patrol arrest rates are not significantly associated with changes in unemployment rates. The coefficients for the unemployment rate in both these models are negative. The finding that unemployment fails to significantly decrease Border Patrol arrests is not surprising. As suggested in the earlier figures, associations between unemployment and arrest likely differ depending on whether enforcement in internal versus external. Other variables also fail to differentiate change in these arrest rates at a $p <$ .05 level. The results of Model 3 reveal that the expected positive association between change in unemployment rates and change in ICE arrest rates is significant. Approximately, a 100% increase in unemployment rates (i.e., 100% ≈ 1 unit change in x) translates into a 100% increase in ICE arrest rates. Increases of this magnitude were observed over the course of the Great Recession (Figure 2). State and local spending on corrections also has a significant positive association with ICE arrest rates.

Model 4 shows zero-order effects of variables on ICE arrest rates using jurisdictions as the unit of analysis. Unemployment once again has a positive and significant association with ICE arrest rates ($p <$ .01). Several other variables have significant effects ($p <$ .05) as well. Declines in state and local tax revenue are associated with increases in ICE arrest rates. All three state and local spending variables (corrections, police, and total) are positively associated with increases in ICE arrest rates. Model 5 combines measures of unemployment, the crime rate, the number of police officers, and police spending. Interestingly, the effect of unemployment falls out of significance ($p <$ .05) when police spending is in the model. Model 6 is similar to Model 5 but includes corrections spending rather than police spending. Only unemployment has a significant effect in this model ($p <$ .05). Changes in tax revenue are highly correlated with changes in unemployment rates (Enns & Shanks-Booth, 2015); patterns for the spending variables are similar when

tax revenue is substituted for unemployment in these last two models (not shown).

I additionally ran a number of sensitivity checks. For sake of brevity, I focus mainly on ways in which Model 4 was altered. One specification used the foreign-born population in each jurisdiction as the denominator for immigrant arrest rates rather than the unauthorized population. Two other specifications weighted jurisdictions by the size of their general population and the size of their unauthorized population. A fourth specification lagged the independent variables 2 years and a fifth specification measured independent variables contemporaneously rather than lagged. A sixth specification added a lagged dependent variable to account for the fact that changes in immigrant arrest rates depend on levels of immigrant arrest rates. The seventh specification substituted change in unemployment rates at the national level for change at the jurisdictional level. Importantly, the unemployment rate had a significant effect ($p < .01$ or $p < .001$) on immigrant arrest rates in all of these models, with the exception of the model that included the 2-year lag.

Conclusion

Research on immigration enforcement suggests that two competing frameworks potentially explain changes in immigrant arrests. The political economy framework links changes in immigrant arrests to shifting interests on the part of different groups in immigration enforcement. Its dominant formulation predicts that immigrant arrest rates will rise when unemployment rates increase as policymakers attempt to placate unskilled native-born workers. This framework assumes that key authorities have considerable discretion in decisions to arrest immigrants. In contrast, the migration framework predicts that arrest rates decrease when unemployment rates increase as a consequence of reduced flows of unauthorized migrants into the U.S. from Mexico. This framework applies to Border Patrol enforcement along the Southwestern (U.S.-Mexico) border, presuming BP arrests along this border are comprised largely of cases involving individuals who have been apprehended in an attempt to cross the border illegally.

The findings of this study for ICE arrests lend overwhelming support to the political economy framework. Results from the descriptive time series analyses showed that changes in immigrant arrests (both counts and rates) echoed changes in unemployment rates. Such a pattern was documented for the U.S. as a whole and for specific jurisdictions. Findings for the Detroit Sector suggest that Border Patrol agents working along the Northern border

similarly had a "discretionary beat." As evidence of this, changes in BP arrest rates closely matched changes in unemployment rates. Support for the migration framework was observed for the San Diego and El Centro Sectors that covered California, located on the Southwestern border. But for the nation as a whole, changes in BP arrest rates were not significantly associated with changes in unemployment rates. This is a deviation from prior periods and signals a shift to interior enforcement. Any suppressing effect that unemployment may have had on border arrests (through its effect on border crossings) could have been offset by its opposing effect on interior arrests.

Results from the first-difference regression models demonstrated that, within ICE jurisdictions, yearly changes in unemployment rates were positively and significantly associated with yearly changes in immigrant arrest rates. The positive effect of unemployment was not only statistically significant, but also large in magnitude. The effects of unemployment persisted in models that used different units of analysis (i.e., the nation versus jurisdictions). Increases in immigrant arrests were not an epiphenomenon of increases in arrest more generally, as changes in unemployment rates were not associated with changes in arrest rates for the broader population. The effect of unemployment rates on ICE arrest rates fell out of significance when state and local spending on police was taken into account. The mediating effect of police spending conforms to the notion that arrest and detainment of immigrants helped state and local governments subsidize growth in criminal justice infrastructure during a time when crime rates were falling (Stageman, 2013). It is also consistent with theory that suggests when majority groups view minority groups as a threat, they lobby state and local governments to increase their spending on police (Blalock, 1967; Vargas & McHarris, 2017).

While this study fills an important gap in research, it has some limitations. This study does not rigorously address the mechanisms by which unemployment increases immigrant arrests. A recent report suggests that the temporal relationship between unemployment and criminal justice spending is not clear (Enns & Shanks-Booth, 2015). Golash-Boza (2009) points out that immigration enforcement in previous decades likely reflects "a confluence of interests." Future frameworks on immigrant arrests could be expanded to consider the interests of politicians, the media, and corporations in immigrant arrests. These frameworks could also emphasize the costs of immigrant arrests for state and local LEA, such as the diversion of resources from public safety issues (ACLU of California, 2011) and the creation of insecure communities (Kubrin, 2014).

Furthermore, the DHS does not distinguish the publicly-released counts of arrest for jurisdictions in different years by whether they were initiated by state and local LEA (versus BP or ICE). Ideally, the models would use smaller jurisdictional areas as the unit of analysis (e.g., counties or municipalities). The devolution of immigration enforcement from federal to local agencies ultimately produces spatial variation in programs and practices (Menjívar, 2014; Provine et al., 2016; Varsanyi et al., 2012). The use of jurisdictions comprised of multiple states potentially produces aggregation bias, inflating the coefficients by some unknown value (Clark & Avery, 1976). Official crime data do not permit calculations of crime rates for the immigrant and unauthorized populations (Ousey & Kubrin, 2017). The models lacked statistical power to simultaneously examine the effects of multiple variables in the analyses that used the nation as the unit of analysis. As elaborated earlier, limitations in the Border Patrol data meant only cursory attention could be paid to BP arrest rates.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study contributes to a nascent wave of research that considers the effects of immigration programs and practices on the outcomes of immigrants (Rosenfeld, 2014). Research from this wave demonstrates that recent immigration enforcement practices have injurious effects on immigrants and immigrant communities (Menjívar, 2014; Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014). Arrest is a pivotal outcome for immigrants because it typically leads to deportation. Some unknown percentage of those deported had a spouse, partner, or child in the country. As many immigrant families are of mixed status (i.e., comprised of both authorized and unauthorized members), an arrest often disrupts the lives of family members who are citizens or permanent residents (Chavez et al., 2013). Finally, the possibility of arrest instills fear and insecurity among immigrants and their families that pervades daily activities such as commuting between home and work (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014).

The dramatic shifts in immigrant arrests that this study documents are particularly worrisome, as they suggest that decisions to arrest immigrants were largely discretionary, at least during the period of 2002 to 2013. As Kent and Carmichael (2016) argue, in the absence of clear-cut policies and procedures, the discretionary nature of immigrant policing potentially leads officers to stop individuals solely on the basis of suspicion that they are unauthorized. Some officers may be tempted to use race or ethnicity as an indicator of undocumented status (Government Accountability Office, 2009). Indicating a "gendered racial removal program, the vast majority of individuals removed between 1997 and 2012 were men from Latin America

or the Caribbean (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2012). This suggests that the arrest of immigrants during the Great Recession differed according to country and region of origin, a possibility for future studies to consider.

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Appendix A. ICE Arrest Rates (Per 100,000 Unauthorized Population) for Select Years, by Jurisdiction: ICE

Jurisdiction	Fiscal Year			Percent Change		
	2002	2007	2012	2002-7	2007-12	2002-12
California (CA, HI)	1,127	350	2,813	-69.0	703.6	149.5
Phoenix (AZ)	1,966	284	4,505	-85.6	1487.7	129.2
Texas (TX, NM, OK)	1,564	766	3,978	-51.0	419.5	154.3
New Orleans (AL, AR, LA, MS, TN)	1,865	1,072	2,719	-42.5	153.7	45.8
Miami (FL)	569	550	1,888	-3.3	243.3	231.9
Atlanta (GA, NC, SC)	425	756	3,077	77.8	306.9	623.5
DC	693	1,664	2,811	140.2	68.9	305.7
Baltimore (DE, MD, PA, MA)	1,733	1,547	1,859	-10.7	20.2	7.3
Newark	417	551	1,102	32.3	99.8	164.3
New York	1,238	672	1,179	-45.7	75.5	-4.7
Boston (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)	1,246	1,100	1,456	-11.7	32.3	16.8
Detroit (MI, OH)	1,227	1,903	2,569	55.1	35.0	109.4
Chicago (IL, IN, KS, KY, MO, WI)	1,131	647	1,834	-42.8	183.3	62.2
St. Paul (IA, MN, NE, ND, SD)	4,497	1,843	2,955	-59.0	60.4	-34.3
Denver (CO, WY)	4,845	2,511	3,464	-48.2	38.0	-28.5
Salt Lake (ID, MT, NV, UT)	---	146	1,987	---	1258.2	---
Seattle (WA, OR, OK)	1,882	1,261	2,223	-33.0	76.2	18.1

Appendix B. Sources for Variables (Retrieved June 25, 2017)

Variables	Sources
Time-Varying Variables	
Uniform Crime Report of Number Arrested	FBI
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/asp/ucr_display.asp	
Number Arrested by BP	CBP
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/	
2016-Oct/BP%20Total%20Apps%2C%20Mexico	
%2C%20OTM%20FY2000-FY2016.pdf	
Number Arrested by ICE https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook	DHS
Table 35	
Number Unemployed & in Labor Force (not Seasonally Adjusted)	BLS
https://www.bls.gov/cps/	
Total and Foreign-Born Population	Census
http://factfinder.census.gov	
Total Population Unauthorized http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/12/11/unauthorized-trends/	Pew
Number of Jobs in Construction http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data/tables.html	Census
Number of Index Crimes (Property and Violent)	FBI
State and Local Police Officers https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/	FBI
police-employee-data/main	
State and Local Revenue and Expenditures	Census
http://www.census.gov/govs/local/	