

## **Situations of the Muntafiq Under the Policy of the Ottoman Governors (1850-1852)**

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### **Abstract**

*This research discussed the issue of Situations of the Muntafiq Under the Policy of the Ottoman Governors (1850-1852), this study seeks to analyze and know the policy of the Ottoman state towards the tribes of the Muntafiq and its attempts to assert its control over the tribes of the Muntafiq. This research consists of two main sections, we devoted the first topic to the attitude of the Muntafiq tribes towards the policy of the governor Wajih Pasha (1850-1851). While making the second topic about the attitude of the Muntafiq tribes towards the first government of Namik Pasha (1851-1852).*

*The research relied on a collection of unpublished Ottoman documents, in addition to Ottoman government and peaceful publications. In addition to important historical sources related to the subject, such as Arabic and Arabized books, and some Arab and foreign theses, as well as a section of Arab and foreign research.*

**Keywords:** *the Ottomans, Al- Sa'adoun, Muntafiq.*

### **Introduction**

There are many academic studies that dealt with the history of the Al-Muntafiq tribes during the middle of the nineteenth century during the period of direct Ottoman occupation, due to the great importance of this period of time in the modern history of Iraq, and its undeniable historical value, but these studies mostly exceeded its aspects. political, its geographical borders and its duration, and that most of them did not benefit from the Ottoman documents that were not available as they are today and the ease of obtaining them and benefiting from them, which we would like to show here that the research methodology, directions and results are determined by the information that the available Ottoman documents provided us with Which we have seen, which was the letters and reports exchanged and filed between the governors of the era of study and the government of Istanbul and vice versa, and among the topics that did not get enough research and study, especially those that went hand in hand with the administrative, economic and social history of those tribes, which is the subject ( The situations of the Muntafiq under the policy of the Ottoman governors 1850-1852) Therefore, this study seeks to analyze and know the policy of the Ottoman state towards the tribes of the Muntafiq and its attempts to assert its control over the tribes of the Muntafiq that remained alone struggling with its satanic policies towards them, which is the period that began in which tribe organizations are integrated into the mechanisms of the modern state. The study aimed to explore the status of the state, with a special focus on various forms of seizing political power, and the relationship between the center and the periphery with the context of the tribe structure in Ottoman Iraq, which began from this time onwards, from the tightening of the Ottoman authorities' grip on the tribes of the

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Muntafiq. By constantly changing the sheikhs and setting one against the other, and at each change they increased the tribute paid by the tribe. Thus, between 1851 and 1852, the nominal tribute increased from (185) thousand to (310) thousand shami. This modest research deals with the situations of the Muntafiq under the policy of the Ottoman governors (1850-1852), and how the governors of this era tried to implement the central policy towards the tribes of the Muntafiq? By following various methods in order to fuse these tribes with the authority of the state, and despite their multiple attempts, it did not bear fruit. This research consists of two main sections, we devoted the first section to the attitude of the Al-Muntafiq tribes towards the policy of the governor, Wajihi Pasha (1850-1851), that policy that is to say the least a game of carrots or sticks, which was built on creating frictions between the sons of Al-Sa'adoun family, And the recognition of a rival Sheikh from the sons of Al-Sa'adoun at the expense of another, in an attempt to break up the family cohesion of those tribes that remained a thorn in the throat of the Ottoman governors appointed to the Eyalet of Baghdad for decades. While the second topic focused on the attitude of the Al-Muntafiq tribes towards the first government of Namik Pasha (1851-1852), who relied at times on force and mobilization of armies to eliminate the continuous uprisings of the Al-Muntafiq tribes, and at other times on spreading division and feeding competition between the sons of Al-Sa'adoun by nominating a new figure who would be accepted by the government Sublime Porte.

The research relied on a collection of unpublished Ottoman documents, in addition to Ottoman government and peaceful publications. In addition to important historical sources related to the subject, such as Arabic and Arabized books, and some Arab and foreign theses, as well as a section of Arab and foreign research.

Situations of the Muntafiq Under the Policy of the Ottoman Governors (1850-1852):

The first topic: the Attitude of the Muntafiq Tribes on the Policy of the Governor Wajihi Pasha (1850-1851):

The policy of appeasement pursued by Abdi Pasha with the Iraqi tribes in general and the al-Muntafiq in particular, on which he built his hopes to put an end to the uprisings and tribe unrest, failed. And after Abdi Pasha realized the futility of his attempts to solve the tribe problem, especially the Al-Muntafiq tribes, and restore security and stability to the parts of the Baghdad Eyalet, he took the initiative to submit his resignation to the government of the Sublime Porte, It was not necessary for the Istanbul government to accept his resignation immediately. Because it found that his remaining in this attitude will lead to a worsening of the situation more than it is, and that the Baghdad Eyalet will witness more conflicts and tribe uprisings, which in turn will affect the state's revenues from that district, and after the issuance of the decree deposing Abdi Pasha , it was assigned the governorship of Baghdad to Wajihi Pasha on December 21 of the year 1850 .

Wajihi Pasha wanted to follow a sound policy that was dominated by friendliness and encouragement, and rejected the manifestations of violence and intimidation in the administration of the Baghdad Eyalet. Because he believed that these measures were the cause of the Iraqi tribes' repulsion from obeying the government, especially the Muntafiq tribes, because of their weight and attitude , which made it difficult for the governors to enter into conflicts with them. It seems that it was an attempt by Wajihi Pasha to get close to the people, especially the tribes, and for that he made a great effort to keep the army away and not involve it in wars with the revolting tribes of Al-Muntafiq, on the other hand, he was at that time holding the attitude of command of the sixth Army ( Field Marshal Muhammad Namik Pasha), who was characterized by cruelty and injustice and was in control of the policy of preserving the status quo, even though the governor is the one who directs Namik Pasha according to the laws of government, so the governor of Baghdad Wajihi Pasha entrusted him with the affairs of administration, being knowledgeable and familiar with the situations Eyalet and a good observer of what is

going on in it. It seems that Namik Pasha's ambitions were to seize the attitude of the state over Baghdad. He kept himself in constant contact with the higher authorities in Istanbul through the biuliyards that he sends there first-hand about every incoming and outgoing matter regarding the situations of the Baghdad Eyalet, in order to gain the confidence and approval of the government of the door. The Supreme did not hesitate to tell the government of the Sublime Porte about the deterioration of the situation of the province as a result of the soft policy of Wajih Pasha towards the tribe movements and that he was ready to sacrifice the precious and precious to protect the property of the Ottoman state. In order to prove his loyalty to the government of the Sublime Porte, he suggested to the government of Istanbul the necessity of forming the Great Council, or what is called (the board of directors) in the light of the councils that the Ottoman state began to establish in five of its affiliated provinces, to organize the government administration there. Whereas, the new governor of Baghdad, as soon as he assumed the reins of power, the uprisings raged in his face, as Nassir and Mansour announced the uprising against Persia and the government of Baghdad after re-assigning Persia as sheikh of the Muntafiq. Paying the accumulated commitment funds that they pledged to the former Pasha of Baghdad, Abdi Pasha.

In district al-Muntafiq - the matter of our study - Wajih Pasha acknowledged the Sheikdom of Fares over all the tribes of the Muntafiq, and that was under the direction of the Mutasalim of Basra Ma'shuq Pasha, as he explained to Abdi Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, that Persia's obtaining the Sheikdom means collecting the money of the miri without the grip of a sword By the army of Iraq and the Hijaz, and inform him of Fares' signature on the bonds in order to fulfill his obligation and pay the miri money resulting from the recognition of his sheikdom, in addition to the money accumulated in his custody and which he had not previously paid, and his pledge to build the dams located on the Euphrates River and to control his tribe with the pledge of good settlement and taking care of the administration, and he was given a support from Ma'shuq Pasha, the judge, by his confession as Sheikh Ali al-Muntafiq, which was not accepted by the sons of Rashid (Nassir and Mansour). And in order for the new governor who supported him to head the tribes of Al-Muntafiq to approve, he even began to send gifts to him while showing loyalty and obedience, waving his hand of allegiance to the Pasha of Baghdad through good times and bad times, among the gifts sent to the Pasha of Baghdad was a mare and a horse, and they were of the best and finest Arab species owned by Faris, until he obtained the approval of the governor to be a sheikh for the Muntafiq.

Mansour Al-Sa'adoun did not like this matter, and he did not remain silent about this matter. Rather, he rode to Baghdad intending to meet the new governor, Wajih Pasha, and to bless him with the attitude of governorship and to submit a complaint to him, as a result of the betrayal he was subjected to by the former Baghdad government after he made peace with it and paid it what was in it. I entrusted him and presented him with his objection to recognizing the sheikdom of Persia, hoping for justice for him and restoring him at the head of the sheikdom of Al-Muntafiq, but he was surprised by the issuance of arrest warrants against him and those with him, and they were placed under house arrest in Baghdad. It seems that this happened as a result of the lack of knowledge and familiarity of the new governors appointed to the rule of the Eyalet of Baghdad with the method and mechanism for the installation of the sheikdom in that emirate, as they took to relying on the correspondences of the Mutasalim of Basra, Ma'shuq Pasha, considering that region under his rule and that he was knowledgeable about the affairs of those tribes, which was confirmed by the Ottoman documents It stated, "Through the mutaslim of Basra, Faris was appointed as a sheikh for the Muntafiq. Recently, Mansour Khalaf was appointed to Faris, and the tribe entered into a state of turmoil and corruption. I do not know whether the replacement of successive sheikdoms in this way is for wisdom or a foregone conclusion, because we are forced to obtain calm in That part of the Eyalet".

And following the arrest of Mansour in Baghdad by Wajih Pasha, his brother Nassir did not have to accept the matter and he persisted in dealing with the matter in his own way that he was famous for, which is the events of unrest inside and outside the Muntafiq in favor of his brother. so he gathered a crew from the al-Muntafiq tribes and began changing from time to time against Persia, and his uprising began to expand to include all regions of southern Iraq, which caused obstruction to the flow of river and land trade convoys until the connection between Baghdad and Basra was completely cut off, and even agricultural crops were not spared from his evils as he intended to destroy it in order to force the Baghdad government to submit to his order to release his brother Mansour, and even to recognize the latter as a sheikh of the Muntafiq, which deprived the Mutasalim of Basra from collecting the imports that Persia pledged to him, and Nassir's actions also harmed the agricultural crops whose harvest season had arrived, and the effect of this would be harsh on the treasury of the state, and due to the lack of forces in the Baghdad Eyalet, it had a prominent impact on not controlling the situations of the Muntafiq tribes, since the Suq Al-Shuyoukh was under the protection of the sheikhs of the Al-Sa'adoun family and being surrounded by the regions of Algeria, which became a hotbed for deserters Regular and wanted by tribes under certain issues, and as a result, the Mutasalim of Basra pressured the Baghdad government to implement one of the two things: the first is to provide assistance and provide him with two squads of soldiers, one with a hand and the other a column of masts with cannon shooters and nearly a thousand irregular soldiers in order to increase Their presence and control of matters in the provinces and Mutasalimiyat of Basra. And he noted that if the army gained control, it would facilitate the process of collecting al-miri's money and raising the obligation allowance for the Al-Muntafiq tribes and the rest of the other tribes, but this is difficult to achieve because it lacks the abundance of military forces, and the other issue is the release of Mansour, as it was mentioned in His request submitted to the governor of Baghdad Since the harvest season has approached, he does not need to delay one day, and in order not to lose as a result of Nassir's actions, the governor of Baghdad requested aid from Sheikh Mansour in this regard, which resulted in the failure of Faris bin Aqil Al-Sa'adoun to send the transfer he is required to send it, which is (40 thousand) Shami, and this was suspended, and in order to collect this transfer, it is necessary to assist Mansour and Nassir because of the approaching harvest time and collecting the accumulated money from the miri, and to remove grievances, the governor of Baghdad asked to allow the transfer and release of Mansour, who was arrested at the time in Baghdad.

The Mutasalim of Basra, the governor of Baghdad, Wajih Pasha took advantage of this competition over the sheikhdom of the Al-Muntafiq tribes, and the intensity of the dispute between Sheikh Faris and Sheikh Mansour escalated, which reached the point of fighting and shedding tears for the brothers in order to win the leadership of the Al-Muntafiq tribes, and as a result of the lack of sufficient forces to prove one the two parties implemented the directives of the Mutasalim of Basra, Ma'shuq Pasha, which stipulates an increase of (240) purse over the previous commitment allowance of (800) purse, so that the new commitment becomes (1040) purse, and whoever pays the new allowance obtains the approval of Wajih Pasha.

As a result of those pressures and because of the need of the new governor to provide the necessary funds in his custody for the government of the Sublime Porte, Mansour was released after he pledged not to cause any hostilities or create disturbances in the Sheikhdom of Al-Muntafiq, since that time is the time of reaping the fruits of agricultural crops, and after being reassured in December 1850, Wajih Pasha wrote to the government of the Sublime Porte and informed it of the settlement of matters in that important part of the Eyalet through which he surrendered to the sheikhdom of Persia after his pledge to pay the miri money owed by him, in addition to the money accumulated two years ago, and it was also agreed with Mansour that the successor of Fares would grant Mansour the sheikhdom to the Muntafiq after pledging to pay what

Fares owed from the accumulated money for two years. In order to control matters there, it is necessary to send more soldiers to That remnant of the Eyalet.

However, Mansour, as soon as he obtained his freedom, hit his pledges with the Pasha of Baghdad and turned to the Al-Dhafir tribe and asked for their help in restoring his leadership over the Al-Muntafiq tribes. An arduous journey, they reached the province of Samawah and settled in one of its towns called (Al-Khidr), which is 4 hours away from the center of Samawah affiliated to the sheikhdom of Al-Muntafiq. After Fares learned of their control over that province, he sent his brother Abdullah and his uncle Saleh with (500-600) fighters. The two groups met where Mansour was present in the beginning of December of the year 1850, and the conflict ended with the defeat of Abdullah and those with him, and Mansour declared himself a sheikh over the Al-Muntafiq tribes from the province of Samawah, and as a result of Fares's retraction from his pledges to Ma'shuq Pasha, the mutaslim of Basra hastened to recognize Mansour as a general sheikh. To the Al-Muntafiq tribes, after raising the miri's money to (800 purse) and calling on the Baghdad government to remove Fares in order to return him to submission and obedience.

Mansour faced great attitude to his leadership of the Al-Muntafiq tribes, this time from the sheikhs, notables, and notables of the Al-Muntafiq, and they are among the seniors of the Sa'adoun family, so she asked the governor to help rid her of the evils of Mansour and that he did not deserve to rule over them, and that they were not obligated to pay the commitment money to him, and due to their desire In order to isolate Mansour and discipline him, the Baghdad government sent a group of soldiers to support Fares, in addition to the support that Fares received from the tribes of Rabia, Shammar, Anza, Qasha'em, Al-Naeem and Bani Lam, until he became with him (6000) fighters and crossed them to where Mansour is. And after a short battle, and the least that can be said about it is a lightning battle, because many of those who joined the knight of the tribal forces joined. Fares was able to isolate Mansour and restore his sheikhdom over all the tribes of Al-Muntafiq, as Mansour did not expect Persia to attack so quickly, and the tribes of Al-Dhafir were standing with him, and the tribes and Bedouins from all sides gathered for the sheikhdom of Al-Muntafiq, and so Fares restored his emirate from Mansour in a short time And he became controlling the tribe . It is noticeable in this confrontation that few of the Al-Muntafiq tribes or the southern tribes in general joined Mansour . Where it was stated in one of the Ottoman documents " The failure of the Al-Muntafiq tribes supporting Mansour at that time was due to the time of reaping the fruits of their agricultural crops of wheat and barley. From her efforts, and for this reason, Mansour was unable to continue with the sheikhdom for a long time ".

As a result of the betrayal that befell Mansour by the Ottoman authorities and the defeat he received from Persia, he became in a attitude of weakness in front of Persia's candidacy for the chiefdom, and he found in the enmity between Wadi and the government the best ally and supporter and a great opportunity to achieve his to aim at, which is something he warned against The commander of the army, Namik Pasha, told the government of the Sublime Porte after he informed it that the dispute between the sheikhs of the al-Muntafiq tribes increased the intensity of the unrest over al-Hindiya, and that disobedience will extend to include all areas of Hilla, and indeed large tribe uprisings took place in the regions of the middle Euphrates in addition to The disturbances that pervaded the Al-Muntafiq tribes as a result of the conflicts over the sheikhdom, and despite the turbulence of the situation in those areas, Wajihi Pasha decided to deal with it in leniency and politics and rejecting intimidation and force, and it seems that he was not inclined to violence and did not favor the use of military means in dealing With the problems and insisted on following the diplomatic methods in resolving the problems of the tribes.

Wajihi Pasha used to see that the tribe uprisings were nothing but a group of people from among the people who needed to be dealt with, and this procedure is required and the

money belonging to the people should not be seized and destroyed because it is contrary to justice and leads to the people leaving their monastery after the destruction of their money, in addition to that there is a salary in his custody Those tribes go to the treasury of the state, for the Indian tribes have an amount of (15,000) purse, in addition to the amount of (28,600) leftover purse required from the era of Abdi Pasha, and they must be fulfilled. which had not been paid previously, and there would be a defect in it if that happened and the forces advanced and stormed those areas, but his policy was met with a strong refusal by his army commander, Namik Pasha, who found it necessary to follow the path of the sword and severity in that case in order to preserve for the prestige of the state and the discipline of those uprisings, and that was nothing but an honor for the Ottoman government, and it was mentioned in one of the manuscripts that Namik Pasha, after he assumed command of the army in Iraq, had "sworn to resist anyone who deviates from obedience to the government, and the sword rose up for him not politics".

Due to the insistence of the governor of Baghdad and the intransigence of the army commander in the way of dealing with the tribe uprisings, the two parties entered into a deep disagreement, and after Namik Pasha's inability to convince Wajihi Pasha, the issue was transferred to the corridors of the Sublime Porte, and after the Sublime Porte's government was briefed on the views of the two parties, it was found in a pledge The army commander accomplished the task militarily and put an end to those uprisings in a welcome manner, so she did not hesitate for one moment and issued orders directly to Namik Pasha to quickly move the soldiers and direct them to the revolted tribal areas, and in order to start the process of collecting the miri's money, the Ottoman state was willing to get rid of these uprisings quickly. And since those uprisings coincided with the time of harvesting and harvesting agricultural crops, and that the state was in dire need of that money, it gave Namik Pasha full powers to mobilize part of the army of Iraq and Hijaz and strike the revolting tribes, and in order to succeed the mission and raise his status among the Ottoman government, he himself marched on He led a great force against the revolting tribes in the middle Euphrates and achieved great successes over these tribes.

Wajihi Pasha was one of the least effective rulers of Baghdad, and although he was described as knowledgeable about administrative matters and a mastermind, his short tenure in Baghdad made him unable to know the population, as he was not described with good management and selection of employees, and his internal policy did not differ from that of the governors. Those who preceded him, especially with regard to imposing taxes and collecting them in various ways with the aim of obtaining money to run the affairs of government, and although he was the ruler who implemented the organization reforms in Mosul (especially the formation of local councils), the term of his term in Baghdad was less important. On the other hand, Namik Pasha, the commander of the Iraq and Hijaz army, was the one who dominated and controlled the general policy of the Baghdad Eyalet, unlike Wajihi Pasha, Namik Pasha was well aware of the problems of the Baghdad Eyalet, but the Pashas had different opinions about the policy that should be followed towards tribes. The success of Namik Pasha's campaign had the greatest impact on the governor of Baghdad, who did not find him qualified except to submit his resignation, indicating the failure of his policy with the Iraqi tribes, especially with the Muntafiq tribes. At that point, the resignation was accepted directly, and the Eyalet of Baghdad was assigned to the commander of the Sixth Army in Iraq, Namik Pasha, on November 12, 1851.

Namik Pasha advocated a military solution, while Wajihi Pasha favored a peaceful solution to these uprisings. The dispute ended when Namik Pasha was able to obtain the support of the Sublime Porte and promised to solve the tribe problems. Wajihi Pasha resigned and was replaced by Namik Pasha.



The second topic: the attitude of the Muntafiq tribes towards the first government of Namik Pasha (1851-1852):

The failure of the governor of Baghdad Wajih Pasha in managing the rule over Iraq, which led to his resignation, was matched by the great success of his army commander, Namik Pasha, in his last campaign against the Middle Euphrates uprising in 1850, and his capture of seven of the sheikhs of those tribes and their handcuffs to the government of the Sublime Porte. This matter led to a rise in his popularity among the Ottoman political circles, and he found great support for him from the government of the Sublime Porte in his candidacy for the pashawiyah of Baghdad, and after deliberations in the corridors of the authorities of the Sublime Porte, they found it appropriate to combine the civil and military administrations under the same authority. The person, taking into account the efforts of Namik Pasha in state services and the experiences he gained as a result of his long career as Commander-in-Chief of the sixth army in Iraq and the Hijaz, in order to carry out actions faster in the strategic and important Baghdad Eyalet for the Ottoman state .

Therefore, the government of the Sublime Porte decided to appoint Namik Pasha to the governorship of Baghdad instead of Wajih Pasha, and on the 12th of November 1851, the judge arrived at the complete government of Namik Pasha over the Baghdad Eyalet from Mosul to Basra, to be appointed by whomever he wished from him, not by the Supreme state. And (37.500) piaster were added to his salary, and his allowances were increased to (100.000) piaster. Based on the authority obtained by Namik Pasha, he moved the government palace to a wider palace in order to carry out civil and military works at the same time. From (Al-Mushairiyah) a palace for him, the Ottoman state was striving to fully restore central control over that province since 1831, especially control over the Al-Muntafiq tribes, which represented the main obstacle in implementing its new reform policy, and on Despite the efforts of the Ottoman administration to impose its direct control, no tangible change occurred, the reason for this is due to the different orientations of its policy and that of the Muntafiq tribes, as the latter do not like to submit to the government . Based on the foregoing, the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman state sought to implement a more firm and central policy on Iraq, for this reason it saw in Namik Pasha the appropriate person to occupy the attitude of governor of Baghdad after a failure of nearly twenty years of restoring direct rule over that district, so Namik Pasha became Pasha was one of the prominent rulers of Baghdad during that historical stage.

Namik Pasha was aware of the affairs of the Eyalet of Baghdad and the situations of the Iraqi tribes, and he was feared among Iraqi society, as his reign was characterized by a military character. The armed forces were the tool he relied on in his attempt to extend Ottoman control over all the provinces of Iraq and end the tribe rebellions, adopting the policy of violence and the sword, not the policy of friendliness and understanding with the tribes, which greatly affected the souls of the people of those tribes, which generated a state of anger and resentment when he took over the rule of Iraq. This is the front of the government of Namik Pasha, the uprisings since their beginnings, especially in central and southern Iraq, including the Muntafiq tribes.

Namik Pasha was not satisfied with the incident of the shift, but rather appointed a military governor, who is (Khalaf Agha al-Muslimani) over those tribes, from whom the people suffered because of his exercise of power that is the least described as oppression and cruelty in governance, as he went too far in imprisoning many of the sons of those tribes in the Indian castle and he took pleasure in insulting them, rather he made them like mules carrying stones and dirt on their backs and they are generous and brave Arabs, and this act could not remain without a strong reaction by the Iraqi tribes, especially after Namik was appointed as governor, which means the continuation of the style he treated himself with everyone who violated his policy, his actions led to the opposite of what he had hoped for, as he turned the people into a blazing bloc of discontent with which he needed a force of no less than fifty thousand fighters to restore order, which led to the

spread of Chaos throughout Iraq and the roads became unsafe, which affected the state's crops, as convoys began to be attacked and looted from every direction.

As for the Al-Muntafiq tribes, after Faris bin Aqil defeated his cousin Mansour bin Rashid with the help of the government soldiers and some of the tribes that stood with him, the Mutaslim of Basra, Ma'shuq Pasha, hurried to endorse the sheikhdom of Fares without remarks or a statement of the reason, and as soon as Namik Pasha reached power. In the beginning, Faris committed himself to being a sheikh for al-Muntafiq, and he was given a document of ratification for that, on the situation that he pay what he pledged, and a Sunni decree was issued by the Sultan to do so, and after Namik Pasha completed his mission with the tribes of the Middle Euphrates to confront their uprising by force, he his campaign was successful, which encouraged him to continue the policy of the sword to get rid of the tribal uprisings, and he was determined to move forward. He was contacted with the Mutasalim of Basra, Ma'shuq Pasha, to settle the matter of the sheikhdom of the Muntafiq tribes associated with the Mutasalimiyah of Basra.

In order to settle the matter, both the governor of Basra and the governor of Baghdad tried with Mansour to settle him in a suitable place, as he was located on the outskirts of Diwaniyah and to be a sheikh over those who followed him from those tribes in order to facilitate the task of collecting the money of the miri , and it seems that it was an act of disdain. Pasha did this to avoid Mansour's alliance with the valley of Sheikh Zabid, the leader of the uprising of the Central Euphrates tribes, which declared disobedience against the Baghdad government, but Mansour did not accept this matter and insisted on wresting the sheikhdom from Persia and entrusting it to him, so he fell into a dispute with Marshal the army of Iraq and Hijaz Namik Pasha, and Mansour gathered around him many tribes and before embarking on his campaign against Persia, he sent a group of people dependent on the governor of Baghdad presenting to him all pledges of (khula'h) and others to accept him as a sheikh of al-Muntafiq, but the governor did not give an answer. The hesitation of these groups was repeated many times, but to no avail, due to the fact that Fares also adheres to his leadership over the Al-Muntafiq tribes.

As a result of the continuing disturbances and problems in that sheikhdom, and because Namik Pasha was known for his seriousness and sound work, and by virtue of his being well-informed and fully knowledgeable about the situations of the tribes and how to deal with them, he telegraphed to the government of the Sublime Porte, as well as to the Mutasalim of Basra, informing them literally of the need for the tribes of the Muntafiq to follow one of them. The two parties are either Basra or Baghdad, as he explained in his telegram, "The occurrence of the Al-Muntafiq tribes between Baghdad and Basra made them have links with those two cities, so they tend where their interests or the interests of the stakeholders in the Baghdad Eyalet tend, and it is appropriate for that tribe to be on one side." The sultan, on what Namik Pasha brought, issued a firman accordingly, and the governor of Baghdad was given full powers to isolate and install the sheikhs of the Muntafiq as required by the interest of the government authorities, and since then the Sanjak of the Muntafiq was associated with the administration of Baghdad.

There were several points that Namik Pasha took into consideration during the appointment and dismissal of the senior sheikhs, while military force was absolutely vital in both deposing and strengthening the sheikh, the harvest period was taken into consideration. Even if the sheikh was stubborn, no military action was taken during this period to allow the harvest to be collected. In 1851, Namik Pasha thought about separating Persia, but he did not dare, because he owed unpaid taxes for two years, and it seems that Namik Pasha deliberately exploited the rivalry between Persia and Mansour and the readiness of the two parties to the conflict for the last duel, which will make the victor among them is weak in front of the Baghdad government, which is what Namik Pasha is working on in preparation for adding his situations represented in declaring the Sheikh market as a district, and that he gives the document of ratification to the sheikh who accepts this matter in preparation for controlling it.



When Mansour was unable to obtain recognition of his sheikhdom from the governor of Baghdad, he went to Diwaniyah and resided in the vicinity of Hilla and began to gather his followers until the total number of what he had with him reached approximately (4,000) knights. Meanwhile, the sheikh of the Zabid tribes announced Wadi's uprising against the government of Namik Pasha, so the endeavors of Nassir and his close friend Wadi, both of whom had hostile intentions, coincided with the governor in order to eliminate the Baghdad government, as Wadi had deviated from the obedience of the Ottoman governors in charge of Baghdad during the reign of Abd al-Karim Nadir; Because of his stripping of the attitude of Pasha, he was committed to the areas of Hilla from the outskirts of Baghdad to the borders of Samawah, as mistrust of the Iraqi plan made him apprehensive on the part of the government, so he declared rebellion, and after the arrival of Namik Pasha, he tried to reconcile the matter with him, except that the latter was intransigent and his hardening in his opinion precipitated the declaration of the Valley of War, and raised the banner of his Muslim movement against the government of Namik Pasha. The matter was in favor of Mansour, who seized the opportunity and joined Wadi to unite the ranks in a clear challenge to the Baghdad government, and there is no doubt that Wadi's alliance with Mansour, who demanded the sheikhdom over the Al-Muntafiq tribes, was the most dangerous alliance that Namik Pasha's first mandate faced over Baghdad.

After the failure of his attempts with Mansour to find a solution that guarantees the stability of those areas, the situation worsened, so he was forced to send his clerk (Yosif Effendi) to the recipient of Basra to find out the causes of those events that Nassir committed, but before reaching his destination he fell into the hands of a group of supporters of Wadi at Shatt al-Kut and everything he was carrying or acquiring was robbed of money and things.

The governor of Baghdad did not despair and took the initiative to conduct negotiations with the sheikhs of the rebellious tribes and tried to win over the clergy because they have weight and their words are heard in the tribe circles to intervene in order to calm the situation, but things have slipped into unimaginable consequences.

Mansour prepared his fighters with the help of Wadi Sheikh, the tribes of Zubayd and the tribes of Ka'b, al-Hindiya and al-Khaza'il, and in the meantime a group of members of the Grand Council, led by Amin Effendi and Ahmed Effendi, tried to prevent the clash between Fares and Mansour. Mansour from where they arrived, but the latter and those with him did not care about their order and continued on the march to where Fares is located, and the bayonets began to clash in the province of Samawah and Ain al-Sayd, so Mansour was able to control it, and the tribal crowds advanced under the leadership of Mansour and the valley of Sheikh Zubaid towards the Sheikhdom of Al-Muntafiq center in Suq Al-Shuyoukh, where Faris is, but the latter did not wait for their arrival to him, but rather prepared for it and went out with those in his entourage, and the two parties met near the city of Al-Shatrah on April 23, 1851, and after the intensification of the battles between the two sides, Abdullah was killed Brother of Fares, which broke the army of the latter and hastened his defeat until he was arrested, and only his uncle Saleh bin Issa and (150) person of his followers escaped from this confrontation, as they succeeded in escaping to a place two hours away from Basra called Kot Dubai .

The credit for the restoration of Sheikh Mansour Al-Sa'adoun over the Al-Muntafiq tribes in 1851 was due to the success of his alliance with the valley of the Sheikh of the Zabid tribes, who took this victory as a slogan and a symbol of tribe unity in order to expel foreign rule alien to Iraqi land, so he began to correspond with the sheikhs of the tribes that did not Al-Ubaid tribe joined the uprising, and among those tribes was the Al-Ubaid tribe, where he addressed its sheikh, Sa'adoun Al-Mustafa, telling him about the recent events that took place with him and the sons of Rashid Al-Sa'adoun, and how Mansour was able, with his help, to achieve victory, defeat and defeat the sons of Al-Aqeel and the Shabib family and the Ottoman forces present in those lands, and he

managed to defeat them and their killing of Abdullah bin Aqeel and the flight of the rest of their helpers. It seems that Wadi was aspiring, through this correspondence, to win the sheikh of Al-Ubaid on the side of the uprising and to rise up on the side of the revolting tribes, since Wadi felt that Namik Pasha was preparing for a large military campaign and heading it to central and southern Iraq, and in order to confront it, greater unification was required. Some tribes are against that creep.

As for Mansour, upon his arrival at Suq Al- Shuyoukh, the political and commercial center of the Muntafiq, he asked Ma'shuq Pasha to send him his robe (hila), which means the official confirmation of his supreme leadership over the Muntafiq tribes. Nassir , and with him many knights and fighters, Al-Bayada, and the people of Al-Jazeera, whose number was estimated at (5) thousand fighters in the vicinity of Basra. Ma'shuq Pasha tried to make Nasser understand that the matter had become the prerogative of the governor of Baghdad, and he is the one who will confirm the sheikhdom. He understands this until he extended his control over the trade routes from the outskirts of Basra to Kut, and Basra became militarily semi-declined in the military sense, and he took raids on the ships that pass through the river, so the merchants robbed approximately (4-5 thousand) of Al-Aqchat and worked to raid villages and provinces which did not join him and robbed them of the crops, and as a result of Nassir's harassment of the British merchants, the British consul was forced to go to the great council in Baghdad and presented his testimony until followed by a statement from Nassir , in which he insisted on the necessity of assigning the sheikhdom to his brother Mansour. It seems that an agreement had taken place between Nassir and the British consul, while the consul wanted the safe passage of the British commercial and local ships. foreigners to pass from Basra to Baghdad

After the almost complete cessation of trade, the merchants and the owners of the goods piled up in the port of Basra, and under the threat of Nassir to rob them of their money and belongings, those merchants began to put pressure on the ruler of Basra in order to support the sheikhdom of Mansour, or to send soldiers with them to ensure their safety with their goods for arrival to reach before heading towards Baghdad, and in order to stop the increasing disturbances, Ma`shuq Pasha Mansour appointed reluctantly (and perhaps temporarily) as a supreme sheikh for the Al-Muntafiq tribes, so did the Zabid tribes, according to what the tribes to whom each of the (Nassir and Mansour), as it announced its uprising against the government and took the initiative to cut off the land and river trade routes that connect the regions of Diwaniyah, Najaf, Karbala and Hilla to the center of Baghdad Eyalet, and many tribes joined the ranks of Mansour and Wadi. Mutlaq bin Kreidi, who was exiled to Istanbul, and the tribes of 'Afak, Al-Aqra', and Al-Jubour joined the uprising.

Surprisingly, despite what Nassir and Mansour did and the general situations of the Baghdad Eyalet worsened, Namik Pasha appointed Salih as a supreme sheikh for the Muntafiq, therefore, the governor of Baghdad sent the baylordarar in which he requested the authorities of the Sublime Porte to take a temporary measure to use a group of soldiers to strike the Muntafiq tribes as a result of daring the sons of Rashid against Sheikh Faris attitude by the government. In fact, Namik Pasha's point of view was that the sheikh of the tribe, Faris, and its previous sheikhs adhered to the sheikhdom, and that Fares and Mansour both did not deserve the sheikhdom, and that they did not fulfill the covenants and covenants, and they had leftovers from the commitment funds. Therefore, it is not permissible to give the sheikhdom to them, and Salih, the son of the former sheikh, can be used as a sheikh to the tribes of Al-Muntafiq, and as soon as Ma'shuq learned of this matter, he took the initiative to justify his attitude to the sheikhdom of Mansour that he had obtained the sheikhdom by illegal means (by force), and his sheikhdom was not valid, and according to the interest of the state at that time, Saleh bin could be used Isa, when he was known for his good behaviour, as well as his pledge to increase the miri's funds to (300) thousand Aqcha, and that his choice is in the interest of

the state treasury. Attached to his request was a record of the state council oath and a notification of the mutaslim of Basra, Ma'shuq Pasha, who recommends the annulment of previous pledges with Fares and Mansour, and everyone agreed that it was useless for any of these to remain at the head of the sheikhdom of al-Muntafiq. As a result, the Sultan's response was not delayed, and on March 24, 1851, the Sultan issued an order to Namik Pasha to use the army to strike those tribes, and he was also given permission to assign the sheikhdom in the Muntafiq to whomever he deems appropriate and in the interest of the state. In order to keep the Muntafiq tribes in the vortex of internal divisions, Namik Pasha summoned Salih bin Isa to Baghdad. At the beginning of June 1852, Saleh, the new candidate for the government, arrived and met Namik Pasha, and after their agreement, Saleh made an undertaking to pay the commitment allowance amounting to (300) thousand Aqcha. So the leadership of Sheikh Saleh was confirmed by the ruler of Baghdad as a supreme sheikh of the Al-Muntafiq tribes, and he marched forces with him to the center of the Al-Muntafiq tribes in order to establish his sheikhdom.

There is no doubt that Saleh's candidacy was not accepted by Mansour bin Rashid, who gathered his forces with the help of Wadi and attacked Saleh bin Isa, the new Sheikh of the Muntafiq, and the two parties met near the city of Shatrah in 1852, and after fierce battles, Mansour managed to defeat him and Saleh turned to Baghdad, which angered the governor of Baghdad. In order to establish Saleh in his attitude, Namik Pasha sent a military campaign led by (Turkechah Yilmaz) in 1852, but Mansour confronted it at a site called (Al-Mughisil) on the Euphrates River, which resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman forces, and he was killed. Its leader is at the hands of one of the descendants of Al-Sa'adoun, called Mishary bin Abdullah Al-Sa'adoun, and it is said that Mishari initially refrained from participating in this war. Among the women of Al-Muntafiq, who are leaders of people with opinion: Mashari was jealous of the Ottoman forces as he recited those enthusiastic verses:

law halhalt katimat wanakhatni firyat      kuli shidat labuda laha firyata(alfirj)  
'iinjan easkarkam katae halfarih                      rasi sabil wabayaeah bifals ahmr.

After Mashari finished off the Ottoman commander, Turkechah Yilmaz, one of the sons of al-Muntafiq sang a poetic verse in which he drew a historical painting about the killing of this commander:

eakab bajir yasir alqult walqal                      waealah sifahi yathur alhij walqal  
mashari almahisib akathar walqal                      wadhabh turkiun lieadi rashid dhahiya

In view of the failure of that campaign, the governor of Baghdad, Namik Pasha, Sheikh Mansour, revolted against the Ottoman government and out of obedience to the Sultan, and as a result of the lack of sufficient forces in the presence of the governor of Baghdad, a plan was drawn up to tighten control over those tribes, which is the involvement of the armies deployed in the center and south Iraq in one campaign against the center of the Al-Muntafiq tribes and hit Nassir and Mansour with all force. Al-Hillah led by Khurshid Agha to go to Al-Muntafiq and a column of regular forces from the army of the Mutasrifiyah of Deir ez-Zor under the leadership of Shakir Pasha, and before they reach their destination, those forces gather and strike a blow with one sword. Fares and Mansour were arrested, and the weapons they had seized from the soldiers in the Turkechah Yilmaz campaign were returned. As for Mansour's brother Nassir, he fled to Al-Zubayr, and Salih bin Isa was officially appointed Sheikh of Al-Muntafiq in 1852, but a group of tribes supporting Mansour, including the Al-Zafir and Zabid tribes, joined the forces that captured Mansour and surprised them until they managed to free him from their hands. Which led Nassir and Mansour to gather their forces once again and they returned the ball to Saleh, and Mansour was able to restore his authority over the Al-Muntafiq tribes once again.

The news of the failure of that campaign reached the ears of Namik Pasha until he became angry at this act, and in the meantime the forces that he requested from the Sultan arrived, and in order to restore the Ottoman government's consideration of the Muntafiq tribes for what Nassir and Mansour had done by expelling the government's candidate, Saleh, and it seems that what It was found by the Ottoman forces from letters and papers after suppressing the (Shammart and Al-Zaqrut) groups which indicate the occurrence of contacts between the leaders of those groups and the heads of the Arab tribes in Iraq who were discontented with the government of Namik Pasha, led by Mansour bin Rashid, which aimed to announce the armed uprising on the Ottoman rule in all parts of Iraq, and in view of that situation, Namik Pasha decided to get rid of Mansour permanently, so Namik Pasha dispatched a large military campaign under his leadership, consisting of the royal armies, and he fulfilled the good service, and as soon as he reached the outskirts of the center of the presence of the Muntafiq tribes Until Mansour fled towards the desert, and the tribe was organized and the uprisings of Nassir and Mansour were eliminated, and Sheikh Salih was installed once again as the sheikh of the Al-Muntafiq tribes, with an increase in the fulfillment of commitment.

As soon as Namik Pasha returned to the headquarters of his government in Baghdad, Mansour resumed his attack on Salih bin Isa, the sheikh appointed by the government, and expelled him. Meanwhile, Ma'shuq Pasha sent a memorandum to Namik Pasha about the appointment of Sheikh Salih as a sheikh of the Muntafiq tribe, and he explained in it the need to send soldiers with Salih from Baghdad to the center of his sheikhdom, as a result of the deterioration of the situation and the chaos that began to occur in the Al-Muntafiq tribe led by Mansour and the Al-Dhafir tribes and some of their supporters who support him, since the new sheikh and the forces of the tribe sheikhs supporting him are difficult for them to resist (Nassir and Mansour), as well as insufficient local strength. As a result of this intense competition and its repercussions on the overall situation of the Baghdad Eyalet, Namik Pasha began to think about alternative solutions and suggested to the Istanbul government to manage the Al-Muntafiq tribe union through the federal administration by appointing a district governor who would be subordinate to the Baghdad government.

After the failure of the previous attempts to establish Saleh's sheikhdom, the governor of Baghdad was convinced of what Ma'shuq Pasha had brought. Al-Muntafiq to establish him as a sheikh in general for the Al-Muntafiq tribes. During the march, before reaching the gate of Hilla, a group of Zabid tribes led by the brothers of Wadi (Fahal and Samarmad) confronted him and cut off the road to Hilla, which forced him to take the road to 'Amarah passing through Badra and Jassan, and orders were given to the Sunni royal ships stationed in Basra to provide help and assistance to Sheikh Saleh bin Isa, and for this reason two pieces of ships were moved to the Sheikhdom of Al-Muntafiq to support Saleh, and as soon as the news of this reached Mansour, he fled to the outskirts of the desert where the Al-Dhafir tribe .

As a result of those disturbances caused by the competing sheikhs of the Muntafiq, which were accompanied by disturbances that pervaded central and southern Iraq, Britain and Persia tried to interfere in the affairs of the Baghdad Eyalet under the pretext of helping to control its troubled situations, but Namik Pasha dispelled those hopes by informing the British consul and everyone appointed Salih bin Isa as a sheikh for Al-Muntafiq, and in order to preserve the sheikhdom of Salih, Salih was assigned with military forces from Baghdad to preserve the money and belongings of the merchants and the crops of the people of the villages located in that sheikhdom. Despite the warnings of the Sublime Porte to Namik Pasha of the need to take an effective stance towards the Al-Muntafiq tribes, his effectiveness was limited only to the form of war operations, which made the tribes alienate from his bloody policy , which was reflected in the weakness of the Ottoman control over the rural areas, especially the areas located between the Tigris and the Euphrates south of Baghdad specifically (the tribes of the Muntafiq) until the taxes

there became collected with difficulty. In this regard, British consul Henry Rawlinson described Namik Pasha's policy towards the Iraqi tribes, including the al-Muntafiq tribes in 1852, when he said, "Namik Pasha inaugurated his government with acts of violence and cruelty that are totally unnecessary, then pushed the tribe heads one after the other towards a hostile alliance against the government, and because of his military weakness, and his support for treacherous measures and operations of cruelty that are difficult to describe, and from his harsh and bitter words and his behavior characterized by pride and arrogance that completely contradict the psyche of the desert Bedouins, he has turned the population into a blazing mass of discontent with which he needs a force of not less than fifty a thousand men to restore order and the prestige of the state". The method adopted by Namik Pasha led to the opposite of what he had hoped for, as chaos spread, the roads became unsafe, and convoys were attacked and looted.

The sources differed as to the real reasons behind Namik Pasha's dismissal from Baghdad, which lasted only (9) months and four days. Some of them attributed his dismissal to the fact that the Sublime Porte did not like the removal of the sheikh of the Muntafiq tribes, Mansour al-Sa'adoun, despite his uprisings against the rule in Baghdad, and the installation of Saleh al-Sa'adoun in his place, and he blamed the misbehavior of the government of Namik Pasha. Some of them attributed his dismissal to the intervention of the French ambassador in Istanbul, Charles-Jeanne de Lavelle, as a result of Namik Pasha's bad dealings with one of its subjects, as it was known about Namik Pasha that he was not only harsh with the Iraqis, but foreign nationals insisted on a share of his severe dealings and cruelty. He assaulted a Christian when he saw him riding his horse while his procession was passing by. People used to stand in their places with their heads bowed to the ground when the procession passed, and if someone was riding, he dismounted out of respect for the governor. As for the Christian money changer, he did not dismount, because he had no knowledge of these customs in the Arab countries, so Namik Pasha ordered the gendarmes to remove him from his horse and beat him. Following this incident, the French consul in Baghdad presented a protest to the Sublime Porte and demanded compensation for the money changer, and the Sublime Porte was forced to summon Namik Pasha to Istanbul, and this incident was a reason for his isolation from the Baghdad Eyalet, while some sources mentioned that the reason for his dismissal was because of the complaint that the state of Persia submitted to the Ottoman Sultan's side, Ali Namik Pasha, due to his misdealing with its subjects and the Shiites The Iraqis alike, as Namik Pasha was closely monitoring the Persian activities in Iraq, as it was one of the sources of problems in the Baghdad Eyalet, especially in southern Iraq, and this Persian disgust was evident on Namik Pasha when he was asked to repair Shiite homes and religious schools in Najaf. However, he opposed this matter and did not initiate issuing permits for that, and as a result of Persian pressure and the bad situation of the Ottoman state, which was distancing itself from any problems with its neighbor, the state of Persia, so it decided to isolate Namik Pasha, and there is another opinion that attributed the reason for the dismissal to his poor situation. health, which prevented him from taming and quelling the tribe uprisings that occurred during his reign, and as a result he was isolated. It was also due to the establishment of Namik Pasha in building the docks for the construction and manufacture of ships in the port of Basra in order to establish a commercial fleet to speculate with foreign ships. On the transport road between Baghdad and Basra, which disturbed Britain, which aspired to absolute control over the river trade in Iraq, so its embassy in Istanbul began working to isolate it in order to obstruct that matter as much as possible. The dismissal of Namik Pasha halted his project aimed at transforming the Muntafiq tribes into a sanjak that would be administered through a governor subordinate to the authority of the state.

## Conclusion

Through our study of this time period of the direct Ottoman central rule of the Baghdad Eyalet and its policy with the Muntafiq tribes, we discover some facts that were extracted in this research. Among the most prominent of these facts:

1- The frequent uprisings of the Al-Muntafiq tribes during the study period, weakened the control of the Ottoman Empire over southern Iraq.

2- The research showed that despite the military efforts made by the governors Wajih Pasha and Namik Pasha during his first rule with the Muntafiq tribes in an attempt to impose central rule and consolidate their power policy over the latter, the results were useless and negative many times.

3 - The study showed that the first to aim at governments of Wajih Pasha and Namik Pasha in following the policy of (divide and rule) is nothing but a result of weakness and lack of planning in confronting the al-Muntafiq tribes and controlling the tribal society of the Muntafiq, which remained a stumbling block in front of its ambitions aimed at dismantling ties tribalism to facilitate the task of subjugating it after the failure of the military attempts, as it sowed hatred and hostility and encouraged competition between the sons of the Sa'adoun family.

4 - The first government of Namik Pasha sought to take effective measures towards the Al-Muntafiq tribes, by transforming the sheikhdom into an administrative function by making it a qa'imaqam to be administered by an employee who follows the orders of the state, but those efforts faltered when orders to dismiss him were issued by the higher authorities in Istanbul. In 1852, on the one hand, and on the other hand, its collision with the authentic Arab traditions, which the Muntafiq tribes have made it their duty to waive or forsake them.

5 - The policy pursued by the rulers of this era against the Al-Muntafiq tribes can be summarized as a game of carrots or sticks, and it varied to a large extent from granting privileges to some of the Al-Muntafiq sheikhs, creating frictions between the sons of the Sa'adoun family, and recognizing a rival sheikh from the sons of the Al- Sa'adoun family. Another account, and at another time, military force is used in an attempt to fragment or control those tribes that remained a thorn against the Ottoman governors appointed to the Baghdad Eyalet.

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