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Securitisation, economisation and the political constitution of temporary migration: the making of the Austrian seasonal workers scheme

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Abstract
Temporary migration has recently received considerable attention from migration researchers. This article shifts the analytic focus from migration practices to migration politics and enquires into the logics and processes underlying the formulation of temporary migration programmes. Based on Foucault's analysis of liberal governmentality and Jessop's strategic-relational approach, it is argued that the governing of temporary labour migration by nation-states requires sophisticated political technologies. These technologies entail the differentiated deprivation of fundamental rights and are therefore neither unproblematic nor self-evident. Developing and establishing the necessary legal categorisations along skill levels, nationality, employment status, and so on, requires a complex interplay of two political rationalities that are often conceived of as contradictory: the securitisation and the economisation of migration. Once established, differentiations and measures introduced under securitised conditions can be invested in utilitarian migration policies. The interplay of these two rationalities depends on and is mediated by wider political-economic and societal transformation processes. This general argument is illustrated by the example of the Austrian Seasonal Worker Scheme, which shows significant parallels to policies introduced in other nation-states over the past two decades.

Keywords: temporary migration; securitisation; economisation; strategic-relational approach; liberal governmentality; Austria

Introduction: The contradictory regulation of temporary migration

Temporary migrant worker programmes (TMWPs) are back on the political agenda and they play a crucial role in structuring global labour migration (Ruhs, 2005; Castles, 2006b; Martin et al., 2006; Vertovec, 2007; Stasiulis, 2008). Scholarly discussions of recent TMWPs emphasise resemblances to guest worker programmes of the post-WWII period (Plewa and Miller, 2005; Castles, 2006a; Menz, 2009). However, there are important differences. Besides sectoral shifts and changes in the political-economic context, the new frameworks entail a far more complex differentiation between migrant groups entitled to different sets of civic, political, and social rights. While some

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'voluntarily' temporary migrants enjoy far-reaching freedom of mobility, such as within the European Union, the temporariness of other migrant is enforced by sophisticated state regulations. The following discussion mainly refers to these enforced forms of temporariness that mostly affect third country nationals or migrants from new member states who until recently were subject to labour market restrictions.

The central problem this article is concerned with is the relation between economic and security politics in the development of such temporary migrant worker programmes. Several authors have pointed to the functional fit between restrictive, securitised control policies and the use of labour migration regarding the *effects of migration policies* as well as *concrete regulatory practices*. Harsh migration control policies and the resulting precarious legal status of temporary migrants are constitutive of their specific utility as labour power (Anderson, 2010) – thus mirroring the structure of former guestworker regimes in relevant regards (Castles and Kosack, 1973). De Giorgi (2010) points to how the partly militarised security-driven re-bordering of Western states and the general punitive turn[1] against migrants from the global South go together with the need for highly precarious workers in post-Fordist segmented labour markets.

Turning from the effects of policies and regulatory practices to the realms of political discourse and policy formation, however, the interplay between economic and security approaches becomes more troublesome. The securitisation and the economisation of migration are usually conceived of as contradictory policy approaches (Buonfino, 2004). In line with this understanding, the 'resurrection' of labour migration (Castles, 2006a) has been interpreted as a fundamental shift from restrictive, 'largely defensive security-driven' migration politics towards a rational 'national human resources strategy' (Menz and Caviedes, 2010: 3; Kolb, 2010). Caviedes (2010: 15) shows how employers need to circumvent security-focused political discourses marked by anti-immigration tendencies to push their migration-related agendas. Seemingly, functional adequacy for structuring labour markets does not translate into easy formulation of policy positions. Paraphrasing Sciortino (2000: 22): Has the employer who hires a temporary migrant worker also lobbied for restrictive migration control policies? Scholars have pointed to the complex discursive structuring of temporary migration policies (Stasilius, 2008; Mayer, 2009; Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011; Ellermann, 2013), but the question of how (if at all) securitised and economised discourses are related in framing labour migration policies remains unanswered and contested.

This article contributes to discussions regarding the discursive constitution of TMWPs. To this end, it presents a specific theoretical lense that combines Foucault's analytics of liberal statecraft and Jessop's strategic-relational theori-

[1] De Giorgi (2010) discusses how Western migration regimes have become increasingly restrictive for migrants from the global South. The punitive turn is noticeable in increasing deportation and detention numbers, as well as in new policing measures.

sations of the capitalist state. On this theoretical basis, I argue that the deprivation of fundamental rights of temporary migrants is not a self-evident capacity of liberal nation-states but a complex political technology. As political technologies, TMWPs need to be developed and established before they can be put to use within seemingly rational utilitarian labour migration programmes. Using the example of the Austrian seasonal workers scheme, I argue that this development process is structured by an interplay of securitisation and economisation of migration, both of which can be conceptualised as forms of problematising migration that are (a) contested and (b) structurally anchored in the political form of liberal nation-states.

By implication, TMWPs should not be seen as neutral, innocent policies but must be understood in their relation to power constellations and social inequalities. Although this article focuses on the level of discourse, it is motivated by these links to power and inequality. Temporary migration depends on the global division of labour and the unequal distribution of resources and life chances between regions and countries. It is, moreover, tied to complex processes of labour market segmentation (as already described by Piore, 1979). Analysing the logics and functioning of TMWPs therefore promises to further our understanding of one small mechanism involved in the reproduction of structures of social inequality.

The following section presents my theoretical framework; based on Foucault's analysis of liberal statecraft, the securitisation and the economisation of migration are identified as structural tendencies of 'liberal' migration politics. Jessop's strategic-relational approach is suggested as a basis for linking discourses to the strategic agency of political actors and for analysing how the interplay of these rationalities is embedded in wider societal developments. I then turn to the development of the Austrian temporary migrant worker status as an example for how the government of temporary migration has evolved against the background of ongoing EU integration and general societal transformation processes and discuss how the evolution of a TMWP hinges on the interplay of the securitisation and the economisation of migration.

Temporary migration and the political rationalities of liberal nation-states

Enforced temporariness and the deprivation of rights: TMWPs as political technologies

The political rhetoric that presents TMWPs as win-win-win situations (GCIM, 2005; Agunias and Newland, 2007) masks the disadvantaged labour market positions, the legal precarity, and the enforced temporariness of current temporary migrant workers (Plewa and Miller, 2005; Stasiulis, 2008; Gabriel, 2008; Dauvergne and Marsden, 2011).[2] Their precarious status hinges on the

[2] Dominant accounts of 'shuttle', 'incomplete' or 'liquid' migration, especially in the context of the EU, also pay little attention to these processes of enforcement and discrimination (Iglicka, 2000; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2005; Currie 2008; Burrell 2009; Engbersen et al. 2010).

deprivation of fundamental civic, political and social rights (Anderson, 2010): the right to free settlement and labour market mobility, the right to organise and mobilise, voting rights, and social security entitlements[3]. The employment relation of temporary migrants is structured by restrictions regarding the company, the sector, and the region in which migrants are free to take up employment; in many cases, work permits are issued for single employers only (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001: 7). As a consequence, temporary migrant workers are, in fact, rather 'immobile'. Their resulting easy retention even under poor employment conditions is one of the benefits employers appreciate about temporary migrant workers (Dench et al., 2006). Furthermore, temporary migrants are affected by general migration policies: the more restrictive general migration regulations the easier can migrants' residence be limited and the more (even self-inflicted) temporariness can be expected (de Genova and Peutz, 2010).

Obviously, the differential deprivation of rights is one of the key features of TMWPs. Following Foucault (2002; 2007; Dean, 2010), this capacity to allocate different rights to different categories of migrants can be interpreted as a political technology: as instruments that need to be developed and established. This capacity has important discursive prerequisites. First, the lines along which migrants are differentiated have to be established. In the context of temporary migration, this not only affects forms and degrees of 'belonging', but the very idea of temporariness and, relatedly, of 'skill'.[4] Second, the legitimacy and feasibility of using these categorisations for the deprivation of rights are necessarily contested.

An analytical puzzle follows: How can we explain the correspondence between discursive constellations and labour market needs for TMWPs without resorting to teleological argumentation? In the following, I argue (i) that an interplay between the securitisation and the economisation of migration is a necessary condition for establishing such programmes and (ii) that both of these rationalities are structurally anchored in the liberal nation-state.

The liberal government of migration

Foucault (2002; 2007) identifies two concepts that organise the liberal governing of society: the market and the population. Both are imagined to be too complex to be overseen or understood by any single governmental actor. Therefore, liberal government is to intervene as little as possible in order not to distort the 'natural' order of things. The underlying logic is utilitarian: governmental interventions are not judged on moral grounds but with regard to

[3] Dauvergne and Marsden (2011: 21) point to the example of the Australian Pacific Seasonal Workers Programme which puts an unusual emphasis on migrant workers' rights: 'Ironically, the program appears underused (…) undoubtedly in part because the program cannot address the identified labour market need with such robust rights protections in place.'

[4] Temporary migration is still overwhelmingly linked to low-paid activities marked as 'unskilled' (Plewa and Miller, 2005; Gabriel, 2008). Based on the cases of Canada and the US, Dauvergne and Marsden (2011: 6) argue that this link between 'skills' and temporariness has become stronger rather than weaker over the past decade.

their usefulness for the 'collective interest'. The role of government is to create and ensure optimal conditions for individual market agency. Foucault terms the resulting type of power 'governmentality', distinguishing it from the 'rule of law' and 'sovereignty' (Dean, 2010).

The establishment of market principles and a utilitarian political rationality are the core elements of the economisation of social relations implied by liberal governmentality. The economisation of migration means, first, that migration is construed as an economic issue that is believed to follow and should therefore be governed according to market principles. Second, migration is one of the variables through which liberal governments attempt to balance economic and demographic developments. The differentiation between migrant groups facilitates these governmental tasks. However, the economisation of migration does not provide sufficient legitimation to establish the involved differentiations. The ideologeme of the market is linked to ideas of equality and freedom, both of which are not conducive to the differentiation of fundamental rights.

Here securitisation as a second element of liberal government comes into play. The liberal doctrine of as little governmental intervention as possible inevitably leads to a set of security considerations: the need to keep negative consequences of excessive freedom under control. In Foucault's conception, security is the prime legitimation and mode of liberal governmental interventions (Foucault, 2007). Governmental interventions therefore require a process of securitisation, i.e. the framing of a phenomenon as an existential threat to a referent object (usually the nation), thus laying the ground for (exceptional) political measures. Concerning migration issues, there are three prevalent forms of securitisation that frame migration as a threat (1) to public order, (2) to social security or (3) to cultural identity (Huysmans, 2006).[5]

The Foucauldian conception of liberal government allows to focus on the interrelation of economisation and securitisation of migration. These two logics need to be seen as distinct from each other. They can have conflicting policy implications and they are linked to different institutions and fields of practice: employer organisations, supranational associations, and academics in the case of economisation (Menz, 2009) as compared to security professionals, mass media and party politics (Bigo, 2002; Bunofino, 2004) in the case of securitisation. Still, they are both structurally embedded in the political form of the liberal nation-state and therefore need to be analysed in their interplay.

Three variants of this interplay are relevant for the following analysis. First, securitisation is a condition of possibility for the revocation of fundamental

[5] This Foucauldian conception of securitisation differs somewhat from the understanding of securitisation as it was developed by the Copenhagen School of security studies (Wæver et al., 1993; Buzan et al., 1998). It does not share the Schmittean understanding of sovereignty, states of emergency and friend–enemy relation (Williams, 2003) and moves the analytic focus from states of exception to more mundane tasks of risk calculation and everyday security practices (Bigo, 2002; Neal, 2009).

rights considered inviolable under 'normal conditions'. Once no longer regarded as fundamental (post-securitisation), these rights can be allocated and withdrawn in an instrumental manner for utilitarian governmental programmes. Second, securitisation shifts the overall migration regime towards restriction and control, thus providing a necessary complement for selection policies: the possibility to effectively reject those who do not fit (Menz, 2009: 257). Third, temporary migration policies may themselves be securitised, in the sense of being informed by more than one logic or by fulfilling more than one purpose.

Securitisation, economisation and political-economic transformation

Foucault's analysis of liberal governmentality deals with the political programme and discursive principles of (neo)liberalism.[6] In this article, discourse is understood in the Foucauldian sense as a supra-individual order of knowledge or system of thought[7]. In order to bridge the analytic levels of discourse, strategic agency, and social relations, I suggest to combine Foucault's analysis of liberal governmentality with Jessop's (2002; 2008) strategic-relational understanding of the capitalist state.

Jessop defines the state neither as rational actor nor as neutral stage for negotiating interests but as a social relation (Jessop, 2008). The core function of the state is to 'define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a given population in the name of their "common interest"' (Jessop, 2008: 9). The definition of the 'common interest' is a discursive task (Jessop, 2004) and as such always contested and structured by societal power relations. The resulting focus on logics of 'statecraft' links Jessop's approach to Foucault's concept of political rationalities (Jessop, 2007).

Regarding TMWPs, the strategic-relational approach allows us to analyse why specific forms of problematisation become dominant at different points in time. Societal agents develop strategies and push agendas in specific societal settings that determine the kind of 'problem' (e.g., what kind of migrants are 'needed' for what economic sectors), as well as what ways of satisfying the resultant demands seem feasible and legitimate. What strategies are met with success partly depends on the societal balance of forces, such as between employers and trade unions. Jessop's (2002) account of the transformation of the post-war 'Keynesian Welfare National State' (KWNS) into the 'Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime' (SWPR) offers a framework for linking shifts in the kind of problematisation to political-economic and geopolitical transformations. On this basis, we can ask why TMWPs, once introduced, are re-

[6] Foucault (2002; 2007) identifies two main differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism: neoliberal thinking stipulates that government itself should be organised according to market logics and that competition should supersede the market as the core principle. However, there are also important continuities. The tension between economy and security that organises my argument remains central to liberal governmentality.

[7] For the political field, this understanding implies a focus on different forms of *problematisation* of social phenomena that are informed by *political rationalities* and structure the development and introduction of *political technologies* (Dean, 2010).

tained, how they are adapted, and how they relate to other programmes, logics and initiatives. The strategic-relational considerations presented in the following thus indicate how discourses are linked to strategic agency and thus to link my findings to existing analyses of Austrian migration politics.

Methodological remarks: the case of Austria

In the following, the main argument regarding how the development of temporary migration programmes is shaped by an interplay of securitisation and economisation is illustrated using the Austrian case. Although Austria is seldom mentioned in the literature on temporary migration (cf. Plewa and Miller, 2005; Engbersen et al., 2010), there are a number of studies this article can build on. These studies are mostly concerned with the concrete legal frameworks (e.g. Pirker, 2010) or the changing modes of and actors involved in policy making (Bauböck, 1996; Perchinig, 2010; Kraler, 2011). The turn towards new forms of regulating labour migration in Austria is discussed by Gächter (1995) and Caviedes (2010). The following analysis builds on these existing studies, but moves the focus to the discursive level.

Temporary migration plays a crucial role in the Austrian migration regime. Since the early 1990s, Austria has developed a differentiated framework for temporary migration. The relevance of enforced temporary migration to Austria is obvious even from official numbers that are heavily biased downwards (Kratzmann et al., 2011: 43). Especially its geographic location at the former Iron Curtain and the presence of a strong far-right party make Austria an interesting case for analysing the political-economic transformation processes of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The primary objective of this article is to argue for a specific theoretical perspective. The case discussion therefore fulfills an illustrative function (for a more comprehensive empirical elaboration see Horvath 2014a). Nevertheless, it builds on material that has been systematically compiled for the purpose of analysing the political discourse on migration in Austria. The examples given are taken from a corpus of migration-related contributions (speeches and interpellations) in the Austrian parliament from WWII to 2012[8]. This corpus allows to combine the quantitative assessment of the relevance of different forms of problematisation (such as securitisation and economisation) with in-depth interpretations of key passages.

Considering the crucial role of EU-integration processes for recent temporary migration practices, the focus on one nation-state may appear questionable. After all, the overwhelming majority of temporary migrants to Austria come from the new EU member states[9] (Horvath 2012). There have been several initiatives to harmonise and establish common migration regulations

[8] I translated the originally German quotes for this article.

[9] Due to the labour market restrictions for migrants from new member states, this temporariness was for almost a decade of an enforced nature.

within the EU, and policy frameworks decided by EU bodies trigger developments and force changes in national policies. However, as Menz (2009) points out, the nation-state still is one of the central actors for the regulation of migration – and thus an adequate context to enquire into the underlying discursive developments.

Figure 1: Frequency of indicator terms for securitised and economised problematisations of migration (source: own research)



Guestwork 2.0? How securitisation structured Austria's temporary labour migration policies

The surprising introduction of a seasonal worker status

The late 1980s are generally seen as turning point for Western European migration regimes at which migration issues became, in general, highly politicised (Messina, 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the scope and securitised nature of this development for the Austrian Parliament. It shows the frequency of selected indicator terms for economic and security problematisations over the period 1945 to 2010. During the first three post-war decades, security problematisations were virtually non-existent and migration issues overwhelmingly discussed in economic terms (the grey reference line in the graphs). In the mid-1980s, the picture changed dramatically, with indicators for securitised framings – here references to 'crime', 'integration', 'illegality' and unemployment[10] – outweighing economic discussions for most of the 1990s and 2000s.

[10] Obviously unemployment is an economic *issue*. However, references to unemployment in the corpus are overwhelmingly linked to a *securitised logic* of problematising migration (as a threat to

Against this background, the Austrian migration regime was profoundly restructured (Perchinig, 2010; Kraler, 2011). In accordance with the securitised context of the time, the measures aimed at restricting migration (Mayer, 2009). The alleged state of emergency served as pretext to change the legal framework: *[These changes are made] against a dramatic background: if my information is correct, another 5,000 Romanians tried to cross the border illegally last night. Thousands of Romanians are waiting in the neighbouring Eastern states, ready to enter our Republic. […] We cannot take in half the population of Romania.* (ÖVP/Conservative, contribution to parliamentary debate, July 1990)

However, not all measures seem to fit into the frame of securitisation. As part of the first comprehensive revision of the legal framework in 1992, a measure reminiscent of the 1960s guest-worker programme was taken – the status of 'seasonal worker' was introduced. Given (1) record-high immigration, (2) high unemployment rates and (3) the securitised context, this decision was rather surprising. The rationales for the introduction of the new status emphasised the need for migrant labour in specific sectors of the economy and the existential pressure on enterprises threatening the well-being of the whole country. The quotes in table 1 illustrate the demands for a seasonal worker status across the political spectrum. The argumentations are hardly reconcilable with the image of immigration as out of control. There is an obvious rhetoric of emergency, but migration figures as a solution, not as a source of danger. In this context, the second quote (by a representative from the far-right FPÖ) is especially interesting because it anticipates the win-win-win rationale of current migration management discourses. In short, economisation and securitisation existed side by side, in line with the assumption that both are structurally embedded in the liberal nation-state.

At first glance, the seasonal worker status seems to be a rather straightforward consequence of a utilitarian reasoning – but the story is more complex. The central argument of this article is that it is only once the required technologies are established and normalised that states can make easy use of them to curb or regulate migration within utilitarian policy frameworks. Establishing these political technologies, however, requires the framing of migration in non-economic, securitised terms. Following the theoretical considerations above, there are three ways in which the securitisation of migration directly structured the new seasonal worker status in Austria.

First, securitisation was a *condition of possibility* for the introduction of the new status. The demand for such a model was anything but new; employer organisations had been calling for what they called the 'Swiss model of seasonal work' for years. But for various reasons seasonal worker programmes had been deemed unacceptable by key political actors – mainly social democrats and trade unions – for decades. The change of heart at the beginning of

social security, Huysmans, 2006). Economised cost-benefit arguments mostly circumvent the explicit mentions of unemployment, talking rather of labour costs, lack of labour, or inflation risks.

the 1990s comes rather suddenly and can only be explained by the securitised context of the time. The construal of migration as an existential threat made exceptional measures seem acceptable and even inevitable. What may previously have been considered an unbearable act of discrimination could now be sold as a necessary evil. Rather than avoiding politicisation and circumventing security-centred discourses (Caviedes, 2010), employers made use of this new constellation to push their decades-old agenda.

Table 1: Economising problematisations around 1989

1989: Interpellation, FPÖ (far right), 09/1989.	'The Tyrolean labour market is suffering from a shortage of workers in the areas of tourism and, especially, catering. This shortage can only be remedied by employing foreign workers. Therefore, procedures to approve workers must be fast and non-bureaucratic, in accordance with economic necessities.'
Post-1989: Contribution to parliamentary debate, FPÖ (far right), 12/1990.	'What could be achieved with this status of seasonal worker that we have repeatedly demanded? […] First: Job-seekers could be given employment without much bureaucratic effort. Second, duration of employment would be manageable, which would help to dispel the justified fears of Austrian job seekers. Third, the imminent uprooting of foreign workers could be prevented. Fourth, unskilled workers could go back to their economies with their newly-acquired knowledge and help build infrastructure there. Fifth, the money the seasonal workers put aside could benefit their families and could be used to develop their national economies.'
Post-1989: Contribution to parliamentary debate, Green Party (liberal/progressive), 07/1992.	'I believe that hardly anyone in Austria would deny that a net annual immigration rate of 25,000 is necessary to shape our demographic development in a way that would promote positive development for Austria.'

Source: Author's own research.

Second, the new status can itself be interpreted as a *securitised measure*. Seasonal labour migration in Central Europe was a regular practice established over centuries. In this situation, the only alternative would have been to accept what was increasingly considered a dangerous threat: the undocumented mobility of labour. Two rationales were at play: (1) a utilitarian argument calling for a cheap and flexible labour force and the resultant need for migration and (2) a 'security' rationale that implied a need to bring existing labour market relations under state control. The first, utilitarian rationale was mainly advocated by the far-right Freedom Party, the second, securitised one by social democrats. The combination of the two rationalities is reflected in the parliamentary discussion of the new status: as an instrument of both labour market regulation and migration control (Table 2).

Third, the securitised context structured the overall development of the Austrian migration regime, thus providing the *context for implementing control and selection policies*. The new temporary status did not require changes to labour regulations but a new residence law (Kraler, 2011). New restrictions and regu-

lations contributed to what de Genova and Peutz (2010: 6) termed 'deportability': 'the very possibility of being deported' leading to the 'disposability of ever deportable migrant labor'. This third aspect corresponds to the kind of interplay already discussed by other authors (Menz, 2009; Anderson, 2010; de Giorgi, 2010).

Table 2: Seasonal work as a security measure and labour market instrument

Contribution to parliamentary debate, 07/1990.	'The first challenge was to do something to limit the free influx of foreigners to Austria. The second challenge was to get the increasing irregular employment under control. The third challenge was to address the question: How can we liberalise the procedure of admitting foreigners, speed it up and make it less bureaucratic?'
Interpellation, 03/1991.	'The purpose of this new labour market instrument is not only to meet the demand for labour in specific sectors of the economy that cannot be supplied otherwise, but also to stop illegal practices of employing foreign workers.'

Source: Author's own research

What we see is not merely a compromise between economic needs and security considerations. Rather, the securitised context allowed for the implementation of a decades-old demand at a seemingly very unlikely time. Although the role of political actors cannot be discussed here in detail, it is striking that the observed link holds not only as a discursive pattern but also for important political players. The far-right FPÖ, e.g., was not only the most active securitising player but also the first party to bring the demand for seasonal work onto the agenda. FPÖ parliamentarians used the anti-immigration sentiment – provoked in part by themselves – to push their ideas on *what type of labour migration* to organise *under what conditions*.

The never-ending season: From seasonal worker to temporary migrant

The new migrant status soon lost its character of seasonality and became a general means of enforced temporariness. This process of normalisation and generalisation proceeded in steps. Five measures taken since the early 1990s deserve attention. First, the potential duration of employment was extended by allowing for a one-time extension of six months, after which period the migrant worker can only start to work legally again after a waiting period of two months (this, in combination with the general residence and settlement regulations, effectively made it impossible for temporal workers to receive unemployment benefits). Employment periods of up to one year can no longer be meaningfully regarded as 'seasonal'. Seasonal work has thus been generalised to a scheme for the flexible recruitment of migrant labour for short-term labour market needs. Second, as of 2002, 'seasonal workers' are officially referred to as 'temporarily employed workers', reflecting the generalisation of the status. Third, while seasonal workers could only be employed in tourism,

construction or agriculture, in 2002, the right-wing FPÖ–ÖVP Government allowed for temporary workers to be recruited for any economic sector. Although never used in practice, this option is evidence of the institutionalisation of temporary labour recruitment. Fourth, in 2000, employers of seasonal workers in agriculture were exempted from certain social insurance contributions, explicitly making migrants a cheaper workforce as compared to native workers. This measure is symbolically important because it breaks with the solidarity principle of compulsory insurance. Fifth, the status of 'temporary worker' has been made the main mode of legal labour market integration for various groups of migrants, including asylum seekers and, until recently, migrants from new member states.[11]

The new status of seasonal worker not only developed into a permanent institution, but was broadened and diversified. Its normalisation is obvious from how the status of seasonal worker is now treated as an unquestioned fact, as done, for example, by an SPÖ representative in 2009, in the midst of the economic crisis: 'The crisis notwithstanding, our economy needs labour migrants […] we need the seasonal workers' (SPÖ, February 2009).

Selection, retention, adaptation: The Austrian TMWP from a strategic-relational perspective

Temporary migration programmes depend on a discursive constellation marked by the interplay of utilitarian logics and securitising moves. However, discursive developments alone do not explain why similar developments are evident for the same period across different 'Varieties of Capitalism' (Menz, 2009; Menz and Caviedes, 2010), welfare regime types, immigration histories and party systems. Most Western European countries have established some form of temporary/circular migration scheme over the past two decades (Plewa and Miller, 2005; Engbersen et al., 2010: 8; EMN, 2011).[12]

Although this argument cannot be fully elaborated here, I argue that Jessop's strategic-relational approach offers a framework to understand why similar developments occurred throughout Western Europe. In a nutshell, we can read the introduction and retention of TMWPs as an adaptation process of national migration regimes to new political-economic contexts: 'It took the epochal events of 1989 and 1990 to change the policy of no further recruitment' (Plewa and Miller, 2005: 67) – as well as the crisis of the 'Keynesian Welfare National State' (Jessop, 2002). These transformations led to a new, unevenly structured and 'strategically selective' setting to which state and non-state actors had to adjust their strategies.

[11] After the restrictions have been lifted, migrants from new member states are theoretically no longer subject to enforced temporariness. However, the migration systems that have been established over the past years still bear the marks of the restriction phase.

[12] Sweden is the only country to remain reluctant to enforcing temporariness and relying on voluntary mobility instead (EMN, 2011: 33). Because the forms of legal framework vary considerably, even within the EU, the exact number depends on the definition of temporary migration and thus varies from source to source.

Among the key state actors involved in the securitisation of migration are security professionals (police, military, etc.) who had to respond to the changing geopolitical context of the late 1980s (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2006). Regarding non-state actors, the epochal events of 1989 contributed to an already on-going shift in the balance of social forces. From a strategic-relational perspective, these shifts are crucial to understand how some actors (mainly employer organisations) managed to make use of the new discursive context, while others lost ground (above all, migrant and workers' organisations). This process was linked to the emerging dominance of neoliberal policy approaches. In this changed strategic setting, the securitisation of migration – triggered by other societal actors – opened a window of opportunity for employer organisations.

In addition to the new balance of social forces, the 1980s had also seen important economic shifts leading to a demand for different kinds of migrant labour. The reorganisation of the international monetary system and the deregulation of economic policies had increased the pressure towards international competitiveness and had simultaneously opened new channels for transnational movements of capital, goods, and labour. The economic restructuring resulted in decreasing demand for semi-skilled labour in industrial production, while sectors in which labour demands and practices were far more 'flexible', such as tourism, agriculture and construction, gained importance.

In other words: The status of seasonal worker had become *necessary* and *possible* due to broad societal developments that mark the fundamental crisis of the 'Keynesian Welfare National State' (Jessop, 2002).

Conclusion and outlook

Using the example of Austria, I have argued that the development of temporary migration programmes is linked to processes of securitisation that provide conditions of possibility, motives, and necessary accompanying measures for TMWPs. I proposed Foucault's concept of liberal governmentality to analyse the interplay of securitisation and economisation in the (discursive) formation of migration policies. Jessop's strategic-relational approach enables us to examine how these dynamics of migration regimes and political discourses are linked to strategic agency in concrete political-economic settings.

This analysis has two central implications. First, I maintain that in liberal nation-states securitisation is a prerequisite for establishing discursive technologies such as a seasonal worker status[13]. Once established and normalised, these technologies can be re-invested. Second, it is misleading to interpret new guestworker initiatives as a shift from a restrictive policy approach to a more soliciting one, or to envision the main dividing line in migration politics

13 Even the basic distinction between migrant and national labour had to be established – in Austria this happened in the mid-1920s under heavily securitised conditions (Horvath, 2014b).

to run between liberalising and restrictive positions. Even if that is the way actors frame their argument, this does not correspond to the actual discursive structuring of policies such as the Austrian seasonal worker scheme.

The observed pattern holds not only for temporary migration programmes. For example, the transitional agreements for restricting labour migration from new member states served Austrian employers well. They allowed to keep CEE migrants in precarious labour market positions (either, in fact, falling under the temporary migrant worker scheme or as pseudo self-employed). Today, the resulting migration systems are well established and it will take some time to overcome them even after the transitional agreements ended. However, employers did not push for these agreements themselves; on the contrary, their rhetoric was one of necessary liberalisation. Instead, other Austrian political actors pushed the demand for restrictions on the basis of securitised problematisations of migration, focusing on threats to social security, but also linking to dangers for public order and cultural identity.

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