### **Migration Letters**

January 2022 Volume: 19, No: 1, pp. 41 – 54 ISSN: 1741-8984 (Print) ISSN: 1741-8992 (Online) journals.tplondon.com/ml

TRANSNATIONAL PRESS®

Received: 5 February 2021 Accepted: 3 January 2022 DOI: https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v19i1.1388

# The Impact of Economic, Social, and Political Determining Factors of the Youth Migration in Kosovo

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#### Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the propensity of youth migration in Kosovo and the impact of the determining factors. Worryingly, 59% of respondents have expressed a propensity to migrate. Their most preferred destinations are Germany, Switzerland, and North America. The economic, cultural, and security concerns appear to have a statistically significant impact on the propensity to migrate. The respondents with a propensity to migrate tend to view migration mostly as an opportunity, while those without a propensity to migrate tend to perceive it as both risk and opportunity. The results suggest that employment in the services and craftsmanship sector is the most preferred. Regrettably, only 16% of respondents have participated in a relevant formal migration program. Finally, 43.8% of respondents will return home if they solve the problems or issues for which they would migrate. Significantly, there is a noticeable inter-generational increase in gender equality, measured by the increase of female respondents' participation in higher education.

**Keywords:** Migration; youth; propensity; determinants

### Introduction

A myriad of determining factors simultaneously impact the youth's tendency to migrate, and generally are encompassed into push and pull factors of migration. Numerous studies have provided a comprehensive review and analysis of the issues, methodologies, and results, related to the impact of relevant factors on the propensity to migrate. Specifically, the literature review suggests that migration propensity is contingent on factors such as differential levels of income, unemployment differentials, geographic and demographic aspects, cultural differences, socio-political factors, educational motives, financial motives, strategic motives, psychological or driven by life-course transition process, individual and altruistic motivations, gender hierarchies and norms, human security-related issues, or a combination of two or more related factors. Additionally, various statistical and econometric models have been applied in these empirical studies, such as panel data analysis (Chiang, Hannum & Kao, 2013; Gavonel, 2017), and logistic or probit regression models (Herrera & Sahn, 2013; Eshetu & Beshir, 2017).

This paper investigates the propensity of youth migration in Kosovo, and the impact of determining factors such as age, gender, the destination of migration, relatives abroad, reasons for migration, languages that are spoken, residential background, level of education of parents, employment status, family income, marital status, migration perception, potential challenges, unacceptable changes, migration perspective, provision of formal organized and wellstructured program, desired employment, and finally, whether the potential migrants would return home if they would resolve the problems and/or issues for which they would have



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migrated. Moreover, we will apply the Pearson Chi-square test of independence, a nonparametric test, designed to test if two migration determinants are independent or related. In the following, *Section 2* reviews the literature on the determinants of migration. *Section 3* describes the dataset and utilized variables. *Section 4* presents the statistical analysis. *Section 5* concludes by presenting the main findings of the paper.

#### Literature Review

The review of the literature identifies many determinants of migration, which in general are encapsulated as the push and pull factors of migration. Push factors include economic factors (lack of employment, natural disasters, lack of food shelter, and lower standard of living), social factors (lack of health care, lack of educational opportunities, and lack of religious tolerance), and political factors (unfair legal system, disenfranchisement, and war on terrorism). Alternatively, pull factors comprise of economic factors (hope for better employment, more money and food, better shelter, and hope for the family to have a better living standard), social factors (encouragement from family and friends, better health care, better educational opportunities, and religious tolerance), and political factors (to gain protection under the law, right to vote and freedom from prosecution, and safety), (see European Commission, 2000; World Economic Forum, 2017; European Asylum Support Office, 2016). In the following, we will provide a brief literature review on the determinants of migration.

The findings of Blanchflower, Saleheen & Shadforth (2007), with regards to migration flows, reveal that the UK population has grown at a faster pace since the turn of the millennium, driven by migration from A8 nations (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). In their view, the propensity to migrate to the UK from these countries was higher the lower the GDP per capita in the countries of origin. Secondly, they observed that many of the new 'migrants' may have stayed for only a short time and then returned home, to possibly return later. Thirdly, they found that individuals from the A8 countries were relatively young, male, had low unemployment rates, lower wages, and high self-employment rates, and were especially likely to be in temporary jobs. Finally, they contend that this immigration made the labor market more flexible and likely lowered the natural rate of unemployment and inflation.

On the other hand, Chiang et al., 2013 have emphasized the individual and altruistic economic motivations featured prominently in demographic and economic research on migration. They proposed that the non-economic goal of personal development, a motivation suggested in numerous qualitative studies of women migrants in China and elsewhere, is also important, especially amongst young migrants. Comparatively, Herrera & Sahn (2013) have analyzed the socio-economic determinants of young people's decisions to internally migrate in Senegal, and they suggest that youth undertake mostly rural-to-rural and urban-to urban migrations.

Furthermore, Sprenger (2013) has empirically analyzed the determinants of migration between 21 developed countries, members of the EU, and the OECD. Using data on migration flows over the period 2000–2009, he examined the impact of traditional economic variables such as income and unemployment differentials, geographical and demographic factors. Also, he examined the effect of cultural differences on the mobility patterns in the EU before and after the 2004 enlargement round. In contrast, Piesse (2014) found that socio-political, economic, and ecological factors are the main forces driving migration. In his view, the rising communal



violence worldwide, often because of ethnic or religious intolerance, has led to increased levels of migration. In addition, the economic disparity between developing and developed economies encourages the movement of skilled labor from the former to the latter. Moreover, changes in the ecological environment have the potential to worsen food and water insecurity in various parts of the globe. The limited access to food and water resources may push people to migrate to countries where these resources are more readily available.

Additionally, the UNICEF (2014) study found that labor migration push-pull factors were intensifying. High unemployment and the absence of decent work opportunities, among other factors, push youth to migrate. The pull of demand for labor and skills mobility is permanent, structural, and growing, driven by technological changes, evolving markets, and spreading demographic transitions. Up to 50 % of migration flows comprise youth between ages 18 and 29. Most migrating youth and most migrant youth established in destination countries are or seek to be economically active. However, many migrant youths and adolescents remain highly subject to abuse, exploitation, absence of labor protection, and discrimination in employment. Many face challenges such as unemployment, denial of access to social security, and social exclusion. The key challenges for governance are obtaining full rights protection and decent work, including through effective labor inspection, and social inclusion for all young migrants. A challenge for some young migrants is the non-respect of free circulation regimes in regional economic communities, resulting in restrictions on their rights and lack of protection against exploitation, as well as abuses by authorities, (UNICEF, 2014).

In addition to this, Heckert (2015) has investigated internal migration among the Haitian youth, aged 10–24. The study compares characteristics of youth who migrate with education and labor motives and determines the characteristics associated with family financial support to youth migrants. Accordingly, Deotti & Estruch (2016) have found that migration is a common livelihood strategy for households across sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Despite structural differences, these two regions are facing major migration and youth employment challenges. They developed a conceptual framework to simultaneously address the root causes of distress migration of rural youth and leverage the potential of migration to reduce rural poverty and improve food security, with the overall objective of contributing to agriculture and rural development in migrants' areas of origin and migration-prone regions.

Similarly, Anderson, Apland, Dunaiski & Yarrow (2017) explored the experiences of young people who migrate internally in Vietnam and the Philippines. They investigated how do gender hierarchies and gender norms influence the decision-making and experiences concerning youth migration. First, they examined the push and pull factors driving youth internal migration; second, they identified the difficulties and risks, as well as the opportunities, faced by young migrants, and the gendered dimensions of these; and third, policy and programming to promote safe migration and support young women and men to take full personal and economic advantage of their migration status. In contrast, Gavonel (2017) investigated how life-course transitions to adulthood are related to patterns and predictors of internal migration in low- and middle-income countries. It documented the patterns on prevalence, frequency, timing, reasons, and streams of migration, employment at the destination, subjective well-being, and migration aspirations. In particular, he described the factors associated with young men and women's decision to migrate and the reasons for migrating. Giménez-Gómez, Walle & Zergawu (2017) implied that migration and the refugee crisis in Europe require an understanding of the different migration drivers beyond the well-

known economic determinants. They view migration from a broader human security perspective and analyze the determinants of regular and irregular migration flows from Africa to Europe for the period 1990–2014. Next, we turn to the questionnaire design, data, and variables.

#### Data

The survey was conducted with students at the University of Prishtina (UP) and University of Peja (UPE), both located in Kosovo, during April and May 2018. Specifically, the sample has 500 observations, 300 from UP and 200 from UPE. The following questions were asked to the students: 1. Do you think to migrate after completion of your education (1 - yes; 2 - no). 2. Age (in years). 3. Gender (1 - female; 2 - male). 4. In which country would you migrate (multiple selection questions; 1 - Germany; 2 - Switzerland; 3 - Other countries of Western Europe; 4 - United Kingdom; 5 - the United States or Canada; 6 - Other countries in the East; 7 - Other countries). 5. Do you have any relative that has migrated abroad (1 - yes, 2 no); 6. For what reasons would you migrate (multiple selection questions; 1 - political; 2 economic; 3 - religious; 4 - cultural; and, 5 - security). 7. Which foreign language do you speak (multiple selection questions; 1 - English; 2 - German; 3 - French; 4 - other); 8. Where is your residence (1 – village; 2 - city). 9. What is the level of education of your father (1 - elementary; 2 - high school; 3 - university; 4 - masters or Ph.D.). 10. What is the level of education of your mother (1 - elementary; 2 - high school; 3 - university; 4 - masters or Ph.D.). 11. Employment status (1 - yes; 2 - no). 12. Level of family monthly income (in EUR). 13. Marital status (1 not married; 2 - married). 14. How do you perceive migration (1 - risk; 2 - possibility; 3 - both risk & possibility). 15. What would be the biggest challenge that you would face in the foreign country, (multiple selection questions; 1 - learning of the foreign language; 2 - respect of law and regulations; 3 - getting used with the food; 4 - missing home; and, 5 - missing family). 16. What changes would you not accept (multiple selection questions; 1 - change of religion; 2 giving up on Kosovo citizenship; and, 3 - marriage with a foreigner). 17. Do you think that people should migrate (1- yes; 2 - no). 18. Do you think that migration should be prevented, (1 - it should be stopped; 2 - it should be encouraged; and, 3 - it is not relevant). 19. Have you followed any well-organized and well-structured program from any agency/organization that deals with migration issues (1 - yes; 2 - no); 20. In which sector would you like to work (multiple selection questions; 1 - physical work; 2 - craftsmanship; 3 - agriculture; 4 - industry; 5 - services; and, 6 - any work available); 21. Would you return home if you would resolve problems/issues for which you would have migrated (1 - yes; 2 - no; 3 - no if I find a good job; and, 4 - contingent on how I feel in the country that I would migrate)?


## **Statistical Analysis**


Regarding the willingness to migrate, 59% of respondents have answered yes, while 41% have answered no. Specifically, 58.8% of females and 59.4% of males have answered yes, while 41.2% of females and 40.6% of males have answered no. From a total of 500 respondents the average age was 20.6 years, where 68% of survey respondents were female, and 32% male students, (Graph 1, left panel). The estimated Pearson Chi-square value of 0.014 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.907 indicate that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub> (null hypothesis). The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of gender, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for males and females. Moreover, 60.0% of respondents living in a village and 57.8% of those living in cities would migrate, while 40% responded



negatively for the former, and 42.2% for the latter, (Graph 1, right panel). The estimated Pearson Chi-square value of 0.243 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.622 indicate that we must retain the  $H_0$ . The  $H_0$  states that responses related to migration propensity are independent of residence, i.e., responses are the same for respondents living in a village and city.


**Graph 1.** Relationship of migration with gender and residence.






Concerning employment status, data indicate that 17.4% of total respondents were employed, and 82.6% were unemployed. In contrast, 15.9% of respondents that would migrate were employed, and 84.1% unemployed, whilst 19.5% of respondents that would not migrate were employed, and 80.5% were unemployed, (Graph 2, left panel). Moreover, the estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 1.079 and the estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.299 indicates that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of employment, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for the employed and unemployed respondents.

Graph 2. Relationship of migration with employment and income.







The average monthly income for the sample respondents is EUR 400.09, respectively EUR 387.11 for those willing to migrate, and EUR 418.77 for those not willing to migrate, (Graph 2, right panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 0.014 and the estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.907 indicates that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of family income. Based on the test statistics

we may reject the H<sub>0</sub>, thus migration responses are not dependent on the level of family income. The average level of family income of the female respondents, EUR 387.9, is lower than the income of male respondents, EUR 425.9. Moreover, the average income for respondents living in the village was EUR 380.6, respectively EUR 423.0 for those living in cities.

Graph 3. Relationship of migration with marital status and parents' education.







From the total sample of respondents, 94.2% were not married, and 5.8% were married. In fact, 94.6% of the respondents that would migrate were not married, while 5.4% were married, whereas 93.7% of the respondents that would not migrate were not married, while 6.3% were married, (Graph 3, left panel). Furthermore, the estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 0.186 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.666 indicates that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of marital status, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for married and unmarried respondents.

Regarding the parents' education, the data indicate that 5.6% of fathers have completed elementary school, 45.0% high-school, 40.6% bachelor's degree, and 8.8% post-graduate degree. Alternatively, 28.8% of mothers have completed elementary school, 52.4% high-school, 15.2% bachelor's degree, and 3.6% post-graduate degree, (Graph 3, right panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 3.302 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.347 indicate that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of fathers' education, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for a given level of education of respondents' fathers. Likewise, the estimated value of Pearson Chisquare of 4.230 and the estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.238 indicates that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of mothers' education, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for a given level of education of respondents' mothers.



**Graph 4.** Destination of migrants and relatives abroad.







Concerning the destination country, (see Graph 4, left panel), the data reveals that 26.8% of respondents would prefer Germany as a country of destination, 34.6% Switzerland, 7.0% other Western European countries, 7.6% United Kingdom, 23.8% the United States & Canada, 0.8% a country in the East, and 8.0% in another country. Moreover, 23.5% of female respondents would prefer to migrate in Germany, 33.2% in Switzerland, 7.1% in other countries of Western Europe, 5.3% in the UK, 22.9% in the US & Canada, 0.3 in Eastern countries, and 9.1% in another country. Comparatively, 33.8% of male respondents would prefer to migrate in Germany, 37.5% in Switzerland, 6.9% in other countries of Western Europe, 12.5% in the UK, 25.6% in the US & Canada, 1.9% in the Eastern countries, and 5.6% in another country.

Correspondingly, 80.2% of respondents have relatives abroad, while 19.8% have no relatives abroad. Specifically, from the respondents willing to migrate, 81.4% have relatives and 18.6% have no relatives abroad, whereas from the respondents not willing to migrate 78.5% have relatives and 21.5% have no relatives abroad, (Graph 4, right). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 0.605 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.437 indicate that we must retain the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of having relatives abroad, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that have or do not have relatives abroad.

**Graph 5.** Reasons for migration and languages that are spoken by respondents.





With respect to migration reasons, 7.2% may migrate for political reasons, 66.2% for economic, 0.6% for religious, 26.8% for cultural reasons, and 17.0% for security reasons. From respondents willing to migrate, 6.1% may migrate for political reasons, 73.9% for economic, 0.7% for religious, 33.6% for cultural reasons, and 19.7% for security reasons, whereas from respondents not willing to migrate, 8.8% may migrate for political reasons, 55.1% for economic, 0.5% for religious, 17.1% for cultural reasons, and 13.2% for security reasons, (Graph 5, left panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 19.057, respectively 16.757, and estimated asymptotic significance values of 0.000 for economic and cultural variables, indicate that we may reject the H<sub>0</sub> in favor of H<sub>1</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of economic, respectively cultural reasons, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for the respondents that have economic concerns, respectively cultural concerns, compared to the ones that do not have. The evidence suggests that, on average, the respondents with the presence of economic and cultural concerns have a higher propensity to migrate.

In contrast, in the case of political and religious reasons, the estimated value of Pearson Chisquare of 1.299, respectively 0.073, and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.254, respectively 0.787, indicate that we may not reject the H<sub>0</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of political, respectively religious reasons, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for the respondents that have political, respectively cultural concerns, compared to the ones that do not have. The evidence suggests that having political or religious reasons will not result in a statistically different propensity to migrate. Concerning security reasons, the estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 3.611 and the estimated asymptotic significance values of 0.057 indicates that we may just reject the H<sub>0</sub>, though this rejection is marginally above the limit of 5% level of significance (l.s.). The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of security concerns, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that have security concerns, compared to the ones that do not have. The data suggest that this is not the case.

The data shows that 0.4% of respondents speak no foreign language, 67.0% speak English, 4.2% German, 0.2% French, 2.6% other, 15.6% English & German, 2.4% English & French, 4.8% English & other, and 2.8% speak English, German & other language. In contrast, from those willing to migrate 0.3% speak no foreign language, 62.7% speak English, 5.8% German, 0% French, 2.4% other, 16.9% English & German, 3.4% English & French, 5.1% English & other, and 3.4% speak English, German & other language. Similarly, from those not willing to migrate 0.5% speak no foreign language, 73.2% speak English, 2.0% German, 0.5% French, 2.9% other, 13.7% English & German, 1.0% English & French, 4.4% English & other, and 2.0% speak English, German & other language, (Graph 5, right panel).





0%


Total

Yes

**Graph 6.** Perception of migration and the biggest challenges.

Female


Male




Another key point is that 2.4% of total respondents perceive migration as a risk, 56.6% view it as an opportunity, and 41.0% see it as both risk and opportunity. Correspondingly, 0.3% of pro-migration respondents perceive migration as a risk, 68.1% view it as an opportunity, and 31.5% see it as both risk and opportunity. In contrast, 5.4% of respondents not willing to migrate perceive migration as a risk, 40.0% view it as an opportunity, and 54.6% see it as both risk and opportunity. Moreover, 1.2% of female and 5.0% of male respondents perceive migration as a risk, 60.0% of female and 49.4% of male respondents view it as an opportunity, and 38.8% of female and 45.6% of male respondents see it as both risk and opportunity, (Graph 6, left panel). Also, the estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 45.404 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.000 indicate that we may reject the H<sub>0</sub> in favor of H<sub>1</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of perceptions of migration, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that view migration as risk, opportunity, or both risk & opportunity.

Concerning major challenges, 29.2% of total respondents view learning of foreign language as one of the biggest challenges for potential migrants, 27.0% the respect of law and regulations, 7.6% getting used with the food, 29.4% missing home, and 62.6% missing the family. In addition, 30.3% of female and 26.9 of male respondents view the learning of foreign language as one of the biggest challenges, 27.4% of female and 26.3% of male respondents view the respect of law and regulations, 6.8% of female and 9.4% of male respondents consider getting used with the food, 31.2% of female and 25.6% of male respondents missing home, and 63.5% of female and 60.6% of male respondents missing the family, (Graph 6, right panel). Additionally, the estimated values of Pearson Chi-square tests and values of asymptotic significance are not above, respectively under, critical levels, hence the H<sub>0</sub> stating that responses related to migration challenges are independent of gender may not be rejected in all the cases. The corresponding values of Pearson Chi-square tests and the values of asymptotic significance are 0.615 and 0.433 for language, 0.067 and 0.796 for law and regulations, 1.056 and 0.304 for food, 1.615 and 0.204 for missing home, and 0.392 and 0.531 for missing the family.

**Graph 7.** Unacceptable changes and migration perspective.





On the other side, 52.0% of total respondents view the change of religion as unacceptable, 33.2% renouncing Kosovo citizenship, and 36.0% marriage with a foreigner. Furthermore, 46.2% of female and 64.4% of male respondents view the change of religion as unacceptable, 32.9% of female and 33.8 of male respondents' view giving up of Kosovo citizenship, and 40.0% of female and 27.5 of male respondents' view marriage with a foreigner., (Graph 7, left panel). The H<sub>0</sub> for religion variable states that responses related to change of religion are independent of gender. The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 14.436 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.000 indicate that we must reject the H<sub>0</sub>. On average, female respondents are less likely to view the change of religion as unacceptable, compared to male counterparts. The H<sub>0</sub> for citizenship variable states that responses related to change of citizenship are independent of gender. The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 0.032 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.858 indicate that we may not reject the H<sub>0</sub>. On average, the female and male respondents are likely to view the change of citizenship as unacceptable in the same way. The H<sub>0</sub> for marriage with foreigner variable states that responses related to marriage with a foreigner are independent of gender. The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 7.378 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.007 indicate that we may reject the  $H_0$ . On average, female respondents are more likely to view marriage with a foreigner as unacceptable, compared to male counterparts.


With regards to migration perspective, 37.2% of respondents consider that people should migrate, 24.2% think that people should not migrate, and 38.6% believe that migration is an irrelevant issue. Specifically, 35.9% of female and 40% of male respondents consider that people should migrate, 24.1% of female and 24.4% of male respondents think that people should not migrate, and 40.0% of female and 35.6% of male respondents believe that migration is an irrelevant issue, (Graph 7, right panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chisquare of 86.719 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.000 indicate that we may reject the H<sub>0</sub> in favor of H<sub>1</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of respondents' perspectives on whether migration should occur, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for the respondents that are pro-migration, anti-migration, or indifferent. Hence, we may suggest that there is statistically significant evidence that migration responses are contingent on the migration perspectives of respondents.


Accordingly, 33.2% of respondents consider that migration should be stopped, 20.6% think it should be encouraged, and 46.2% believe that it is an irrelevant issue. Specifically, 33.2% of



female and 33.1% of male respondents think it should be stopped, 19.1% of female and 23.8% of male respondents think it should be encouraged, and 47.6% of female and 43.1% of male respondents believe that migration is an irrelevant issue, (Graph 8, left panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 43.353 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.000 indicate that we may reject the H<sub>0</sub> in favor of H<sub>1</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of the respondents' beliefs on migration, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that prefer to stop migration, to encourage migration, or those who think it is an irrelevant phenomenon. On the contrary, the significant value of test statistics suggests that responses related to migration are dependent on the respondents' beliefs on migration.


**Graph 8.** Stopping of migration and participation in formal or organized training






Unfortunately, only 16% of respondents have participated in a formal migration program or training, whereas 84% have not participated. Moreover, 14.1% of female and 20% of male respondents have participated, whereas 85.9% of female and 80% of male respondents have not participated in the relevant program, (Graph 8, right panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 0.039 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.843 indicate that we may not reject the H<sub>0</sub> in favor of H<sub>1</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of participation in formal training, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that have participated in the training, and those that have not. The evidence suggests that respondents' response is the same for those that have participated and those that have not participated in formal training.

**Graph 9.** Potential employment and returning home





Concerning the potential employment sector, only 2.0% of respondents willing to migrate would perform physical work, 25.0% in craftsmanship, 0.8% in agriculture, 17.2% in industry, 50.6% in the services sector, and 13.8% would do any work available. Secondly, 0.9% of female respondents willing to migrate would perform physical work, 23.8% in craftsmanship, 0.0% in agriculture, 16.5% in industry, 54.4% in the services sector, and 10.9% would do any work. Thirdly, 4.4% of male respondents willing to migrate would perform physical work, 27.5% in craftsmanship, 2.5% in agriculture, 18.8% in industry, 42.5% in the services sector, and 20.0% would perform any work available, (Graph 9, left panel).

Finally, on whether the respondents would return home if/when they resolve problems/issues for which they would have migrated, 43.8% answered yes, 9.9% no, 9.6% suggested no if they found a good job, and 36.7% responded that return is contingent on how they would feel in the country they will potentially migrate), (Graph 9, right panel). The estimated value of Pearson Chi-square of 75.740 and estimated asymptotic significance value of 0.000 indicate that we may reject the H<sub>0</sub> in favor of H<sub>1</sub>. The H<sub>0</sub> states that responses related to migration are independent of return variable, i.e., migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that prefer to return home, do not prefer to return, whose response is contingent on the quality of the job, and those whose response depends on how they feel in the migrating country. Therefore, the evidence suggests that there is a statistically significant difference related to how respondents view potential return to Kosovo. Next, we will provide a summarized analysis and offer some policy recommendations for relevant Kosovo institutions.

#### Conclusion

The literature review revealed that youth migration is a complex process induced by a combination of several push-pull migration factors. Concerning the willingness to migrate, 59% percent of respondents have answered yes, whereas 41% have answered no. Additionally, migration propensity responses are the same for respondents living in the village compared to those in the city. Furthermore, responses are the same for the employed and unemployed respondents as well. The responses related to migration are independent of income. The migration propensity responses are the same for married compared to unmarried respondents. The migration propensity responses are the same for a given level of education of respondents' fathers or mothers. The most preferred destinations are Germany, Switzerland, and North America. The migration propensity responses are the same for respondents that have or do not have relatives abroad. With regards to reasons, the respondents with economic, cultural, and security concerns have a higher propensity to migrate.

Moreover, the respondents' perception of migration as a risk, opportunity, or as both risk and opportunity, has a statistically significant impact on the willingness to migrate. Missing the family is considered a major challenge for respondents. On average, firstly, female respondents are less likely to view the change of religion as unacceptable, compared to male counterparts; secondly, the female and male respondents are likely to view the change of citizenship as unacceptable in the same way; and thirdly, female respondents are more likely to view marriage with foreigner as unacceptable, compared to male counterparts. The evidence suggests that there is a statistically significant difference related to how respondents perceive migration. Although the evidence suggests that respondents' response is not related to participation in formal migration training, it is very concerning that only 16% of



respondents have participated in the training. There are many concerns related to the migration of youth in the destination countries, such as being subject to potential formal and informal mechanisms of abuse, exploitation, inadequate application of labor protection laws and discrimination, denial of social security access, social exclusion, which may be misjudged or fully neglected ex-ante, though may become serious issues ex-post, once understood.

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