

Article history: Received 8 June 2017; Accepted 13 December 2017

The Migration-Crime Nexus and the Press in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Alexander A. Caviedes[‡]

Abstract

This article explores the link between migrants and crime as portrayed in the European press. Examining conservative newspapers from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2016, the study situates the press coverage in each individual country within a comparative perspective that contrasts the frequency of the crime narrative to that of other prominent narratives, as well as to that in the other countries. The article also charts the prevalence of this narrative over time, followed by a discussion of which particular aspects of crime are most commonly referenced in each country. The findings suggest that while there has been no steady increase in the coverage of crime and migration, the press securitizes migration by focusing on crime through a shared emphasis on human trafficking and the non-European background of the perpetrators. However, other frames advanced in these newspapers, such as fraud or organized crime, comprise nationally distinctive characteristics.

Keywords: migration; crime; Europe; media; securitization.

Introduction

Whether anarchism, smuggling, or organized crime (King, 2000; Dal Lago 1999), immigrants have a history of being associated with crime. However, during Europe's post-War period the preeminent depiction of immigrants initially evoked their economic function as workers (Herbert, 2001; Schain, 2008). By the 1980s, the narrative shifted toward integration challenges faced by migrants and host societies, highlighting humanitarian concerns or delving into questions of national identity and the desirability of multiculturalism (Helbling, 2012). In large part through heightened public attention to a nexus between migration and crime, scholars have noted a recent rise in the securitization of migration and a transformation of media constructions of migrants (Buonfino, 2004; Bourbeau, 2011).

[‡] Alexander A. Caviedes, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and International Affairs, State University of New York at Fredonia, NY, United States. E-mail: alexander.caviedes@fredonia.edu

Acknowledgements: I am highly indebted to Erin Bischoff, Nathaniel Clark, James Coughlin, Sierra Cuellar, Alex Ives, Zachary Jones, Andrew Lent, Mitchell Macholz, Gabrielle Macool, Richard Nolan, Hannah Orsino, Daniel Orzechowski, Jason Pandich, Austin Parr, Joseph Sienkewicz, Rebecca Thompson, Caroline Villafrank, William Webber, and Dylan Yetter for their assistance in coding 10 years of articles across 5 newspapers. This draft benefited greatly from the comprehensive suggestions of two anonymous reviewers and the special issue editors.



Given the media's ability to influence public discourse and attitudes (Dunaway et al., 2011; Schemer 2012), and in light of claims regarding the centrality of securitizing frames, this research addresses three questions regarding European press portrayals of immigration and migrants. First, is crime the most common frame within press coverage of immigration? Second, when the press links migration and crime, what manner of criminal activity features most commonly? Third, by comparing press coverage in three different countries, this paper examines whether the portrayal of a crime-immigration nexus follows a common European narrative, or whether national modes of depiction remain distinct. The majority of research, comprised of single country cases, cannot answer these concerns. I address these questions by examining the most prominent center-right newspapers in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom over the last decade.

To provide a context for the media's association of crime with migration, the paper first discusses securitization theory's view of media complicity in generating a sense of threat surrounding migration. This leads into a review of the literature on media framing, particularly concerning migration, and how crime figures in this process. I then detail the research design before presenting the findings, beginning by tabulating how frequently these newspapers reference crime within their overall migration coverage. This is followed by a more qualitative assessment of the nature of the coverage, with particular attention toward how crime and migration are commonly connected. The paper concludes by summarizing the findings and arguing that securitization claims of the primacy of crime as a frame and the universality of this narrative may be overstated.

Press Constructions of Threat and Crime

Scholars contend that states increasingly identify security aspects related to migration (Rudolph, 2006; Chebel d'Appollonia, 2008). This tendency dovetails with securitization theory's exposition of how state actors portray a given issue as a threat of existential proportions requiring immediate and sometimes drastic measures (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998). Huysmans (2006) has applied this 'Copenhagen School' of thought, demonstrating a shift in European Union migration policymaking toward enforcement and border issues. Relatedly, Bigo (2002) deconstructs how a sense of 'unease' is generated by media actors who the public trusts to provide unbiased and authoritative readings of the relationship between immigration and security. While migrants are generally portrayed as security threats, even casting them as victims can contribute to a rising sense of unease, purportedly a common tendency throughout Europe (Buonfino, 2004).

The securitization thesis asserts that the media fosters a narrative of threat or unease due to its advantaged position in setting the agenda for discourse over



current events. Research has demonstrated the media's impact on raising individual levels of anxiety about terrorist attacks (Nellis and Savage, 2012), amplifying readers' sensitivity to race (Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000), heightening the perceived salience of immigration as an issue (Dunaway et al., 2011), or increasing negative views of immigrants (Schemer, 2012), among others. Through the framing process, certain elements of a story can be emphasized, linked to or simply included in the first place, lending a specific meaning to the events (Entman, 1993; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Bennett argues that often the media favors simplistic, melodramatic frames over the exposition of more complex realities (2012). As Edelman (1988) points out, paralleling the securitization thesis, labeling specific developments as having risen to crisis levels opens up possibilities for certain political actors – particularly the government – to act in decisive and occasionally extraordinary fashion.

The development of a frame or narrative involves frame building, whose product is the frame manifest in the text, and frame-setting, which focuses on the interaction between media frame and individuals (De Vreese, 2005). Researchers examine media frame building through various analytic foci, such as the presence of specific language or metaphors (KhosraviNik, 2010), the use of established journalistic scripts (Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000), or the episodic rather than thematic approach that offers greater contextualization (Iyengar and Kinder, 2007). Another method for identifying issue-specific frames posits that repeated audience exposure to a topic or frame engrains those ideas or associations (Graber and Dunaway, 2015). This line of research studies the news consumption habits of the public, or the frequency with which the media addresses a particular topic. Studies have found the volume of mentions of a particular candidate to have communicative effects (Kepplinger et al., 1989), and that the emphasis placed on a particular frame bears less influence than the regularity of its presentation (Chong and Druckman, 2007).

In the research on securitization in the media, crime and physical threat are generally considered undifferentiated aspects of a larger phenomenon including extremism and terrorism, but which also extends to economic competition, and cultural or national identity (Bourbeau, 2011). Fewer studies focus more pointedly on the media's construction of a nexus between migration and crime, such as Correa-Cabrera's examination (2012) of coverage of drug violence near the U.S. border, or specific criminal acts such as human trafficking (Berman, 2003), or terrorism (Nacos and Torres-Reyna, 2003). Such studies analyze frame building by illustrating how the role of migrants is accentuated, or the manner through which certain crimes are sensationalized while neglecting to explore migration's deeper causal factors. With the exception of Nacos and Torres-Reyna's (2003) piece on migration coverage in relation to the 9/11 attacks, these analyses are generally more illustrative than systematic. This undermines the securitization thesis assertion of media complicity in generating

a primarily security-driven narrative (Buonfino, 2004), when other studies suggest that the press still largely projects economic frames (Bauder, 2008; Balabanova and Balch, 2010; Caviedes, 2015). The tendency to bypass questions concerning the relative prominence of securitization, or whether coverage is analyzed in a manner that measures lesser or greater intensity, remains one of the challenges for securitization studies and research on the crime and migration nexus within the press (Bourbeau, 2015).

General studies of the depiction of migrants grant a more complete sense of the relative prominence of the crime and migration frame and whether coverage follows a trend. Some scholars assert increasing press association of immigrants with crime since the 1990s, shifting from earlier narratives that focused foremost on humanitarian issues (Benson, 2003) or economic considerations (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004; Montali et al., 2013). The most commonly profiled criminal activities vary by country. For example, the U.S. press often portrays Latin Americans as drug dealers (Retis and Benavides, 2005). In Italy, Albanians are associated with organized crime (Montali et al., 2013), while Romanians have recently been linked with sexual assault (Maneri, 2008). Despite a plethora of research, Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown (2007) lament the dearth of comparative studies examining relative trends over time and across countries. Thus, a comparison across several European countries, taking into account recent developments, can provide insight into whether there is a common European frame tying immigrants to crime, and the prominence of that coverage.

Research Design

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are comparable on several dimensions. The foreign-born populations of each are between 11 and 13% of their total populations (SOPEMI, 2015). Compared to similarly populous Spain and Italy, with similar numbers of foreign born, the trio under examination feature more established histories of immigration, with rates of in-migration over the last decade below .5%, compared to the nearly 1% in the case of the newer migration countries of Spain and Italy (SOPEMI 2010, 2013). This is relevant since immigrants generally enjoy better integration outcomes the longer they have been in a country (OECD, 2015).

To analyze press coverage of immigration in the three countries over the same time period using identical criteria, I selected *Le Figaro*, *Die Welt*, and *The Daily Telegraph*, accessed through the *Lexis-Nexis Academic* database. Offering national level coverage, they comprise France and the UK's center-right broadsheet newspapers with the highest circulation, with *Die Welt* being second in Germany to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (if one considers it center-right). Conservative newspapers have been found to be more critical of immigration (Bauder, 2008; Benson, 2013) and more prone to present securitizing portrayals of migration



(Bourbeau, 2011; Caviedes, 2017). Conservative and left-leaning newspapers' coverage of crime during this time period evidenced significant differences in frequency. From 2010-2016, crime is referenced in 6% of *Le Monde* articles on immigration versus 13% of *Le Figaro* articles (Chi square = 10.3334, df = 1, $p < .01$), and *The Guardian* mentioned crime in 12% of its immigration coverage, compared to 19% in *The Daily Telegraph* (Chi square = 13.1998, df = 1, $p < .01$). This amplified sensitivity to crime yields a larger body of articles mentioning crime, and while a cross-section of the press is not necessarily indicative of the entire range of national coverage, choosing the same type of newspapers helps control for ideological differences,¹ facilitating a valid comparison. Furthermore, the securitization thesis should be more difficult to challenge if we analyze the conservative press that grants security greater attention.

The research team coded the three newspapers from 2007 to 2016 to provide a broader sense of recent press portrayals than would a more punctuated time period. The search included all articles with the word 'immigration' or 'migrants,' together with the name of the country within the header or lead paragraph. As part of an ongoing project, undergraduate students fluent in one of the three languages performed most of the coding. Coders selected only articles dealing with international migration, while omitting duplicates, editorials, and letters to the editor, thereby reducing roughly 2,000 articles to 451 French, 502 German, and 510 English articles, for a total of 1,463. Inter-coder agreement checks based upon thirty articles from each newspaper coded independently by student coders and me produced 100% agreement and a K-alpha reliability measure of 1.0 for the variable of crime in both *The Daily Telegraph* and *Die Welt*, and 93% agreement, with a K-alpha measure of .87 for *Le Figaro*.²

We coded the articles along fifteen separate variables spanning topics including *asylum*, *labor market*, *costs*, *cultural integration*, and *physical threat*. The variables are not mutually exclusive, thus one article could be coded for mentioning multiple variables, without seeking a qualitative assessment concerning a single dominant frame. For example, we considered murder as both *crime* and *physical threat*, while fraud was only the former and contagious disease was only the latter. 'Crime' was defined as "Stories about foreigners committing crimes (beyond illegal entry into the country) or having crimes committed against them." This is broader than only coding instances of criminal migrants, since securitization and the creation of unease can be accomplished even through

¹ For example, in France there were 354 *Le Monde* articles dealing with migration and 270 *Le Figaro* articles during the same period, while, in the UK, there were 982 *Guardian* articles compared to 463 *Telegraph* articles. To aggregate both newspapers as 'national' coverage for each country would lend greater impact to the left-leaning press in the UK than in France.

² Krippendorff (2004) views levels of agreement above .80 as having strong reliability, with values below .67 as having weak reliability.

accounts of immigrant victimhood. I subsequently recoded this subset of ‘crime’ articles to note migrants’ geographic origins, type of offense (trafficking, fraud), and whether the perpetrator, victim, or both, are migrants. These categories guide a more qualitative assessment of the press narrative of crime beyond measuring its frequency. In addition to tabulating the most frequent narratives, each section also references a sample of representative articles to illustrate each newspaper’s general tendencies.

Narratives of Crime and Immigration in France, Germany, and the UK

Some scholars maintain that press linkages of crime to international migration and migrants intensified after the 1990s (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004; Benson, 2013). This study investigates the relative prominence of this framing narrative and whether there is evidence of increasing coverage. Table 1 provides an overview of the relative prominence of key issues within articles about immigration (those most commonly referenced in at least two newspapers), with percentages noted in parentheses to facilitate comparison. The crime narrative is most potent in *The Daily Telegraph* at close to 20%, but less so in *Le Figaro* and *Die Welt* (10%). Aggregating the 1,463 articles from all three, crime is more peripheral than economic issues such as labor market and cost, or integration, though it features in 14% of the articles, more than the related, often overlapping issue of physical threat, which includes terrorism, violence, and epidemic disease.

Table 1. Immigration-related Articles and Selected Issues, 2007-2016 (percentages in parentheses)


	Crime	Physical Threat	Integration	Labor Market	Costs
<i>Le Figaro</i> (N=451)	53 (12)	23 (5)	128 (28)	48 (11)	71 (16)
<i>Die Welt</i> (N=502)	63 (13)	33 (7)	202 (40)	225 (45)	96 (20)
<i>Telegraph</i> (N=510)	93 (18)	63 (12)	62 (12)	232 (46)	152 (30)
All Articles (N=1463)	209 (14)	119 (8)	392 (27)	505 (35)	319 (22)

Figure 1 illustrates that the frequency rates of crime within the overall body of immigration-related coverage fluctuates from 2007-2016 and between countries. A uniform rise in all three newspapers in 2016 is most pronounced



in the *Daily Telegraph*. However, the rate of crime coverage in *Le Figaro* and in *Die Welt* in 2016 is similar or lower to that in previous peak years. From 2007 to 2015, crime is mentioned in 10% of immigration-related *Daily Telegraph* articles, but in 2016 it is significantly higher at 36% (Chi Square = 47.192, df = 1, $p < .01$). In *Die Welt* it is also 10% for the first 9 years, but much higher in 2016 (25%; Chi Square = 13.062, df = 1, $p < .01$). Only in *Le Figaro* is 2016's 13% level merely negligibly higher than the 12% from 2007 to 2015. There is no steadily more prominent crime narrative, though 2016 may herald the beginning of an upward trend. While Figure 1 and Table 1 facilitate broad comparison, the remaining empirical discussion surveys each newspaper's portrayal of crime within immigration coverage.

Figure 1. Percentage of Immigration-related Articles mentioning Crime, 2007-2016



France

Crime is not a central narrative within *Le Figaro* articles dealing with immigration over this ten-year period. Only 53 out of 451 articles (11.5%) involve aspects of crime, significantly fewer than the top issues of irregular migration (41%) or integration (28%) (Chi Square 101.0122, df = 2, $p < .01$). One-quarter of the crime articles identify the perpetrators as originating from outside the EU, mostly from China and the Middle East. Non-EU immigrants are most commonly linked to trafficking, but also to fraud and occasionally to

assault, such as the violence and rioting in the migrant settlement outside of Calais, known as ‘The Jungle’ (DeMareschal, 2014). The only EU nationals *Le Figaro* mentions are the Roma, frequently invoked by politicians insinuating intensified criminal activity rather than concrete crimes. Repeated coverage of a visit by the Minister of Interior to Romania to foster greater cooperation in combating crime (Leclerc, 2012) furthers this depiction of Roma criminality and government efforts to control it.

The most common storyline in the articles about crime concerns trafficking (28%). *Le Figaro* often labels smuggling rings the ‘immigration mafia’ (Leclerc, 2010), though overt linkage between migration and organized crime occurs in only 17% of all articles, with three-quarters of these referring to human smuggling operations. Trafficking’s scale is described in terms of the effort and planning necessary to disrupt the operations. One article situates the government’s countermeasures within a “context of total war against traffickers” (Cornevin, 2009), while another cites President Sarkozy’s declaration of an unrestricted battle upon immigrant trafficking (Jeudy, 2010). Militarized metaphors exemplify journalistic securitization, but the accounts of the vast scale of these criminal operations also generate a sense of alarm that implicitly invites a comprehensive government response.

Outside of trafficking, securitization of the refugee crisis remains limited, even after the 2015 Paris attacks. Police officials admit that a terrorist threat may exist among undocumented migrants, but only one article articulates this connection (“Immigration clandestine,” 2016). Fraud is the only other criminal activity that receives regular attention, mentioned in 11% of the crime articles. This involves the various strategies for gaining residence and citizenship, either through sham marriages or falsifying birth certificates. In response, the newspaper heralds government DNA tests as a step in the right direction (Gabizon, 2009). Overall, *Le Figaro*’s narrative of crime demonstrates little variety in its framing, resting largely on highlighting the pervasiveness of trafficking with the implication of France’s infiltration by organized crime.

Germany

Crime is an infrequent frame for immigration-related articles in Germany’s *Die Welt*. This echoes Bauder’s (2008) study of press coverage surrounding the 2005 Immigration Act, where crime scarcely featured. 63 of the 502 articles coded (12.5%) deal with crime, similar to the share in *Le Figaro*. In Germany, the labor market constitutes the primary frame at 45%, with cultural integration (40%) also commonly referenced, and costs (19%) relevant, too. Each of these frames features significantly more frequently than crime (Chi Square = 180.8735, df = 3, $p < .01$). However, in 2016, 25% of all immigration related articles link to crime, and 30% of all mentions of crime over the 10-year period occur in 2016. One in five articles on crime identify non-EU culprits, with different narratives



corresponding to distinct nationalities and regions of origin. Articles that disclose the non-EU backgrounds of criminal migrants involve trafficking 34% of the time, more than any other single offense, with Afghans, Iraqis, and Chinese the most commonly mentioned nationalities. For standard offenses like theft and assault the most frequently mentioned origin is Northern African, indicated in 50% of such articles.

Trafficking is the most common criminal activity that *Die Welt* attributes to immigrants, with 16% of all criminal mentions in immigration-related articles, still significantly lower than in *Le Figaro* or the *Daily Telegraph* (Chi square = 7.9326, df = 2, $p < .05$). Forty percent of the articles on human smuggling mention the traffickers' nationality, but *Die Welt* never implicates Germans. An article about a Spanish national who bullied foreign women into sex-slavery (Zand-Vakili, 2008) or an investigation of a network of Chinese traffickers ("Beamte durchsuchen 43 China- Restaurants," 2009) portray trafficking as violent and morally reprehensible, meriting harsh punishment. The piece on the Chinese provides a litany of their dishonest practices, including welfare fraud, that often lack security implications, but which reinforce a causal bond between migrants and crime. Berman (2003) has pointed out that trafficking is often highlighted in the popular discourse in the service of elevating migration's security profile.

Stories about crime, particularly among youths, help fuel Germany's salient discourse surrounding failed integration. An interview with the Minister of Interior broaches the question of why foreigners demonstrate higher criminality rates, to which the Minister responds by explaining that integration takes time (Lau, 2009). However, one-quarter of articles linking migration to crime actually feature German perpetrators who threaten or commit violence against migrants, particularly since the arrival of higher numbers of refugees starting in 2015. Fraud is the only other offense to feature in at least 10% of the crime articles. Securitization occurs through a general linkage of criminal activity to the presence of immigrants, but not only the migrants shoulder the blame. Despite the political success of the anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland and the rise of the Pegida protests, a 2016 poll indicates that a majority of Germans are not overly worried about refugee migration leading to more crime (Graw, 2016), suggesting that securitizing attitudes have yet to take hold.

United Kingdom

The crime narrative recurs most often in the UK's *Daily Telegraph*, featuring in 18% of all migration-related articles. This emphasis is recent (see Figure 1), with 60% of the 93 articles dealing with crime over the ten-year span being published in 2016, when 36% of all immigration-related articles mention crime. Confirming Balabanova and Balch (2010) and Caviedes (2015), in the UK

immigration is cast foremost as an economic issue, with 45% of the articles handling labor market concerns, and 30% addressing costs. The *Telegraph* also features undocumented migration more commonly (22%) and references the border to a similar degree (18%) as crime. The *Telegraph* presents crime significantly less than the two economic issues (Chi square = 88.9523, $df = 2$, $p < .01$), but at roughly the same rate as the issues of undocumented migration or the border (Chi square = 3.5058, $df = 2$, $p > .05$). One-third of crime-related articles publicize the non-EU origins of criminals, higher than in France and Germany. While the geographical distribution is broad, the highest number hail from sub-Saharan Africa (about 25%), the Middle East (25%), and South and Central Asia, mostly Pakistan and Afghanistan (30%). Unlike in *Le Figaro* or *Die Welt* where non-EU migrant coverage dominates, one-third of the *Telegraph*'s identified perpetrators are EU nationals, 80% from Romania or Poland.

As in France and Germany, trafficking is the most common criminal activity described in the articles, but at 37% of all crime-related stories, the ratio is highest in the *Telegraph*, compared to 28% in *Le Figaro* and 17% in *Die Welt* (Chi square = 7.9326, $df = 2$, $p < .05$). This emphasis is a recent development, with over 80% of these articles appearing in 2016, while only two of the thirty-four articles appear in 2014 or earlier. The *Telegraph* mentions the geographic origins of the traffickers and smuggling 'gangs' in about one-quarter of these articles, but about 10% feature accounts of domestic traffickers, such as fishermen who were bribed to smuggle in people (Farmer, 2016). Prior to serving as Foreign Affairs Secretary, Boris Johnson traced UK support for EU policies on refugees as an invitation for increased trafficking (Dominiczak and Swinford, 2016), linking trafficking to the narrative of restoring sovereignty within the context of the Brexit vote. The *Telegraph* also invites heightened securitization through repeated mentions of employing military assets in the 'battle' against traffickers, pirates, and terrorists, as when former Prime Minister David Cameron promises to use the British Navy to intercept traffickers and ISIL weapons-runners off the coast of Libya (Vogt and Dominiczak, 2016). Coverage through the initial months after the Brexit vote suggests that the trafficking frame remains salient, featuring in 25% of those articles.

Prior to the rise of the trafficking frame, fraud was the most common narrative, with a shared emphasis upon sham marriages and welfare fraud, in which South Asians were most frequently implicated. 14% of articles accentuate such deception, which operates to criticize government inefficiency in protecting the UK's borders and finances. A more dangerous aspect of crime centers on violence taking place on the UK 'border' in Calais, France. Accounts of violent migrant camps or attempts to force passage across the Channel (Barrett, McCann, and Chazan, 2016), or through the Chunnel, constitute about 10% of all the crime articles, though they only feature once before 2016. Roughly half of the crime-related stories are formulated in general terms, without reporting



individual incidents or perpetrators, but instead referencing ‘criminal migrants’ and government inability to properly regulate their entry. The *Daily Telegraph*’s linkage of crime and migration is the most active among the three newspapers, and it casts this frame the most broadly and vaguely in scope. These findings also support the common claim (Moore and Ramsay, 2017) that media sensationalization of the criminal profile of immigrants intensified leading up to the Brexit vote.

Conclusion

Returning to the questions motivating this inquiry, the key results suggest, first, crime is a substantial frame for immigration-related press coverage, but *Le Figaro* and *Die Welt* grant significantly less attention than *The Daily Telegraph*. The crime frame does not reach the level of prominence of economic or cultural integration frames. Second, with the exception of significantly higher mentions in 2016 in *Die Welt* and *Daily Telegraph*, there is no evidence of a long-term upswing in press linkages of crime and migration. Third, trafficking is the most commonly reported aspect of criminal activity in each newspaper, though it is emphasized in varying degrees. The only other frame found in over 15% of the articles in each country concerns the non-EU origins of criminal migrants. In the *Daily Telegraph*, fraud is mentioned in over 14% of the crime articles, while *Die Welt* accounts involve acts of aggression committed by Germans against immigrants in 24%.

What do these results suggest about securitization tendencies in Europe’s conservative press? The findings challenge claims that the crime and migration nexus is the dominant narrative in Europe. While the security aspects of migration certainly assume prominence in response to terrorist acts or populist electoral rhetoric, economics and integration concerns are the foremost considerations that are brought before even conservative newsreaders. This implies that issues of labor migration, the cost of supporting migrants, and the integration of migrants continue to command the greatest press attention, and quite possibly, that of policy makers.

Despite crime not being a preeminent narrative, European conservative newspaper readers encounter a steady flow of articles relating migration to crime. This association services narratives that cast doubt upon the ability of administrative systems to manage migration and border security, and it inflates the perception that public coffers are susceptible to fraud. Organized crime is commonly linked to migration, which can increase the public’s sense of vulnerability. Even the portrayal of migrant victimhood broadcasts a securitizing message by connecting the presence of migrants with the necessity to intensify policing. While integration and economic policies may be presented with greater urgency, the press transmit a securitizing message concerning crime, albeit at a lower volume.

This study places the magnitude of the press' securitizing portrayals into a comparative context, demonstrating that while certain crime-related narratives stretch across Europe, most frames remain locally distinct in focus and amplitude. While Brexit offers a reminder of newspapers' ability to transmit a sense of unease (Moore and Ramsay, 2017), it is important to contextualize the national character of such framing processes. In this regard, the findings begin to integrate the disparate body of research on the press' securitization of migration – and its association to crime in particular – by properly situating the prominence of this narrative relative to other frames, as well as by comparing press coverage in different countries. This should motivate the expansion of studies of this type across additional countries if domestic or European level efforts are to successfully counter narratives that construct migration as a threat.

References

- Balabanova, E. and Balch, A. (2010). "Sending and receiving: The ethical framing of intra-EU migration in the European press". *European Journal of Communication*, 25 (4): 382-97.
- Barrett, D., McCann, K. and Chazan, K. (2016, January 25). "Passports to UK for thousands of migrant children alone in Europe". *The Daily Telegraph*, p. 9.
- Bauder, H. (2008). "Media Discourse and the New German Immigration Law". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34 (1): 95-112.
- "Beamte durchsuchen 43 China- Restaurants in Schleswig-Holstein". (2009, September 30). *Die Welt*, p. 40.
- Bennett, L. (2012). *News: The Politics of Illusion*. New York: Longman.
- Benson, R. (2013). *Shaping Immigration News: A French–American Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Berman, J. (2003). "(Un)Popular Strangers and Crises (Un)Bounded: Discourses of Sex-Trafficking, the European Political Community and the Panicked State of the Modern State". *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (1): 37–86.
- Bigo, D. (2002). "Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease". *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27 (1): 63-92.
- Bourbeau, P. (2011). *The Securitization of Migration. A study of movement and order*. New York: Routledge.
- Bourbeau, P., ed. (2015). *Security: Dialogue across Disciplines*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Buonfino, A. (2004). "Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe". *New Political Science*, 26 (1): 23-49.
- Buzan, B., *Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998)*. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Caviedes, A. (2015). "An Emerging 'European' News Portrayal of Immigration?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41 (6): 897-917.
- Caviedes, A. (2017). "Media Agents". In P. Bourbeau (ed.) *Handbook on Migration and Security*, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Press.



- Chebel d'Appollonia, A., and Reich, S. (2008). *Immigration, integration, and security: America and Europe in comparative perspective*. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press.
- Chong, D., and Druckman, J. N. (2007). "A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments". *Journal of Communication*, 57 (1): 99-118.
- Cornevin, C. (2009, February 9). "De la Chine à l'Afrique, plus de cent filières démantelées en France". *Le Figaro*, p.9.
- Correa-Cabrera, G. (2012). "The Spectacle of Drug Violence: American Public Discourse, Media, and Border Enforcement in the Texas-Tamaulipas Border Region During Drug-War Times". *Norteamérica*, 7 (2): 199-220.
- Dal Lago, A. (1999). *Non-persone*. Milan: Interzone.
- De Vreese, C. H. (2005). "News Framing: Theory and Typology". *Information Design Journal + Document Design*, 13 (1): 51-62.
- DeMareschal, E. (2014, August 10). "Calais sous haute tension face à l'afflux de clandestins". *Le Figaro*.
- Dominiczak, P. and Swinford, S. (2016, June 1). "Boris: Learn English if you want to move to the UK". *The Daily Telegraph*, p. 1.
- Dunaway, J., Goidel, R.K., Kirzinger, A., and Wilkinson, B.C. (2011). "Rebuilding or Intruding? Media Coverage and Public Opinion on Latino Immigration in Post-Katrina Louisiana". *Social Science Quarterly*, 92 (4): 917-937.
- Edelman, M. (1988). *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Entman, R. (1993). "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm". *Journal of Communication*, 43 (4): 51-58.
- Farmer, B. (2016, June 6). "UK fisherman bribed with 25 times their daily wages to smuggle migrants". *The Daily Telegraph*, p. 9.
- Gabizon, C. (2009, September 17). "Le mariage, première porte d'entrée des immigrés". *Le Figaro*, p. 9.
- Gilliam Jr, F. D. and Iyengar, S. (2000). "Prime suspects: The influence of local television news on the viewing public". *American Journal of Political Science*, 44 (3): 560-573.
- Graber, D. and Dunaway, J. (2015). *Mass Media and American Politics*, 9th ed. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Graw, A. (2016, July 12). "Deutsche sehen Zustrom von Flüchtlingen relativ gelassen". *Die Welt*, p. 1.
- Helbling, M. (2012). "Public Debates, Integration Models, and Transnationalism in Western Europe". *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 10 (3): 241-59
- Herbert, U. (2001). *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge*. Munich: C.H. Beck.
- Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. New York: Routledge.
- "Immigration clandestine: les expulsions en chute libre". (2016, September 2). *Le Figaro*, p. 1.
- Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News That Matters*. Chicago, UCP.
- Jeuzy, B. (2010, April 21). "Seine-Saint-Denis: Sarkozy veut 'harceler les délinquants'". *Le Figaro*, p. 2.

- Kepplinger, H. M., Donsbach, W., Brosius, H. B., and Staab, J. F. (1989). "Media tone and public opinion: A longitudinal study of media coverage and public opinion on Chancellor Kohl". *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 1 (4): 326-342.
- KhosraviNik, M. (2010). "The representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in British newspapers. A critical discourse analysis". *Journal of Language and Politics*, 9 (1), 1-28.
- King, D. (2000). *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004). "Reliability in Content Analysis. Some Common Misperceptions and Recommendations". *Human Communication Research*, 30 (3): 411-433.
- Lau, M. (2009, September 4). "Schaut her, es geht!" *Die Welt*, p. 4.
- Leclerc, J.-M. (2010, May 5). "La délinquance coûte 115 milliards chaque année". *Le Figaro*, p. 8.
- Leclerc, J.-M. (2012, September 13). "Roms: Valls défend sa politique à Bucarest". *Le Figaro*, p. 9.
- Maneri, M. (2008). "Media and the war on migration". In S. Palidda (ed.) *Criminalisation and Victimization of Migrants in Europe*, Genoa: Department of Anthropological Science, Genoa University. http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/224c0704b7b7746e8a07df9a8b20c098/eu_criminalisation_of_migrants_in_europe_report.pdf.
- Montali, L., Riva, P., Frigerio, A. and Mele, S. (2013) "The representation of migrants in the Italian press: A study on the *Corriere della Sera* (1992–2009)". *Journal of Language and Politics*, 12 (2): 226-250.
- Moore, M. and Ramsay, G. (2017). *UK media coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum campaign*, Centre of the Study of Media, Communication, and Power. London: The Policy Institute, King's College. <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/CMCP/UK-media-coverage-of-the-2016-EU-Referendum-campaign.pdf>
- Nacos, B. L. and Torres-Reyna, O. (2003). "Framing Muslim-Americans Before and After 9/11". In P. Norris, M. Kern and M. Just (eds.) *Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public*, New York: Routledge.
- Nellis, A. M. and Savage, J. (2012). "Does watching the news affect fear of terrorism? The importance of media exposure on terrorism fear". *Crime & Delinquency*, 58 (5): 748-768.
- OECD. (2015). *Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Retis, J. and Benavides, J. L. (2005). "Miradas hacia Latinoamérica: la representación discursiva de los inmigrantes latinoamericanos en la prensa española y estadounidense". *Temas de Portada*, 8 (2): 93-114.
- Rudolph, C. (2006). *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Schain, M. (2008). *The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States: a Comparative Study*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schemer, C. (2012). "The Influence of News Media on Stereotypic Attitudes toward Immigrants in a Political Campaign". *Journal of Communication*, 62 (5): 739-757.
- Sciortino, G. and Colombo, A. (2004). "The flows and the flood: the public discourse on immigration in Italy 1969-2001". *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9 (1): 94-113.



- Snow, D. A., Vliegenthart, R. and Corrigan-Brown, C. (2007). "Framing the French Riots: A Comparative Study of Frame Variation". *Social Forces*, 86 (2): 385-415.
- SOPEMI (2010, 2013, 2015). *International Migration Outlook* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
- Vogt, A. and Dominiczak, P. (2016, May 27). "Dozens feared drowned as Mediterranean refugee rescues hit record level". *The Daily Telegraph*, p. 8.
- Zand-Vakili, A. (2008, August 7). "Schleuser zwang Frauen zur Prostitution". *Die Welt*, p. 29.