Diaspora policies and co-development: A Comparison between India, China and Mexico

Camelia Tigau[Υ]
Amba Pande[±]
Yan Yuan[¥]

Abstract

This paper discusses the concept of co-development as related to diaspora diplomacy and its implications for public policies for skilled migration in the countries of origin. We consider the cases of two Asian countries – India and China - that try to streamline the out-migration of their people as a result of lack of jobs and skilled population surplus, by way of engaging, networking and return policies. The case of Mexico is different since it is a country with less tradition in diaspora programs and Mexican expats tend to be more politically and culturally active than economically involved. In the three cases studied we find different problems relating to diaspora programs in accordance with their historical progress, such as poor results due to the lack of financial resources, inadequate institutional background or weak diaspora organization.

Keywords: skilled diaspora; diaspora policy; brain drain; Chindia; Mexican diaspora.

Introduction

Internet and new communication technologies have facilitated the functioning of Diasporas as significant tools of public diplomacy and image promotion on a global scale. Previous studies have shown that contemporary Diasporas tend to use traditional and virtual means of communication as contact zones, spaces where they can display their identities, cultures, creativity and professions, among others (Pratt, 1992; Clifford, 1997; Gillespie & Baumann, 2010). The use of diaspora diplomacy may be considered part of a wider change in the globalized international affairs. Contemporary diplomacy includes the action of official/governmental institutions, multilateral organizations but also ¨track 2¨ or non official actors such as NGOs, media, political parties, universities, religious organizations, etc.

Public diplomacy is based on the use of the public opinion to communicate a state`s or nation´s interest on an international sphere, be it through cultural,

[Υ] Camelia Tigau is Researcher at the Center for Research on North America, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico. E-mail: cameliatigau@hotmail.com.

[±] Amba Pande is associated at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. E-mail: ambapande@gmail.com.

[¥] Yan Yuan is Research fellow at the Institute of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang, Sichuan, China. E-mail: lilyyuan8008@yahoo.com.

educational or scientific messages (Tigau, 2009: 87). For instance, cultural diplomacy is a form of public diplomacy that consists in the promotion of the culture of origin abroad using a variety of means such as the mass media, books, cultural shows and conferences, among others. Knowing the culture of other people may provide for more a human perception among citizens of different countries and create a friendlier international environment. In this way, cultural diplomacy contributes to the safety of migrants and Diasporas, and it is a way to prevent or pacify conflicts (Tigau, 2009: 4). Cultural diplomacy is not only developed by governments at an official level, but also by Diasporas that may act as ¨cultural ambassadors abroad¨ (Tigau, 2014).

Diaspora diplomacy is highly related to the increasing involvement of the international publics in the global affairs affairs, giving space to a ¨citizen diplomacy¨ (Olesen, 2005; Tigau, 2009) that mixes national and international topics of interest. Van Ham (2010: 116) notices that in our present globalized international environment, ordinary people have become increasingly important and they get easily involved in public diplomacy to promote the image of their countries of origin.

While the governments are designing place branding strategies to explore the emotional ties between territory and people, they also design ¨brands¨ to promote their countries, attract tourists and investment. The brand of the state is understood as the ideas that the international public have about a certain country (Van Ham, 2001:2). Countries may produce a certain ¨emotional resonance¨ not only by the official campaigns but also by Diasporas, news and in general, the information that people have about other countries. We believe that Diasporas may provide for both cognitive and emotional information on their native cultures, serving as communication networks between their countries of origin and destination.

Background

The comparison of diaspora policies in three relevant countries of out-migration - India, Mexico and China - allows us to identify similarities as well cultural differences in patterns of public policies for skilled Diasporas. Our purpose is to analyze how countries of origin have engaged with the members of their Diasporas since the 1990s by means of various policy initiatives, whether internet communication, networks of citizen diplomacy or even return initiatives.

By 2025, it is estimated that 25% of the world's workers will be Indians. By 2050, only 19% of India´s population will be aged over 60 as compared to 39% in the US and 30% in the case of China. According to a US Census Bureau estimate, by 2022 countries like the US, UK and China will have a skilled labor shortfall of 17 million, 2 million and 10 million respectively, while India will have a surplus of almost 47 million in the 19-59 age group (MOIA, 2012: 1-2). Therefore, India has a clear-cut demographic advantage which does not apply to China. Nevertheless, India's

demographic advantage also means an increasing demand for energy, food, natural resources and jobs (MOIA, 2012: 13 -14). Therefore, out-migration would serve as a natural outlet in the future which will also help meet the demands of other countries. In the case of Mexico, population growth is 0.7 %, the same as in the US, while the fertility rate is 2.1 (OECD, 2015). This shows a significant slowdown and indicates that Mexico is growing older rather than younger. Young people under the age of 15 now represent 27% of the population, compared to 19.5% in the US, and only 17.4% enjoys access to university education (OECD, 2015). This means that, in the future, Mexico cannot afford to lose many of its young educated people since they are scarce at present and will be even scarcer in the future. However, Mexico may network with its Diasporas through a series of public policy initiatives, as described below.

Public policies for skilled Diasporas try to attract talent, be it foreign talent entering the country or native talent that has been living abroad. We propose a classification of the public policies for talent circulation (see Table 1) that may take the form of direct strategies to attract talent from elsewhere through repatriation or visa programs, or indirect strategies such as networking or diaspora organization.

Table 1. Classification of Public Policies for Talent Circulation

Type of policy / Target public	Nationals abroad	Foreigners
Direct	Repatriation and return	Special visas for foreigners, retention of foreign students
Indirect	Networking and co-development	Aid to foreign Diasporas

Based on this proposal, our basic research questions are as follows: Is co-development a useful category for evaluating diaspora public policies in countries of origin? What are the major differences in the political approaches between countries globally referred to as ¨successful¨ and more experienced in their diaspora policies, such as India and China, and an emerging state in diaspora policies such as Mexico?

Diaspora Diplomacy

In this paper, Diasporas are considered members of ethnic and national communities that have left their countries of origin but maintain contact with them (Ionescu, 2006, OIM). From this perspective, Diasporas are diverse and are not to be confused with the historical understanding of the term. Even when Tölölyan (2007) criticized the conceptual dispersion of diasporas, where they are no longer understood as the Jewish or Greek diasporas in exile, we prefer a more modern comprehension of the term. At present, personal trajectories may vary with people possibly circulating and seeking rights in destination countries.

Diasporas nowadays are a broader inclusive concept than migrants since they include second and third generation migrants with different nationalities and identity profiles and people who have migrated because of a variety of reasons that include political, economic and personal reasons in a globalized international environment.

Diaspora organizations generally emerge from the countries of origin, in destination countries or as citizen initiatives. In any case, Diasporas are based on spaces of communication previously defined as ¨contact zones¨ (Pratt, 1992; Clifford, 1997; Gillespie & Baumann, 2010). These include natural as well as artificial networks of Diasporas, such as personal networks or official networks created by governments to connect with migrants abroad. While these contact zones may take the form of traditional or virtual spaces of communication and dialogue (Pratt, 1992; Clifford, 1997; Gillespie & Baumann, 2010), and may serve as agents that produce or relieve political conflict, they are also spaces of cultural translation and innovation. On a first level, conflicts and ideological differences are therefore understood from a more emphatic perspective of ¨the other¨, therefore they are ¨translated¨. Afterwards, on a second level, innovation may occur as citizens from different countries may come up with new ideas about how to solve their previous misunderstanding of other cultures. In these ways, the contact zones of Diasporas demonstrate the different conditions in which ex-pats find themselves, while also acting as the voice of these Diasporas, receivers of public diplomacy, but also as non-official, active actors of diaspora diplomacy.

Co-development

The relatively recent interest of governments of origin in their Diasporas has been inspired by the brain drain perspectives of the 1960s, but also facilitated by the possibilities offered by international communication, which is increasingly prevalent. From this perspective migration is considered an opportunity for co-development, where developed and developing countries can cooperate in order to share resources and responsibilities and provide for development aid programs (Malgesini, 2001).

In fact, co-development represents the link between migration and development (Nair, 1997). Diasporas can contribute to the development of their countries of origin through their transnational experience, cultural hybridization and existing professional networks. Co-development plans mainly refer to skilled migrants, who are assumed to be active protagonists in their communities and may stimulate the reciprocal enrichment of both origin and destination societies (Observatorio del Tercer Sector, 2008 cit. in Vidal y Martínez, 2008)

While co-development does require cooperation from official institutions (ministries of international affairs, academic institutions, international organizations), it is based on the action of ¨track 2¨ actors such as civil society, NGOs, companies and professional organizations (López Martínez, 2007).

One of the main features of co-development, according to the authors of this article, is its direct link to diaspora diplomacy. Mechanisms such as talent networks provide an example of the combination of official (state) diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, and cultural/ educational/scientific diplomacy. In this way, diaspora diplomacy represents a combination (or hybridization) of state and citizen cooperation, between the regional and international levels.

Tomiczek (2011) studies diaspora diplomacy as a new dimension of diplomacy, as is the case with the civil organization of migrants. Skilled Diasporas are actors of public diplomacy that promote the image and communicate the values of their country of origin, among other activities. Public diplomacy is a ¨g2p¨ diplomacy (government to the people) but also ¨p2p¨ (people to people), as Ociepka (2008) notes (p.11-12). However, empirical evidence shows that Diasporas do not always sympathize with the countries they left. As Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) show, migrants move to solve some type of conflict in the country of origin, be it economic, social, political, personal, etc. therefore they may not be satisfied with some situation in their country of origin, but that is not necessarily linked to the government of the country of origin itself. They want an opportunity to survive and thrive and to practice their culture in a safe environment¨ (Cohen and Sirkeci, 2011: p. 2). Similar to Sirkeci and Cohen (2016, p. 384), we consider conflict in a broad sense to cover a continuum of positions ranging from full cooperation where no conflict exists, to one where conflicts of interest may lead to wars, armed clashes and life threatening risks leading to fear of persecution.

Diasporas´ attitudes and disposition to get involved with the country of origin is determined by the way they have solved conflicts in the process of migration and of the success in the process of their adaptation to the new society.

A classic study by Cerase (1974: 248) measures the immigrant's success in the country of origin according to his capacity to acquire values and patterns of behaviour which would resolve his problems in the new society. Success or failure determine their attitude toward their countries of origin and in this way, the decision to return or stay in the country of destination.

Newland (2010) and Bernal (2014) explain that Diasporas are constantly making their voice heard in their home countries, as well as through international organizations and other non-official diplomatic actors. They lobby while transforming and building their collective identity through webpages, discussion groups and social networks. Eventually, in the case of Diasporas from non-democratic regimes, they exert pressure on governments and speak for their nationals inside their countries of origin. In this way, Diasporas in exile may be stronger at organizing themselves when compared to economic migrants and Diasporas from countries with democratic regimes.

Newman (2010: 7-8) observes that diasporas participate in different ways if they come from authoritarian regimes or democracies. While the former have to lobby

through personal contacts, economic pressure or even ask for external intervention, the latter may express themselves freely. In any case, Newland summarizes the effects of diaspora lobbying as follows: 1) changes in the status of their members in the countries of origin (citizenship, migratory status or the right to vote); 2) intervention in the policies of their countries of origin concerning human rights, good government or political participation; and 3) implications for the bilateral relations of countries of origin and destination, such as commercial politics, humanitarian aid or development policy. These theoretical assumptions will be verified to analyze diaspora public policies in India, China and Mexico.

India

India mostly ignored its overseas population for decades after its independence. New Delhi woke up to its overseas population's potential and initiated a policy of engagement during the 1990s. The strategy of the Indian government has been to respond to a large and diverse diaspora for which it has adopted a multi-pronged strategy to engage at various levels for a win-win situation. These efforts are slowly but visibly yielding results. The Government introduced several institutional changes to pursue its goals and established the MOIA (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs) in 2004 to deal with the Indian diaspora/overseas Indian affairs.

One of the specific agendas of MOIA has been to transform India´s demographic dividend into robust avenues for employment of Indians abroad, taking into account labor gaps and dependency ratios that will emerge in Europe and North America in the future. In this respect, MOIA proposes to partner with states to develop skills through various programs (such as 'Skill India Initiative'). There is a proposal for an 'Emigration Management Bill'; an e-governance project on emigration-- 'e-migrate'-- to help build an electronic database on the flow and stock of migrants and enable all stakeholders to manage their role and responsibilities well. MOIA also aims at upgrading the country / city specific database of overseas Indians through a registration process, designing outreach capabilities through diaspora associations as well as support programs customized for specific regions, countries and categories of overseas Indians (MOIA, 2012: 14)

For the existing overseas population, the government has come up with various institutions/programs to address different aspects of engagement. Some of these important initiatives are: the Overseas Indian Citizenship (OIC) which was granted in 2005, with 1,203,613 OIC cards being issued up to 2012; Social Security Agreements (SSA) to eliminate the double payment of social security contributions; Bilateral Labor MoUs on a bilateral basis to ensure protection and welfare for Indian workers; Person of Indian Origin (PIO) or Non Resident Indian (NRI); the University Council of Overseas Employment (ICOE) - a "think tank" on International migration; the Labor Mobility Partnership Agreement to diversify and secure the overseas labor market for Indian workers; the Indian Community

Welfare Fund (ICWF) to support a wide gamut of welfare services for overseas Indian workers; the Overseas Workers' Resource Centre (OWRC) to provide information and assistance for potential emigrants and their families; the E-governance Project to manage the emigration process through e-governance; the India Centre for Migration to help Indian migrants move up the value chain and position India as a preferred source of qualified and skilled human resources.

The implications, both direct and indirect, of diaspora engagement are many-sided. India's experience with the IT industry can be cited as one of the best instances of these after-effects. However, India has a long way to go before it can fully translate the brain drain into brain regain/circulation by capacity building and engaging diaspora talent/resources. The migration of Indian students for higher studies is not only causing a loss of talent for India, but also an annual foreign exchange outflow of US $10 billion (Assocham, 2009). Skill shortage is clearly visible in the areas of health and education, evidenced by the dearth of doctors and faculty, especially at the state level.

Remittances are another important source of diaspora contributions for India, began to increase significantly from the mid-1990s, mainly due to growing emigration of high skilled migrants to the US, favorable growth opportunities in India, and a switch to formal channels due to more liberal foreign exchange policies (Tumbe, 2012: 7).

In terms of FDI, one of the important initiatives was the establishment of the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) in 2007, a non-profit public-private body which is the joint responsibility of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). The OIFC has a mandate to cover broad areas such as: investment facilitation, knowledge networking and ensuring business-to-business partnerships in focus sectors including real estate, wealth management, taxation, law, healthcare, education and infrastructure (Pande, 2014).

The major share of diaspora investment has been destined for portfolio investment and bank deposits. Since 1991, India has been at the forefront in raising funds through hard currency bonds to tap diaspora resources. Various NRI deposit schemes featuring higher interest rates are also in place and serve as an important channel of obtaining foreign capital, which totaled almost $50 billion in 2010. These deposits are popular due to the interest rate differential as well as favorable tax treatment for capital gains. Indian Banks have established branches in various countries to facilitate this process. The flipside of such investment is uncertainty due to sudden withdrawal, as was seen in 1991, and also that in the recent past NRIs have emerged as India's main source of foreign debt (Pande, 2014).

Philanthropy is another significant area of Indian Diaspora contribution. The largest share of diaspora philanthropy comes through informal channels, 'where

there are some personal links through family and friends' (Kapur, Mehta and Moon, 2001). The Government of India has provided institutionalized platforms for these contributions, such as the Foundation of Overseas Indians (IDF-OI), to help forge partnerships between donors and receivers or voluntary organizations working in the social sector in India (Pande, 2014).

In recent years, reforms to Indian Overseas Citizenship and PIO cards with free Visa entry and other facilities have served as a major incentive for investments and start-ups which in turn in also boosting the ¨Make in India¨ campaign initiated by the Government. However, this issue is still undervalued and much politicized in India. The diaspora factor gets largely ignored in development statistics and data, and does not receive sufficient attention from policy-makers. Moreover, the subject of diaspora spans a number of ministries, government agencies -such as Health, Education, Science and Technology -and regions of India with cross-cutting agendas. Centralized focal points such as the MOIA are useful but diverse entry points and more decentralized approaches need to be articulated to maximize the gains of diaspora engagement.

China

Prior to the 1980s, Chinese borders were closed and those living overseas did not enjoy great prestige. In 1978, in the wake of Deng Xiaoping's policy of "reform and opening", the state opened its doors to those living overseas. This opening was also followed by the State's concern regarding the brain drain. Since 1992, China has encouraged students settled abroad to return for short visits and engage in various programs on the Chinese mainland. In 2001, the government adopted a new policy that outlined a number of ways to encourage overseas mainlanders to contribute to China's modernization, even if they stayed abroad (Zweig, Fung and Han, 2008).

China's growing economy is attracting more foreigners and it also stimulates the return of those Chinese who work or study abroad. Cultural proximity is another factor that encourages overseas Chinese to return. Due to a diaspora population that has grown to more than 50 million, of which 32 million live in Southeast Asia, over the course of recent decades the Chinese government has adapted its policies to respond to this reality (Chang, 2013).

Jacques (2008) shows that, notwithstanding the diversity of Chinese communities abroad - in terms of origin and length of stay -, overseas Chinese enjoy an extremely strong sense of shared identity as well as a powerful attachment to China, feelings that tend to override regional and political differences. This leads to high remittances and forges strong relations between diaspora groups.

Zweig, Fung and Han (2008) offer an extended historical review of Chinese diaspora policies targeting professionals: the Spring light project (*chunhui jihua*, mid-1990s) brought overseas mainlanders back for short visits, especially during the summer vacation, with a pay package as much as five times greater than their

salaries abroad; Freedom to come and go *(lai qu ziyou, 1993),* for flows in and out of the country; the Serving the nation strategy (*wei guo fuwu, 2001),* the Chinese version of the diaspora option; *The Changjiang Scholars' Plan,* funded by Li Ka-hsing's Cheung Kong Conglomerate in Hong Kong that offered leading Chinese scientists living abroad the chance to return for one year to work in strategic research areas; Multiple-entry visas for overseas students and scholars so they could go back and forth easily in 2000; and, in 2001, a major policy document combining the efforts of many ministries called on mainlanders overseas to 'serve the nation' (*wei guo fuwu*), even if they did not 'return to the nation' (*hui guo fuwu*). Chinese citizens who remained overseas were encouraged to let their organizations engage in seven types of activities and simultaneously hold posts in China and abroad (the 'double base model' or 'dumb-bell model'). They were permitted to return to China to teach, conduct academic and technical exchanges, and to set up enterprises in China, among other activities.

Recent changes in the direction of Chinese diaspora policies are summarized by Chareonwongsak (2012) in three trends:

- From a focus on Chinese citizens abroad, it was extended to all overseas ethnic Chinese.
- From a focus on financial capital to human capital, that may help restructure the Chinese economy, changing it from a labor-intensive to a knowledge based economy.
- From return policies to diaspora polices.

Despite the fact China follows the international trend of organizing its diaspora, the country's return policies are quite strong. Between 1978 and 2006 almost 1 million scholars went overseas and approximately one third of them returned. Up to the end of 2013, those who went abroad as students and had not returned to China amounted to 1,613,800 according to the Ministry of Education (2013).

According to the "Report on the Employment of Ten Thousand Returned Students (2012)", published by the Chinese Service Centre for Scholarly Exchange (CSCSE, 2013), a public organization under the Ministry of Education, these returned students had studied abroad for an average of 1.9 years. Those who had a Master's degree studied for 1.5 years and those with a Doctoral degree for 3.8 years. Almost half of those returning graduated from one year Masters Programs, the majority offered by British universities. High level talents with a doctoral degree and overseas research or work experience seldom returned, representing just 11.2% of the total. Chareonwongsak (2012) observes that the education system in China is dominated by experts who graduated overseas. For their part, Cai indicates that 84% of academics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences have studied abroad (2009).

The Chinese government, not only central but also provincial and even municipal, has introduced various programs to recruit overseas talent. In China there are 112

bases to bring in high-level overseas talents and more than 260 Overseas Students Pioneer Parks in which 17,000 enterprises operate and 40,000 overseas talents run businesses (Wang, 2013). These returned talents play an important role in high-tech research, academia and creative corporations. The latest data shows that, as of 2013, from the elites returning from the US, 289 academics have been appointed to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 68 have been appointed to the Chinese Academy of Engineering, 489 have been given the Changjiang Scholars award, and 836 have been supported by the "1,000 youth talents plan". The "1,000 youth talents plan" forms part of the "1,000 talents plan", but is for those aged under 40. The "1,000 talents plan" is also for foreign experts (Shi and Liu, 2014).

As one of the most ambitious programs to recruit overseas Chinese talent, the 1,000 talents plan has been promulgated for 6 years and has recruited more than 4,000 talents. It is reported that those experts and professionals recruited by this program have contributed to innovations in basic research, promoting Chinese scientific research to the top level in the world in the fields of life sciences, plasma physics, quantum communication, and superconducting. This has led to the production of a number of products of Chinese origin or design in the following fields: new materials, new energy, high-end equipment manufacturing and other strategic emerging industries, while helping to break technical bottlenecks in nuclear technology, manned spaceflight, manned diving, Beidou navigation, the weapons industry and other fields[1]. Due to the benefits resulting from the recruitment of high level overseas talents, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the main executive body in charge of overseas Chinese affairs, prioritized investment, technology and talent as its main objectives in order to return Chinese talents from abroad.

Mexico

Prior to 1990, migrants were considered traitors and migration served as a solution to economic, political and social conflict that the migrants experienced back home. The government avoided the term ¨diaspora¨ because of its historical meaning and preferred to use ¨Mexican communities abroad¨ instead. This was due to the traditional approach of non-interventionism with the US (Delano, 2011: 157-165). However, after the Immigration Control and Reform Act (1986) a US legislation initiative that directly affected Mexican migrants, both skilled and unskilled, when almost two million undocumented Mexicans benefited from amnesty, the Mexican government had to change its discourse and policy. Formal relations with Mexican communities abroad were established for cultural, educational, health, business and tourism activities.

---

[1] BeiDou is a system of navigation that uses Earth orbit satellites, different from the American, European and Russian ones that are based on a GPS system.

In 1991, the Mexican Government launched a 'Program of Retainment and Repatriation of Mexican Researchers', created by the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT). The majority of the repatriated come from: the US (40%); France (15%); the UK (13%); Spain (9%); Canada and Germany (5% each). The repatriation program had its difficulties, such as a lack of academic posts, meaning that Mexican policies were criticized for being outdated and failing to adapt to international economic conditions (Tejada and Bolay, 2005)

A 'Program for Student Mobility in North America' (PROMESAN) was launched in 1995, involving 348 academic institutions. This initiative was financed by the Ministry of Education in Mexico, the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) in the US and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. The goal of PROMESAN was to validate studies and form tri-national work teams. From 1996, two years after NAFTA was signed, dual nationality was allowed for Mexicans who live abroad.

In 2002, the Institute for Mexicans Abroad was established to strengthen relations with the Mexican diaspora. Jorge Castañeda, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, said he ¨opted out of the historical meaning of the diaspora, implying Jewish lobbying, in order to adopt a broader view to protect the interests of Mexicans abroad, without interfering in the domestic affairs of the US.¨ Later, Delano (2011) recalls, President Ernesto Zedillo was the first to admit that the Mexican nation extended beyond frontiers and that migrants formed an important part of it. His successor, President Vicente Fox, described himself as the president of 120 million Mexicans, including the population living abroad. These changes can be explained in terms of remittances and the contribution of migrants to their communities. However, in comparison with the previous status of 'traitor' or subordination, the new approach granted a far superior and respectable status to the expatriate population and created opportunities for better forms of cooperation.

Consequently, Mexico initiated its first programs for networking with the diaspora such as The Special Program for Science and Technology (PECYT, 2002); and the Network of Mexican Talents Abroad (RTM, for its Spanish abbreviation) in 2005. The RTM functions through local associations named ¨chapters¨, the majority of which are from North America. The mission of the Network is to facilitate contributions from the highly qualified and those linked to high value-added businesses or sectors in the diaspora to the integration of Mexico in the Global Economy, in particular the knowledge-based economy (IME, 2007: 3).

According to official statements concerning the Network program, it is designed to invite highly qualified migrants to share their contacts, experiences and abilities to enter new markets. They become bridges of understanding who do not necessarily need to come back physically, only virtually through the contribution of ideas, projects and innovative proposals. It is therefore of great interest for the Mexican Government, as well as for civil society, to support the

"Mexican Talent Network" (IME, 2007: 3). In addition, there are other diaspora associations created by universities, such as the Association of Former Students of the Monterrey Technological Institute (Asociación de los Ex Alumnos del Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey, Ex-A-Tecs) and such citizen organizations as A Hundred Mexican Women (¨Cien Mujeres Mexicanas¨ in Canada).

Since all these initiatives started after 2001, they may be considered relatively new if we compare them with Latino associations that date from the 1970s (Tigau 2012). Previous studies on Mexican professionals abroad (Tigau 2012) show there is little, if any, connection between these associations, which tend to reproduce the social class differences already existing in Mexico. Therefore, members of the government association often refuse to cooperate with representatives of private associations, such as Ex-A-Tec. The participation of women is low since they tend to create their own associations, such as Mexican Women Professionals in Florida (Profesionistas Mexicanas en la Florida). As far as Associations of Mexicans abroad are concerned, they are more oriented towards socio-cultural integration and tend to interact at the local level rather than with the Mexican government.

In May 2013, US President Barack Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto announced the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation and Research. The objective of this new policy was student exchange between Mexico and the US: 100,000 Mexicans would go to the US and 50,000 US students would come to Mexico each year. Financing for this plan is provided by both governments in cooperation with US–based companies. Even though this student mobility may benefit the individuals involved, the plan itself does not demonstrate any real expertise in dealing with the brain drain problem that the government wants to solve.

At present, Mexico has several different institutions offering contradictory programs: while government actors such as the National Council for Science and Technology and public universities try to attract foreigners to study in Mexico, these foreigners are not issued with work visas when they finish their postgraduate studies. Recent government initiatives try to stimulate Mexican students to study in the US, apparently without complementary tools to offer them jobs when they return. This could mean that the government itself finances skilled migration at the same time it tries to solve the problem.

Discussion

As far as the diaspora policies of home countries are concerned, all three countries have an active diaspora policy. China appears to be far ahead since it started to engage with its diaspora as early as 1978 and has introduced various initiatives to engage/attract/return its diaspora. It has also managed to accrue concrete benefits in terms of the entry of the latest in science, technology, knowledge and information through its overseas talent. Chinese students are encouraged to study abroad and then to return in order to build China as an

innovative modern nation. China's success in being able to attract investment from its diaspora has also been unprecedented.

In the case of India, which started engaging with its diaspora as late as the 1990s, the association is still being redefined and evolving. While there are certain concrete policy initiatives resulting in successes like the IT industry, remittances and philanthropy, Indian students are migrating in large numbers and the country has not been able to attract them back as China has managed to do. India has a long way to go in this direction before it can emerge as an attractive destination for diaspora investment and attract the return of talent desperately needed in the health and education sectors.

As for Mexico, it is the newest and still at the nascent stage of diaspora engagement policy, especially with regard to attracting the return of its skilled diaspora. Due to a national context of violence and limited financial resources for research and development, incentives for the return of Mexicans abroad are few, not only on the personal level but also from the government.

Therefore, engaging with the diaspora seems to be a cheaper and more realistic option for the country and for its citizens abroad. While the policies for return, repatriation and retention may depend on resources to pay competitive wages to the skilled migrants, the diaspora programs are mostly based on the voluntary work of the involved citizens abroad. Diaspora networks are cheaper for the governments, as they imply few if any transportation costs, they can be based on internet communication (webpages and social networks) and they don´t require an expensive governmental infrastructure to attend the members of the diaspora. However, diaspora networks are also less difficult to control, therefore their results depend almost entirely on the composition and disposition to help of the nationals abroad. That is, diaspora diplomacy is cheaper but also more unstable than the public subsidized programs for talent management.

References

Beine, M., Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2001). Brain drain and economic growth: theory and evidence. *Journal of development economics*, *64*(1), 275-289.

Bernal, V. (2014). *Nation as network: diaspora, cyberspace, and citizenship*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cerase, F. P. (1974). Expectations and reality: a case study of return migration from the United States to Southern Italy. *The International migration review*, *8*(2), 245-262.

Chandrashekhar, C.P. 2012. "The Source of Remittances". *The Hindu*, 19 September.

Chang, A. (2013). *Beijing and the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: to serve the People*. National Bureau of Asian Research.

Chareonwongsak, K. (2012). ¨The Global Chinese Diaspora - Creating Wealth, Contributing to National Development¨. 4th World Chinese Economic Forum, Melbourne, November 12.

Clifford, J. (1997) Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press.

Cohen, J. H., & Sirkeci, I. (2011). *Cultures of migration. The global nature of contemporary mobility.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Delano, A. (2011). *Mexico and its diaspora in the United States: Policies of emigration since 1848*. MA, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Gillespie, M., & Baumann, G. (2006, September). Diasporic Contact Zones at the BBC World Service. In *CRESC 2nd Annual Conference" Media Change and Social Theory", Unpublished Conference Paper, Oxford, England* (pp. 6-8).

Indian Diaspora North America, http://indiandiasporana.com/. Acessed on May 10, 2016

Institute of Mexicans Abroad. (2007). "Mexican Talent Network: The Institutional Perspective of Mexico", Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City.

Ionescu, D. (2006). *Engaging diasporas as development partners for home and destination countries: challenges for policymakers* (pp. 1-85). Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Jacques, M. (2008). "As China's Power Grows, the Diaspora Starts to flex its Worldwide Muscle'." *The Guardian* June 10.

Kapur, D., Mehta, A. S., & Dutt, R. M. (2004). Indian diaspora philanthropy. In Geithner, P.F., Johnson, P.D. And Chen, L.D., *Diaspora philanthropy and equitable development in China and India* (pp.177-213). Cambridge: Global Equity Initiative and Harvard University Press

Kuznetsov Y. (2012). How Can Countries' Talent Abroad Help Transform Institutions at Home? Instruments and Policies of Diaspora Engagement. Working paper. Washington, DC: World Bank. Online: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16453636/can-countries... Accessed on May 4, 2015.

López Martínez, D. (2007). "El Codesarrollo: análisis, experiencias y proyecto Cañar – Murcia". AFESE 48, p. 105 -115

Malgesini, G. (2001). Reflexiones sobre migraciones, cooperación y codesarrollo. *Arxius de Ciències Socials*, (5), 123-146.

Naïr, S. (1997). Rapport de bilan et d'orientation sur la politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires. *Paris: Ministère des affaires étrangères*.

Newland, K. (2010). Voice after exit: Diaspora advocacy. *Migration Policy Institute*.

OECD Statistics (2015), http://stats.oecd.org/. Accessed on May 15, 2015

Olesen, T. (2005). "Transnational publics: New spaces of social movement activism and the problem of global long-sightedness." *Current Sociology* 53.3: 419-440.

Pande, A. (2014). Diaspora and Development: Theoretical Perspectives. In: Irudaya Rajan (ed.), *India Migration Report*, London: Routledge, pp. 36-46.

Pratt, M.L. (1992). *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London: Routledge.

Roth, K. P., & Diamantopoulos, A. (2009). Advancing the country image construct. *Journal of Business Research*, *62*(7), 726-740.

Saxenian, A. (2004). The Silicon Valley connection: transnational networks and regional development in Taiwan, China and India. In: *India in the Global Software Industry* (pp. 164-192). Farnham: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Shi, Yuchen and Hua Liu (2014). "Review of Sino-US students exchange in the past 35 years", June.

Sirkeci, I., & Cohen, J. H. (2016). Cultures of migration and conflict in contemporary human mobility in Turkey. *European Review*, 24(03), 381-396.

Stark, O., Helmenstein, C., & Prskawetz, A. (1997). A brain gain with a brain drain. *Economics letters*, *55*(2), 227-234.

Tejada, G., & Bolay, J. C. (2005). *Impulsar el desarrollo a través de la circulación de conocimiento: una mirada distinta a las migraciones de los mexicanos altamente calificados* (No. CO-ARTICLE-2005-001).

Terrazas, A., & Batog, C. (2010). Indian immigrants in the United States. *Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute*.

The Chinese American Professors and Professionals Network", http://scholarsupdate. hi2net.com/news.asp?NewsID=20386, Accessed on June 3, 2016

The Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange (CSCSE). (2012). "Employment Report of Ten Thousand of Returned Students".

The Economist. (2011). "The magic of Diasporas: Immigrant networks are a rare bright spark in the world economy. Rich countries should welcome them". November.

The Indian Diaspora, http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/. Acessed on March 5, 2015

The Indian Express. (2012). Students' exodus costs India forex outflow of $10 bn (2009) Assocham. January 26.

The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. (2010). *Strategic Plan for Next Five Years*. New Delhi.

The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. (2012). "The Swarnapravas Yojana – New Plan Scheme". January.Year-end Review 2014, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx ?relid=114332

The Ministry of Overseas Indians. (2014). "India Centre for Migration". January.Year-end Review 2014. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=114332

Tigau, C. (2009). *Diplomacia en la era digital: la ayuda alimentaria como maniobra neoliberal*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte and Ed. Cenzontle.

Tigau, C. (2014). Las élites en la diáspora como embajadoras culturales. *Revista mexicana de ciencias políticas y sociales*, *59*(222), 423-428.

Tigau, C. (2012). "De talentos a élites: un camino a recorrer por la diáspora mexicana en Norteamérica.¨ In Salas-Porras, A., & Luna, M. (2012). ¿Quién gobierna América del Norte? Élites, redes y organizaciones. México, Océano: pp.263-291

Tölölyan, K. (2007). The contemporary discourse of diaspora studies. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27(3), 647-655.

Tomiczek, M. (2011). Diaspora diplomacy–about a new dimension of diplomacy, the example of a New Emigration non-governmental organisation. *Journal of Education Culture and Society*, (2: Against exclusions).

Tumbe, C. (2012). EU-India Bilateral Remittances. *Available at SSRN 2119769*.

Turner, W. (2005). *The Diaspora Knowledge Network Work Program*. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. (Unpublished)

Van Ham, P. (2001). The rise of the brand state: The postmodern politics of image and reputation. *Foreign affairs*, 2-6.

Van Ham, P. (2010). Social power in international politics. London: Routledge.

Vidal, P., & Martínez, S. (2008). *An approach to codevelopment. The transnational migrating community: Protagonist of codevelopment*. Barcelona: Observatorio del Tercer Sector.

Wang Yaohui and Lv MIAO, eds. (2013). *Annual report on the development of Chinese returnees, Blue book of global talent, Num.2*, Social Science Academic Press, China.

Zweig, D., Fung, C. S., & Han, D. (2008). Redefining the Brain Drain China's 'Diaspora Option'. *Science Technology & Society*, *13*(1), 1-33.